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Sic  utere tuo ut alienum non laedas 
ome is the ultimate refuge. For most of us, there is a need for a 
place where defenses can be down, where retreat can be had from 
both the offensiveness of others and offensiveness to others. And, for 
most of us, home is that place.' 
Regrettably this is less so every day. The inflow to urban areas, the 
cheapening of construction and the trend towards multi-family housing 
all have contributed to make being a t  home, for more and more 
people, an increasingly social encounter. No longer are the neighbors 
left behind a t  the street or front door. The neighbor's stereo, the dog 
that barks next door, the upstairs tenant's parquet floor-these are 
types of annoyances which can be with us all the time. And, at the 
same time, there is the plague of neighbors who complain that our own 
stereo, children, parties and activities are too loud or otherwise annoy- 
ing. Such are concomitants of modern urban life.2 
It is not suggested that these problems are new. Nor does the 
modern tendency to cram an increasing part of the population into 
high-density housing present any particularly unique new factors 
which in themselves would suggest the advisability of reexamining and 
reworking old solutions. The relevant factors which are new seem to 
be largely attitudinal: greater emphasis on tenant3 protection, espe- 
1. I t  would be nice to avoid the psycho-sociological thicket. However, people routinely engage 
in activities through which they seek as well as deprive others of noneconomic vnlues ((cg., 
psychic values). If the law is to rationally intervene in and regulate such activities, it must try, 
explicitly or a t  least implicitly, to take into account what these values rue. The present inquiry 
concerns the private creation of conduct norms for situations where the interplay of psychic or 
like noneconomic values and aims tends to predominate. Unhappily, mere questions of definition 
might bog down the discussion for all time. Nonetheless, a t  the minimum, an explicit statement 
can be made as to what the relevant values are asstrmed to be. That is all that any reference to 
alleged psycho-social values purports to do herein. 
2 .  Moreover, indications are that the segment of the population housed in multi-family or 
other non-detached housing will, by economic necessity, grow larger and larger as the per capitrt 
land area-particularly around desirable urban centers-continues to decline. One recent study. 
sponsored by three agencies of the federal government, has estimated that the cost of developing 
new housing on a non-detached plan can result in savings of up to 44 per cent compared 5viU1 the 
cost of single-family housing. See Real Estate Research Corp., The Costs of Sprawl: Executive 
Summary 3 (1974), reported in Time, Nov. 4, 1974, at 63. The capital cost figures could not of 
course take account of the noneconomic (psychic) cost of crowding, but the question remains open 
whether people can or will incur greater monetary outlays in order to avoid such non-cnsh costs. 
3. The discussion herein focuses on residential leasehold tenants. However, the problelns 
discussed are, on the whole, not problems unique to the landlord-tenant context as such but apply 
in the case of all multi-family housing. Thus, even though the multi-family housing in question 
may happen to be owner-occupied, as in the case of condominiums, the same sorts of problems 
may be expected. 
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cially in tight housing markets; a judicial wariness about supporting 
attempts a t  private oppression under the guise of freedom of contract; 
and a reconfirmation and bolstering of a policy of tolerance under 
which certain differences among people (e.g., racial or religious) must 
be tolerated and a growing feeling that other differences (e.g., "life- 
style'') should be. 
The present Article suggests that the problem of incompatible 
neighboring tenants can be most efficiently and "justly" dealt with by 
permitting a substantial degree of landlord control over tenant 
behavior-with the removal of offending tenants, at the landlord's 
instance, being the most effective sanction of ultimate recourse in the 
effectuation of such control. For some courts, ceding this power of 
control to landlords would require a measure of constraint which they 
may find uncustomary or even distasteful. As institutions charged with 
doing justice, the courts' instinct to intervene in the norm-creating 
process is undoubtedly great, even when the parties before the court 
have ostensibly agreed beforehand to the norms of behavior (and 
consequences of violation) which are to apply. Of course, such inter- 
vention is appropriate when the privately established norms or conse- 
quences contravene some articulable public policy, such as prohi- 
bitions on visits by members of racial minorities or incarceration of an 
offending tenant as a sanction. But the courts have not limited their 
second guessing on the propriety of agreed norms or sanctions to cases 
The question arises as to the extent to which the rules developed and being developed to xn ' e  
in the landlord-tenant context can be adapted to fill out a body of law on community assodations 
and the like. The case of cooperative ownership, which is landlord-tenant in form but oumer- 
occupant in common understanding, is an intermediate case. See Comment, Restrictions on the 
Use of Cooperative Apartment Property, 13 Hasting L.J. 357 (1962). The general tendency 
seems to be to treat the status of the cooperative tenant vis-2-vis the "lmdlord" according to more 
or less the same rules which obtain in ordinary landlord-tenant relationships. See, e.g., the 
analytical methodology in 1915 16th St. Co-op. h ' n  v. Pinkett, 85 A.2d 58 (D.C. hIun. Ct. 
App. 1951); Zamzok v. 650 Park Ave. Corp., 80 hZisc. 2d 573, 363 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1974); 
Justice Court Mut. Housing Cooperative, Inc. v. Sandow, 50 hiisc. 2d 541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829 
(Sup. Ct. 1966); 1 American Law of Property 8 3.10 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter d u d  as 
Am. L. Prop.]; 2 P. Rohan & hf. Reskin, Cooperative Housing La\\. and Practice 4 1.03 (1975); 
Note, Legal Characterization of the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment Realty or 
Personalty?, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 250 (1973). This treatment of cooperative arrangements may 
have interesting consequences, for example, the possibility that the person who is in effect the 
''owner" of an apartment can forfeit the right to possess the apartment See, e.g., 1915 16th St. 
Co-op. Ass'n v. Pinkett, supra; Green v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 232 Md. 496, 194 A.2d 273 
(1963). The economic pressure resulting from such a forfeiture may mean that the cooperative can 
force a cooperator to sell hi property in certain events-where the m m g m e n t  has gone 
sour--even though no express right to force such a sale is reserved. C o m p m  the trid court and 
appellate term opinions with the appellate term dissent in 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 65 h k .  2d 
776, 315 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 71 hlisc. 2d 359, 336 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. T.), 
rev'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972). 
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where the adverse effect on the tenant violates some clear public 
policy. In New York, for example, tenants have been allowed to 
physically attack their neighborsj4 gas themselves in the k i t ~ h e n , ~  keep 
accumulated garbage and "unhygienic" animals in their apartmentst6 
and play piano scales twelve hours per day7 without jeopardizing their 
possessory rights or losing the sympathy of the courts. Perhaps the 
courts in such cases ask themselves, "Where can these people go?" But 
where can their neighbors 
The essential concern should be how best to maximize the security 
and the utility of possession for urban residential tenants in a world 
where activities, habits, lifestyles and tolerances vary but where the 
emanations and by-products of each person's life activity will some- 
times unavoidably spill over, affecting the activities and tranquility of 
others. That is, for people whose respective activities and tranquility 
are not fully reconcilable (as long as they remain in physical proxim- 
ity), how can the burdens of dislocation be minimized, both by 
minimizing the likelihood that an "objectionable" tenant will be forced 
to move and at the same time minimizing the likelihood that a tenant's 
"objectionability" will leave his neighbors with no choice but to move 
or to suffer "unduly." 
Fundamentally, the problem is one of environmental regulation. 
And environmental regulation is itself a problem, broadly speaking, of 
nuisance. 
The effect of nuisance law is to limit each possessor in the use of his 
real property for the benefit of neighboring possessors. Thus, a posses- 
sor of land, or of space in a building, cannot do with absolute 
justification all that he pleases with his premises, and this is true 
despite the fact that the possessor normally has exclusive use, enjoy- 
ment and control of his possession. There is no paradox here; it is 
4. Valley Courts, Inc. v. Newton, 47 Misc. 2d 1028, 263 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Syracuse City Ct. 
1965). 
5. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Moldoff, 187 Misc. 458, 63 N.Y.S.2d 385 (App. T.  1946), 
aff'd, 272 App. Div. 1039, 74 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1st Dep't 1947). 
6. Tmncali v. Kusstatscher, 61 Misc. 2d 500, 306 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). 
7. Twin Elm Management Corp. v. Banks, 181 Misc. 96,46 N.Y.S.2d 952 (N.Y. City hlun. 
Ct. 1943). 
8. In the recent case of Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 
N.W.2d 843 (1975), where the landlord was held responsible for offensive conduct caused by a 
tenant, the dissenting judge observed that imposing such responsibility on landlords will make it 
more difficult for "troublesome" tenants to find a place to rent. Id. at 420-21, 224 N.W.2d at 
855-56. 
On the other hand, the fact that "courts . . . 'make it impossible' to evict troublesome tenants" 
has been cited as a contributor to the abandonment of buildings, which has the effect of reducing 
the housing stock for all. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at  42, col. 2. 
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merely that the "premises" which a possessor exclusively controls 
cannot be defined simply as the volume enclosed by the premises' 
dimensions in space. 
It is a physical reality that one person's premises are other persons' 
environment, and vice versa. The overall environment, consisting of 
everybody's individual possessions, is thus a "common asset" belonging 
to all who are in physical proximity. This is particularly true when the 
premises involved are stacked, apartment upon apartment, into great 
monuments to the social instincts of urban mankind. 
Unlike space, which possessors may occupy on a separate and 
exclusive basis, the environment of neighboring possessors is not 
physically allocable. It is simply not susceptible to division into parcels 
whose owners have equal and corresponding rights of exclusive domin- 
ion and control: if any individual possessor is permitted to enjoy an 
absolute right of use, this will unavoidably result in a more limited 
right of use for the others. The spill-over from activities in one 
neighbor's space will impinge on the absolute utility of the space 
possessed by the  other^.^ If we are not to countenance unequal 
freedom to use the environment (whether achieved by right of law or 
by sheer power), then limitations upon the use of all-presumably for 
the maximum benefit of all-must be introduced.1° 
The traditional law of private nuisance is by no means the only 
source of such limitations on the use of the commonly owned environ- 
ment. To remedy situations not effectively dealt with by the law of 
private nuisance, a number of other legal devices (e.g., zoning codes, 
9. For example, an apartment building environment cannot be used as a quiet surrounding at 
the same time that it is used as a place to engage in a noisy activity. Either the noisy neighbor 
must cease his sound-generating activity or the quiet-seeking neighbor must c w e  his use of the 
environment as a place of quiet. Either way, one of the incompatible uses will be impossible and 
the person who is forced to yield will be limited in hi freedom to use. 
10. An analogy may be drawn between the environment of a multi-tenant building and 
running water in its natural state, a more traditionally recognized "common asset" Like running 
water, such an environment is not publici juris (commonly owned) in the sense that it is bonum 
vacens which anyone may appropriate by merely asserting control (e.g., by filling the environ- 
ment with noise). Rather, like running water, it is publici juris only in the sense that all may 
make "reasonable" use of it who have a right of access to it. See note 260 infra. See also hfcBr).de 
Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 193-98, 504 P.2d 1330, 134244 (19731, cert. denied, 417 
U.S. 976 (1974); Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585 (Ex. 1851); h b o n  v. Hill, 110 Eng. 
Rep. 692, 700-02 (K.B. 1833); 3 Kent's Commentaries 439 (12th ed. 1896). Undu the law of 
nuisance, absent private agreements concerning use (or in the event of their unenforcdility), 
specific norms regulating the use of the environment, as in the case of running water, will tidie 
the form of refinements upon the meaning of the term "reasonable" as used in the preceding 
sentence. See note 260 infm Ho\vever, as with running trpater. the rights of and limibtions upon 
competing users of an environment ought to be modifiable and thus regulatable by mutual 
agreement. Such agreements are the mechanism for regulation discussed in this Article. 
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land use regulations) have been resorted to, generally involving public 
intervention to effectuate local environmental control. Although the 
limitations on use imposed by such devices are couched in terms of 
restrictions upon the use of individual possessions, they are in fact, like 
the law of private nuisance, environmental regulations. This Article 
will attempt an analytical examination of a method for achieving this 
environmental regulation privately, a method which has a conceptual 
basis at least as old as the defeasible estates in land." 
11. SOURCE O F  A N D  MOTIVATIONS F O R  LANDLORDS' 
POWER TO CONTROL TENANT CONDUCT 
If one were to approach this topic with something of a historical 
bent, one might well begin with the traditional power of the feudal 
barons: exercising control through their manorial courts, the lords of 
yore could impose their will, nearly without limitation, upon the 
assorted villeins within their demesnes.12 Indeed, were one to ap- 
11. I t  will be seen that this private mode of environmental regulation has been accorded a less 
than warm reception by the courts. Perhaps the coolness of the courts' reception is directly related 
to the very ancientness of its conceptual underpinnings. See discussion in note 13 infra. NU~ough 
transferors of land have long been able to control the transferee's use of the land, the exercise of 
such power to achieve desired environmental goals is apparently a comparatively recent phenom- 
enon. See Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates, 18 Iowa L. Rev. 425, 441 (1933). 
Prior to the mid or late nineteenth century, it would probably be difficult or impossible to find 
examples of transferor-imposed land use controls that were not aimed solely a t  achieving some 
purpose (economic or otherwise) of the transferor himself. See id.; cf. First Universalist Soc'y v. 
Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892) (to assure fulfillment of purpose of tmnsfer); Lovnt v. 
Ranelagh, 35 Eng. Rep. 388 (Ch. 1814) (repairs, mode of cultivation); Descarlett v. Dennett, 88 
Eng. Rep. 290 (Ch. 1722) (not to suffer a way across the land). For a more recent example, see 
Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958). 
In  any event, prior to the advent of widespread subdivision-type land development, viz., the 
parceling out of land (or space in a building) to a number of transferees who take from a common, 
entrepreneurial transferor, it is unlikely that environmental regulation for the benefit of tmns- 
ferees was an important motivating factor in the creation of defeasible estates. However, the 
adaptation of the defeasible estate device to private land use planning for the benefit of the 
transferees (especially in the landlord-tenant context) has seemingly not triggered a reevaluation 
and modification of the basic rules pertaining to that device. But cf. Goldstein, Rights of Entry 
and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 248, 250 
(1940); Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Conditions Subsequent and Determinable 
Fees, 27 Texas L. Rev. 158 (1948). However, where such adaptation has occurred, two mnjor 
assumptions underlying those rules (that the transfer creates no continuing relation and that the 
transferor is merely benefiting himself as against the transferee) are not necessarily applicable. 
Moreover, the hostile attitudes of courts toward private land use restrictions themselves (see notes 
23-25 infra), stemming from a time when land was relatively underdeveloped and its usefulness 
for all purposes was to be encouraged, continued to carry influence in situations where, in light of 
modem ideas about land use planning, their appropriateness is doubtful. 
12. Nonetheless, even in the manorial courts, the practice appears to have been a good deal 
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proach this topic with an unsympathetically critical bent, this would 
be the ideal place to begin. For the application of feudal institutions to 
the modern situation has become something of a prima facie cause for 
condemnation, especially in the landlord-tenant area. l3  And a feudal 
institution which smacks of fealty, of innately ascribed status and of 
tutelage for adult individuals seems clearly out of place in a time when 
pledges of allegiance to private persons (or almost any oaths at  all, it 
sometimes seems) are regarded as quaint curiosities of a more primitive 
era. 
To be sure, the efforts of a modern apartment owner to control 
tenant conduct could not be justified by arguing that the landlord, as 
successor to the feudal lord, is a quasi-representative of the state, 
charged with assisting the administration of justice and harmony. In 
an egalitarian society, it is generally only the state itself, acting 
constitutionally through its legislative, judicial and administrative 
organs, which should be allowed to unilaterally impose conduct stan- 
dards on others.14 As one court has reacted: "A landlord may not 
more democratic than seems sometimes to be assumed. See I1 W. Holdsworth, A History of 
English Law 375-85 (3d ed. 1927). 
13. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C Cir.1, cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp.. 71 hlisc. 2d 
353, 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873-74 (App. T. 1972); Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant 
Act 5 1.102, Comment [hereinafter ated as URLTA]; 1 Am. L. Prop.. supra note 3. 5 3.47; 
Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with 
Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 225 (1969). 
Criticizing a legal principle because it has received long-standing recognition seuns itself to be 
a fairly long-standing tradition of the common law. E.g., the attack on the Rule in Shelley's Case 
reported in Van Grutten v. Foxwell [I8971 A.C. 658, 669 (H.L.) ("Its feudal origin was a 
disgrace. Its antiquity was a reproach. Some judges thought that on those grounds it ought to be 
'discountenanced."'). The mindless adherence to old ~ l e s ,  without their reexamination, is 
undoubtedly to be reproached. For even though the old law "is fun for the antiquarian and 
profitable for the lawyer . . . society pays a high price for these dubious benefits." Merr)man, 
Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by Lawson), 18  Tul. L. Rev. 916,945 (1974). Still, 
to reject the old law for its antiquity alone may be less a mark of modernity than a substitute for 
thought. 
14. Not that the idea of private delegates to enforce state policies is entirely dead. The 
"private attorney generals" entitled to recover treble (i.e., "punitive") damages for criminal 
violations of the antitrust laws is a well-known instance. 15 U.S.C. 5 15 (1970). Undcr the recent 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 55 2510-20 (19701, private 
atizens in civil actions may recover liquidated and punitive damages (amounting to a avil  fine) 
from violators of the Act's criminal prohibitions on wiretapping. 18 U.S.C. 5 2520 (1970). It is to 
be observed, however, that in both of these instances, the standards of conduct thunsclves arc 
precisely prescribed by the state and only the enforcement decision is delegated (and that only in 
Part). 
For a case where private prescription of the standards themselves has been oflicially 
sanctioned, consider the broad power which the national securities exchanges had (until 1975) to 
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constitute himself a censor of the personal tastes, choice of friends or 
preferences in interior decoration of his tenant . . . . ,,IS 
But the unilateral imposition of conduct norms by extra- 
constitutional centers of authority is not exactly what is at issue. To 
the extent that a modern landlord does have any power to prescribe or 
enforce norms of tenant conduct, the source of that power is ostensibly 
the lease by which the legal relationship between landlord and tenant 
was established. The detailed rights and duties within a landlord- 
tenant relationship, including the duties and limitations on rights 
assumed by the tenant, can only exist (except where implied by law) by 
virtue of the parties' mutual agreement to them. It is this mutual 
agreement, or more specifically the presence therein of either a provi- 
sion for the norms or a stipulation of them, that is the basis for the 
adopt and enforce rules applicable to their members under section 6(c) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 886. Perhaps this last power is more accurately analogized to Ule 
power of feudal lords to privately exercise public jurisdiction pursuant to special grants from the 
King, who once could liberally "franchise" out judicial jurisdiction like Kentucky Fried Chicken 
stands. See G. Adams, Council and Courts in Anglo-Norman England 153-54 (1926). 
For an insightful discussion on how private unilaterally imposed norms may gnin validity, see 
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Hnrv. L. 
Rev. 529 (1971). 
15. Moss v. Hirshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 405, 303 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 
1969). The court went on to concede that an exception would exist for cases where the tenant's 
tastes or preferences would "result in a willful violation of a substantial obligation of the tenancy 
inflicting serious and substantial injury upon the landlord." Id. 
A somewhat related set of problems is presented by attempts of employers to fix and enforce 
conduct standards to be observed by their employees. For an excellent discussion, see Blades, 
Employment at  Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer 
Power, 67 Cofum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blades]. Even though Professor 
Blades concedes that "the employee can never expect to be completely free to do as he pleases" 
and that the employer may even be "legitimately concerned with . . . the 'off hours' behavior of 
the employee" (id. a t  1406), the unilateral imposition of conduct, especially lifestyle constrnints by 
employers seems more difficult to swallow philosophically than similar impositions by Iandlords. 
There are at  least two major distinctions. 
Fiat ,  the employer's main interest is in productivity; it is harder to see, at least in the absence 
ofepecial circumstances, how employer imposed constraints would be germane to the employer's 
legitimate (i.e., understandable) interests in the employment relationship, except only such 
restraints, such as sobriety on the job, which directly affect productivity. Lnndlords, by contrnst, 
have an important continuing interest in the character of their buildings; that character (physical 
or reputational), which is directly affected by tenant conduct, can be protected only by limitations 
on such conduct. 
Secondly, the employer-employee relationship seldom involves any substantial interest of third 
parties (such as other tenants) whose concerns can be efficiently protected only by more or less 
centrally sourced constraints. If, as is probably true, tenants cannot as a procedural matter 
negotiate for conduct constraints on a mutual basis among themselves, the appropriateness of 
some sort of central source may be indicated. 
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modem landlord's power to prescribe and enforce.16 Thus, the issue 
resolves itself not to whether a landlord may validly impose conduct 
norms on the tenant unilaterally; rather the question is whether certain 
particulars of a consensually assumed arrangement are to be enforced. 
As a prelude to considering this question, it may be helpful to make 
explicit the legal background against which landlords seek to prescribe 
restrictions on tenant conduct. A leasing transaction is a voluntary 
legal transaction by which both landlord and tenant deliberately 
undertake to modify their respective preexisting endowments of rights 
and obligations. The result is a new legal relationship, with new rights 
and new obligations created between the parties.'' Few of the details 
of this legal relationship--of the specific rights and duties acquired by 
each party respectively-need be expressly agreed to between them. 
Once the parties manifest the minimum of agreement which is required 
to change their legal positions to those of landlord and tenant,18 the 
16. The adhesive character of lease forms typically used in routine lensing transactions 
appears to be at odds with the assumption that there is any L'mutual" agreement with respect to 
many, if not most, matters covered in the lease-tenant conduct restrictions included. Admit- 
tedly, lease agreements are often not the freely negotiated tmnsactions presuppmed by thc id& of 
freedom of contract. Moreover, if prospective tenants have no reitlistic choice but to accept 
whatever terms the landlord offers, any conduct standard contained in such a "toke-it-or-lmve-itn 
lease must be considered in a sense to be "unilaterally" imposed (unless, of course, the tenant 
would have agreed to the standards even if the transaction were freely negotiatd). Under 
?ucurnstancei where conduct restrictions are "unilaterally" imposed in this sense (and if them is n 
housing shortage or if landlords uniformly adhere to standard l w e  forms, such arcurnstances 
may be tipical), the "unilateral" imposition of conduct norms by extr-canstitutiond centers of 
authority is a t  issue. And the issue goes to the question of the validity of the restrictions as 
"privat6 legislation." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); 
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 
629 (1943); Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 130 (1962). 
However, the question of whether the adhesive nature of leases ought to affect heir enforceability 
as "consensual" transactions is separate from the question of whether even willingly 
conduct restrictions ought to be enforced. Accordingly, for clarity of exposition, the appropriate- 
ness of enforcing "adhesive" lease terms will be considered sepi-irately. See section DI(D](l)(a) 
infra. 
17. In addition, consonant with the theory that the tenant acquires an estate in rem, the l e d  
posture of both the landlord and the tenant vis-5-vis the rest of the world is modified, the 
landlord having conveyed to the tenant the rights and protections which the landlord had 
formerly enjoyed as possessor. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.38; 1 H. T i a n y ,  Red  Property 
8 94 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as Tiffany]. Since the focus of the present discussion is on the 
legal relationship between landlord and tenant, the effect of leasing on the in rem rights of the 
parties is only tangentially relevant 
18. Presumably, all that need be actually agreed (expressly or impliedly) between the parties 
is that the tenant should take possession of land or space which the landlord possesses andlor over 
which the latter exercises appropriate dispositive control. See 1 Tiffany, supra note 17, 5 157. 
Without an agreement as to duration, a tenancy so created mould be "at v,<U." Id.; 1 Am. L. 
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law will take care of the rest, supplying necessary specific terms to 
round out the new legal relationship. Moreover, where the parties do 
agree to specific details (e.g., that rent shall be paid monthly), but fail 
to do so completely (e.g., by failing to specify the time or place of 
payment), the law fills in the gaps.19 On the other hand, with the 
notable exception of certain statutory protections which the parties are 
not free to waive con t r a~ tua l ly ,~~  the law-implied "terms" of a lease 
are almost never mandatory and almost always yield to a contrary 
agreement of the parties.21 I t  is to the creation and expression of such 
contrary agreements on many particulars, generally to the advantage 
of the landlord, that a substantial part of a routine form lease is 
devoted. 22 
Among the lease provisions intended to reduce the rights of the 
tenant are provisions which impose restrictions on the tenant's conduct 
or, more generally, which restrict the tenant in his use of the premises. 
In the absence of such conduct or use restrictions, "[tlhe right to 
exclusive occupation granted by a lease entitles a tenant to use the 
premises in the same manner that the owner might have used 
Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.29. Whether the tenant must actually take possession before the 
relationship comes into existence depends on the local attitude townrds the now genernlly 
outmoded concept of "interesse termini." See C. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real 
Property 67, 166-67 (1962). 
19. For example, law-implied terms would make the place of payment at the dcmiscd 
premises and would make the rent payable in arrears. See Klinger v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 373, 378 
(Alas. 1971); 3A G. Thompson, Real Property 5 1297, at 440-41 (J. Grimes ed. 1959) [hereindter 
cited as Thompson]; 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenan: $5 555, 562 (1970). 
20. An important recent example is the extensive tenant protections proposed by the Uniform 
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act which would prohibit any provision in a "rentnl ngreement" 
by which the tenant "agrees to waive or forego rights or remedies under this Act." URLTA, supra 
note 13, 5 1.403. See also, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. 5 521-31 (Supp. 1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
5 59.18.230 (Supp. 1976). However, older nonwaivable tenant protective legislation may be citcd. 
See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5 7-103(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. Real Prop. Law 5 254 
(McKinney Supp. 1975). In addition, courts occasionally have held that judicially created "terms" 
which are to be read into leases cannot be waived by contrary stipulation. See, e.g., Javins v. 
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) 
(implied warranty of habitability based on Housing Regulations). 
21. See M. Karam & Sons Mercantile Co. v. Serrano, 51 Ariz. 397, 77 P.2d 447 (1938); Bovin 
v. Galitzka, 250 N.Y. 228, 165 N.E. 273 (1929) ("absolute right" to insert provisions different 
from law-supplied rule); 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant 5 141 (1970). 
22. Expressing "agreements to the contrary" is not, of course, the sole function of form lenses 
in common use. In fact, one commentator has observed that a large part of a typical current form 
does no more than restate legal rules (usually those favoring the landlord) which would be 
applicable to the parties' relationship even without any recitation of them in the lense. Bergcr, 
Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 791, 829 (1974) bereinafter cited ns Bcrger]. 
23. Lyon v. Bethlehem Eng'r Corp., 253 N.Y. 111, 113, 170 N.E. 512, 513 (1930); nccord, 
Davidson v. Goldstein, 58 Cal. App. 2d 909, 136 P.2d 665 (Super. Ct. 1943); Turman v. Snfcway 
Stores, Inc., 132 Mont. 273, 317 P.2d 302 (1957); People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 258 
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As between the tenant and the landlord specifically, only the require- 
ment that the tenant refrain from committing or suffering wastet4 
qualifies the general right of use and enjoyment which the tenant 
presumptively acquires at  common law as the possessor of the demised 
premises.25 Of course, the doctrine of waste does not represent the only 
law-imposed constraint on the tenant's freedom to use and enjoy the 
demised premises; with particular reference to conduct which may 
affect the persons or property of others in the vicinity of the demised 
premises, the law of private nuisance, the duty to exercise ordinary 
care and, indeed, the law of torts generally may be thought of as 
- - 
limiting factors. 
Presumably, the law of torts reflects the societally determined desir- 
able balance between protecting activities and protecting others from 
the impact of a c t i v i t i e~ .~~  As a matter of administrative necessity, the 
N.E.2d 206, 208, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919, 923 (1970); Bovin v. Gditzka, 250 N.Y. 228. 165 N.E. 273 
(1929); 1 T i a n y ,  supra note 17, 8 94. Even where the I w e  does contain u-w restrictions. the 
tendency is to construe them strictly against the landlord, freely permitting "incidental uses," in 
order not to inhibit any utilization of the premises not dearly prohibited by the lease itself. E-g.. 
Beck v. Giordano, 144 Colo. 372, 356 P.2d 264 (1960); Delta Wild L i e  8: Forestq, Inc. v Bear 
Kelso Plantation, Inc., 281 So. 2d 683 (hfiss. 1973); Boyd v. Shell Oil Co., 454 Pa. 3i4, 311 A.2d 
616 (1973); Oakwood SmoMess Coal Corp. v. hledows, 184 Va 168, 34 S.E.2d 392 (1945). But 
see 30-88 Steinway S t ,  Inc. v. Bohack Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 577. 344 N.Y.S.2d 205 (2d Dep't 
1973). 
24. Even this inroad on the leasehold tenant's general right of use and enjoyment is of 
statutory origin. Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. S (1278). repealed, Civ. P. Acts, Reped Act, 
42 & 43 Vict., c. 59 (1879); Statute of hlarlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23, § 2 (1927); see 5 R. Po~sell, 
Real Property TI 637 (1975)- [hereinafter cited as Po~vell]. In some states, reenactmen& of Lhse 
early statutes (or variations thereof) still supply a basis for relief in cases of \saste (see. e.g.. 
Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 28 N.J. 316, 146 A.2d 458 (1958); Potvell. supra a! F 650) but descendants 
of the common law action on the case "in the nature of \~.35te'' and parallel equitable doctrines 
provide additional nonstatutory bases for remedies in waste cases (Powell, supra at $7 637, bll. 
650). For a discussion of the availability of the forfeiture remedy for traste. .see note 115 infn. 
25. In addition to the waste limitation on the tenant's general right of use and enjoyment. 
courts have also recognized an implied obligation on the tenant not to put the premises to a use 
which is materially different from that for which they were constructed, or to which they have 
been adapted and usually appropriated. See, e.g., Rivera v. Lacrosse, 490 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 
1974); F.W. \Voolworth Co. v. Nelson, 204 hla l72,8S So. 449 (1920); Gale v. bfcCuUough, 118 
Md. 287, 84 A. 469 (1912); Lyon v. Bethlehem Eng'r Corp., 253 N.Y. 111, 170 N.E. 512 (193CQ. 
However, thii sort of implied restriction-which seems a reasonable enough candidate for a 
covenant implied in fact under appropriate circumstances-appears to receive more lip service 
than it does reliance as an operative basis for actually curtailing tenant freedom. The courts' 
reluctance, in the absence of waste, to prohibit any lawful uses against which the I w e  does not 
expressly provide reflects, no doubt, the attitude of hostility towards limitations on the g e n d  
possessory right See Saad v. Hatfield, 258 Ky. 525, 80 S.W.2d 583 (1935); Turman v. Slllervay 
Stores, Inc., 132 Mont. 273, 317 P.2d 302 (1957); Carbon Fuel Co. v. Gregory, 131 W. Va. 494. 
48 S.E.2d 338 (1948). See also note 23 supra. 
26. Actually, it is not critical to the analysis to make any assumptions about the policy 
objectives of tort law, and the assumption made in the text may be considered as only 
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balance must be struck on the basis of generalized assumptions con- 
cerning the values of "ordinary" persons acting in "normal" factual 
contexts and what would constitute "justice" for such persons and 
contexts.27 The conduct standards implied by such generalized as- 
sumptions are expressed in terms of generalized duties of conduct, 
owed to generalized but limited classes of protected persons, with 
remedies of general application for their breach. 
Undoubtedly, the generalized societally determined balance between 
protecting activities and protecting others from the impacts of ac- 
tivities, and the duties implicit in such balance, will not precisely fit 
every particular case. The law's protection may be unsatisfactory 
because the law defines the protected class too narrowly (standing2", 
because its remedies are i n a d e q ~ a t e , ~ ~  because its formulations of the 
standards are too subjective to permit easy proofj30 or because its 
behavioral requirements fail to protect "special" concerns not shared 
by the "ordinary" person contemplated in making the generalized 
 assumption^.^' Thus, the law-imposed duties, remedies, formulations 
and behavioral requirements will not, in every particular case, repli- 
cate the ones which the parties themselves would have established had 
they been free to negotiate the rules governing their prospective 
interactions. This is no less true in the landlord-tenant context than in 
any other. The landlord may be willing to relinquish some of his 
law-conferred protections (e.g., protection from waste) in order to 
obtain something in exchange (e.g., a higher rent, a longer lease term 
or a tenant-financed improvement). The landlord will presumably be 
willing to do so when the benefit received in exchange is worth more to 
the landlord than the rights relinquished. The tenant may likewise 
prefer to have certain benefits which the law does not confer, and he 
may be willing to give up in lieu thereof certain other benefits which 
he would normally have as a matter of law. Indeed, since leasing 
provisional. As will be developed infra, the important point is that, whntever the objectives of 
tort law, it is a dissatisfaction with the protections afforded by law that prompts private 
agreements which purport to limit or expand the scope of a person's lawful activities or conduct 
and the consequences of transgressions. 
27. Just as no assumptions need be made about the policy objectives of tort Inw, no 
assumptions need be made about what constitutes "justice" or the criteria therefor. Clenrly, the 
question is more complicated than a judgment of what constitutes "fairness" or "Pareto optimnl- 
ity" in particular cases, if for no other reason than that such judgments are almost neccssnrily 
imperfect. For further discussion, see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1093-1105 (1972). 
28. See section III(A)(2) infra. 
29. See section III(B)(I) infra. 
30. See section III(C) infra. 
31. See section III(D)(l) infra. 
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transactions are simply devices for allocating the value and potential 
benefits of land use, the particular requirements of the participants in 
such transactions are likely to be as diverse as the uses to which real 
estate may be put. Accordingly, it is most unlikely in the landlord- 
tenant context that the general tort law norms ( i -e. ,  the generalized 
societally determined balance between protecting activities and pro- 
tecting from activities) will perfectly parallel the balance which the 
parties probably would (if they could) privately negotiate. 
It is no reproach to the substantive law of torts that private 
agreements are necessary in order to align the rights and duties of 
particular persons in accordance with the balance which, for their 
particular interactions, is mutually optimal. In the first place, as a 
prescription of norms, duties and remedies having general application, 
the law of torts could not be otherwise. Moreover, apart from such 
administrative concerns, there may be valid policy objectives--e.g., 
wealth distribution, paternalism or concerns about transaction costs 
and nontransactionable external "costs'1-which may lead to tort rules 
that depart deliberately from the rules likely to be established in 
private  negotiation^.^^ For these reasons, the societally determined 
balance will almost always be imperfect, often leading parties to seek 
desired freedoms or protections in exchange for less valued freedoms or 
protections which the law would otherwise provide. I t  is against this 
background that the question is raised whether such exchanges should 
be permissible and enforced. 
m. TYPES OF AGREEMENTS WHICH INCREASE THE 
LANDLORD'S CONTROL OF TENANT CONDUCT 
Out of dissatisfaction with the protections provided by law, land- 
lords may rationally attempt to improve their protection via private 
agreements with tenants. As observed in the preceding section, this 
dissatisfaction may relate to either the duties, remedies, formulations 
or behavior requirements which the law supplies.33 Thus, there are at  
least four distinct ways in which such private agreements may supply 
protections greater than those which the law provides: 
1. By conferring standing to complain of conduct (e.g., illegal use 
of the premises) which is unlawful, but which is not normally remedi- 
able at the instance of the landlord; 
2. By prescribing a remedy (e.g., forfeiture) which the law does not 
provide; 
32. Calabresi & blelamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabilit).: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1098-1105, 1113-15 (1972). 
33. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra. 
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3. By stipulating objective standards of conduct which are more 
susceptible to determinations of noncompliance and hence more readily 
enforceable than the vague and relativistic standards of tort law; 
4. By protecting "special" concerns which might be described as 
idiosyncratic but nonetheless understandable. These may either be 
concerns of the landlord in his own right or they may be derivative 
concerns, affecting the landlord mainly in that he is interested in 
promoting the comfort and convenience of the greatest number of 
tenants. 
These four ways of increasing available protections are listed in 
ascending order of their implications for tenant freedom. Indeed, the 
first and second methods (obtaining standing or a remedy) and proba- 
bly the third (avoidance of tort law vagueness) involve no theoretical 
reduction of tenant freedom at  all. They are directed rather at supple- 
menting or streamlining the mechanism for enforcing constraints on 
tenant freedom which the law would impose anyway. Nevertheless, d l  
four possibilities are hostile to the general possessory right of free use 
and enjoyment which the law favors.34 The inhibiting effect which 
better enforcement possibilities have on conduct means that tenant 
freedom is likely, as a practical matter, to be impaired irrespective of 
how the increased protections are achieved. And, in any case, the 
conduct-related provisions in a given lease are likely to be mixed, 
containing elements from all four categories. Still, it is useful analyti- 
cally to break down and separately treat the four categories of methods 
for increasing landlords' control: each offers its own justifications in 
support of enforcement .of conduct-related lease provisions and each 
has its own implications for the withholding of enforcement. 
A. Standing 
1. Reasons for Allowing the Landlord Standing to Complain 
Nearly always, when a landlord seeks to control tenant behavior, he 
does so in reliance upon lease  provision^^^ authorizing the landlord to 
move in controversies that are essentially controversies between ten- 
ants. The question of standing comes down to whether and with what 
limitations recognition should be accorded the power to intervene 
which such provisions purport to confer.36 
34. See notes 23 & 25 supra. 
35. For a discussion of possible exceptional situations, where the landlord may move without 
the benefit of such lease provisions, see text accompanying notes 61-78, 115-16 infra. 
36. This issue is approached as something of an original question even though there is no real 
question of law as to whether a landlord may validly acquire standing by contract to enforce use 
and enjoyment restrictions against tenants. E.g., Miles v. Laurnine, 99 Gn. 402, 27 S.E. 739 
(1896); Bovin v. Galitzka, 250 N.Y. 228, 165 N.E. 273 (1929); see 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 
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The antagonisms which arise among tenants in close prosimity 
receive judicial attention, if not as criminal proceedings, then probably 
as legal proceedings by the landlord against a tenant who is alleged to 
have violated one or another provision of his lease. Controversies 
rooted in relations among tenants thus become cases between landlord 
and tenant.37 
It would not, of course, have to be so. If an offending tenant's 
activities unreasonably interfere with the neighboring tenants' enjoy- 
ment of their respective premises, the neighbors could maintain actions 
in their own rights for damages or injunction predicated upon the 
nuisance.38 The possibility even exists that tenants may rely on uni- 
$5 3.40, 3.94. For a discussion and collection of cases, see Annot., 2 A.L.R2d 1148 (1948). 
However, the reasons for the rule allowing standing so to be acquired, and the limitations on the 
rule which such reasons might suggest, receive little judicial discussion. Furthermore, doubts 
about the propriety of "free-enterprise" police powers for landlords may well be an unarticulattd 
influence in deciding particular cases against the landlord; and being unarticulated, such doubts 
may even cany the decision without any consideration, explicit or othertvise, of pmsible 
justifications for such policing. See quotation from hloss v. Hirshtritl, 60 X k .  2d 402. 303 
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969), in text accompanying note 15 supn.  
When landlords attempt to enforce restrictions on tenant conduct, the interest being asserted by 
the landlord is often factually derivative (see note 37 infr l ,  something which may obscure the 
real conflict-tenant vs. tenant-which the courts are asked to resolve. The very fact that the 
landlord may be held to have waived or estopped himself fr 1 ~sscrting a conduct restriction (see 
notes 52-53 infra), indicates that the courts do not always see the other tenants as the most direct 
henef~ciaries of the protection. 
In  any event, approaching the issue of standing for the landlord as an original question appears 
better suited to revealing the various policy considerations, both those which commend the rule 
that allows landlords to contract for standing and those which suggest limitations on the mle. 
37. It is not uncommon in reported cases to see specific references by the court to the fact l a !  
it was other tenants' complaints which prompted the landlord to bring proceedings against the 
breaching tenant. E.g., Modem Amusements, Inc. v. New Orleans Pub. Sen.., Inc.. 183 L;r. 
898, 165 So. 137 (1935); Bonan v. Sarni Original Dry Cleaners, Inc., 359 h h .  217, 2 6  N.E.2d 
366 (1971) (commercial lease); 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 
(1st Dep't 1972); Louisiana Leasing Co. v. Sokolow, 48 Mist. 2d 1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. 
City Civ. Ct. 1966); Valley Courts, Inc. v. Newton, 47 b&c. 2d 1028, 263 N.Y.S.2d 863 
(Syracuse City Ct. 1965). 
38. Leasehold tenants, like any holders of possessory interests in land, have standing to 
maintain actions based upon alleged nuisances which interfere with the use and enjoyment of 
such interests (e.g., Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122 (1969); Restatement sf 
Torts 5 823 (1939)), either to recover damages (e.g., Sherman v. Fall River Iron \\'orb Co.. &, 
Mass. (2 Allen) 524 (1861); Comes v. Harris, 1 N.Y. 223 (1848)). or to obtain an injunction (e.g., 
Martin v. Val-Lo-Will Sherman Co., 337 Ill. App. 166, 85 N.E.2d 358 (1949); Fox v. Corbitt, 
137 Tenn. 466, 194 S.W. 88 (1917); Grantham v. Gibson, 41 Wash. 125, 83 P. 14 (1905)). For 
citations to other cases, see Annot., 12  A.L.R.2d 1228-30 (1950). 
However, the imprecision with which two key elements of private nuisance (substantiality of 
harm and unreasonableness of activities) are defined (see note 260 infn) confronts prospective 
tenant-plaintiffs with practical problems of proof and advocacy which are. to say the least. 
formidable. This can especially be expected when the competing interests to be bdanced in 
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form use restrictions contained in their leases as a basis for direct 
actions against their fellow tenants to enjoin their inconsistent uses of 
the premises, by analogy to equitable servitudes created pursuant to a 
common scheme or plan.39 Yet, when the occupancy of a tenant 
becomes objectionable to the neighbors, i t  is often not (and probably 
usually not) the directly offended party who seeks protection at law; 
rather it is usually the landlord who moves.40 
nuisance cases are not even theoretically quantifiable, for example, the interests in personal 
comfort or convenience at home or the interest in canying on an activity a t  home. Cf. text 
accompanying notes 264-75 infra. Considering also that for the residential leasehold tennnt (I) 
litigation costs may easily exceed the value of the protection being sought, and (ii) it is relatively 
easy to leave a short-term leasehold, it is not surprising that nuisance nctions, tennnt vs. tennnt, 
brought by residential leasehold tenants are, if reported cases are any indication, practically 
nonexistent. 
39. The theory has been recognized in England (Newman v. Real Estate Debenture Corp., 
[I9401 1 All E.R. 131 (K.B. 1939); cf. Hudson v. Cripps [I8961 1 Ch. 265 (1895)) but its 
acceptability in this country remains a t  best an open question, and a doubtful one at that (see 
Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255 (1926). See also Stewart v. La~vson, 199 Mich. 
497, 165 N.W. 716(1917); K.G.O. Constr. Co. v. King, 12 N.J. Misc. 291, 171 A. 164 (Dist. Ct. 
1934); Sefton v. Juilliard, 46 Misc. 68, 91 N.Y.S. 348 (App. T. 1904); Beebe v. Tyra, 49 Wash. 
157, 94 P. 940 (1908)). For an argument that the theory should apply in the case of cooperatives, 
see Comment, Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment Property, 13 Hastings L.J. 357, 
364-66 (1962). Interestingly, however, the equitable servitude theory has been applied to lease 
covenants restricting competition. See Note, Lessors' Covenants Restricting Competition: 
Drafting Problems, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1400, 1408-11 (1950); Note, Restrictive Covenants in 
Shopping Center Leases, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 940, 940-44 (1959); cf. White Star Realty Co. v. 
Schreiber, 229 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); cf. Pekelner v. Park W. Management 
Corp. (Sup. Ct.), in 176 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1976, at  5, col. 3 (upholding damage action by tenant 
against landlord based on latter's failure to enforce restriction on piano playing by neighboring 
tenant). See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4, 7688 (1964). 
Form leases often will expressly deny tenants the power to take action against other tenants 
based upon lease-contained use restrictions. See Berger, supra note 22, at  825. However, this 
denial of enforcement power to tenants does not necessarily mean, as has been argued, that "tile 
inclusion of rules for tenant conduct must be inspired by something other than an interest in the 
peace and comfort of the tenants in the building." Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 
Colum. L. Rev. 836, 848-49 (1974). I t  may only mean that the landlord does not, by his conduct 
restrictions, want to give tenants still another weapon, legal action, with which they can harass 
each other. That is, the landlord, whose perspective in inter-tenant disputes may at Iewt be 
more dispassionate, wants to retain control of the sword which he has created. 
40. In background research for this Article, by far the majority of use restriction casa 
encountered involved proceedings, usually eviction proceedings, brought by landlords. Only 
rarely do tenants seem to bring (or at  least pursue to a reported decision) legal proceedings to 
protect their occupancy against the spill-over effects of a neighbor's activities. Tenant-instituted 
proceedings are not, however, unknown. See, e.g., Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 313 Mass. 
280, 47 N.E.2d 303 (1943); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 524 (1861); 
Bly v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 172 N.Y. 1, 64 N.E. 745 (1902); Zamzok v. 650 Park Ave. 
Corp., 80 Misc. 2d 573, 363 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (co-op tenant); Ryan v. Steele, 6 Misc. 
2d 370, 163 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Pool v. Higginson, 8 Daly 113 (N.Y.C.P. 1878), and 
for a collection of older cases, see Annot., 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 560 (1911). More often, though, it 
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The seeming preponderance of landlord-initiated proceedings in 
inter-tenant controversies suggests the presence of practical consid- 
erations which discourage tenants from taking action themselves. One 
can but speculate what those considerations may be, and quite proba- 
bly the considerations differ depending upon the use (viz . ,  residential, 
commercial, etc.) that the offended tenant makes of his premises. 
Nonetheless, at  least in the case of a residential tenant, a number of 
factors may be fairly confidently cited as contributors to the teridency 
to leave to the landlord the job of protecting tenants from each other: 
-Resources available to the landlord for maintaining legal procekd- 
ings against offending tenants will usually exceed those available to the 
offended complainants. Even if the costs of a proceeding were likely fo  
be about the same irrespective of who the moving party is, h e  
landlord would still usually be in a superior position to bear such costs. 
--Convenience of instituting proceedings is far more likely to be bh 
the side of the landlord than on the side of the offended tenant; the 
landlord probably already has an established relatidnship with ,an 
attorney, and both landlords and landlbrds' attdrneys are pre~uiiidbly 
better equipped by experience to bring the types df proceedings appro- 
priate for eliminating offensive tenant conduct. 
-Effectiveness of the Available Remedies to eliniiriate the offensive 
conduct is generally greater when the proceeping is brdught by the 
landlord insofar as the landlord's urtirilate (arid usu6l) recourse d l  be 
to assert his reserved power to terminate Ihe offeiidihg tenant's occu- 
pancy, a measure virtually certain to bring abolti the desired result 
(especially as compared with damages o k  iajunctive relief).41 
-Expeditioustzess of Available ~rocedziues also favors the landlord 
rather than the offended tenants, again irisofar as the landlord may 
terminate the offending tenant's ;occupancy and utilize a special sum- 
mary procedure,42 streamlined to give quick relief, to enforce such 
termination. The costs of such special proceedings are almost inevita- 
bly less than the costs of the full scale action at law or in equity which 
a tenant would have to maintain in order to obtain damages or 
injunctive relief. 
seems that tenants bring their complaints to the landlord for satisfaction (see, e.g., c s s  cited at 
note 37 supra), soEetiEm attempting to reinforce their complaints through self-help techniques 
which the law does dot rllithbrize. See, e.g., Thompson v. Harris, 9 iu iz .  App. 341,452 P.2d 122 
(1969) (rent withhol&iig); Katz v. Duffy, 261 hlass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927) (abandonment); 
Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Sugarman, 264 App. Div. 240, 35 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1st Dep't 
1942) (rescission). But cf. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.53 for a discussion of limited type9 of 
cases where a tehant may relieve himself of liability for rent on a constructive eviction theory. 
41. See section m(B)(l) infra. 
42. E.g., N.Y. Red Prop. Actions Law Art. 7 (hlcKinney 1963). 
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-Avoidance of Dificult Requirements of Proof is possible when the 
landlord proceeds insofar as the landlord may rely on violations of 
more or less objective conduct standards, articulated in the lease, as 
the basis for relief. A complaining tenant, on the other hand, generally 
must rely on relatively subjective tort analysis-e.g., in showing that 
his neighbor is committing a nuisance-involving both greater diffi- 
culty (and higher costs) of proof and less certainty of result,43 
-Interest i n  Eliminating the Annoyance is primarily the interest of 
the tenant; a t  best the landlord's interest is derivative, a t  least so long 
as the neighbors of the offensive tenant continue to pay their rent. 
However, the interest of the tenant in leased premises is always more 
transitory than the landlord's, and the tenant's financial stake in the 
premises is certainly less. When a tenant is annoyed, he may, far more 
realistically than the landlord, simply choose to leave. And given the 
cost burden of legal proceedings to abate an annoyance, to say nothing 
of the relative cost burden in light of the respective resources of 
landlord and tenant, the costs of moving to a new place will very likely 
make moving out the more cost-effective, and hence preferred, choice 
of residential leasehold tenants who are bothered by their neighbors.44 
43. See note 38 supra. 
44. The tendency of residential leasehold tenants to leave it to the lnndlord to move ngninst 
disturbing neighbors may also be a manifestation of the overall attitude and custom concerning 
"gross" lease arrangements in general, i.e., that almost all of the usual burdens nssocinted with 
deriving benefit from the real estate are, under a gross lease, left to the lnndlord. (By contrast, 
such burdens-including payments for insurance, taxes and repairs--are nssumed by the tenant 
under a so-called "net" lease.) Certainly, the residential gross lessee customnrily expects to hnve 
more things taken care of for him, from minor plumbing repairs to major structural renovntions, 
than does, say, the owner-occupant of a single family house. And the residential gross lessor 
expects to have to take care of these, or most of them, as a matter of custom and goodwill, if not 
as a matter of law. 
The nature of a multi-tenant structure necessarily reinforces the expectntion that the landlord 
will bear the burden with respect to major items or common facilities, for example, mdntennnce 
of elevators and supplying of heat. On the other hand, it may be questioned whether there is 
anything in physical or social reality which compels centralizing in the lnndlord much of the 
minor in-apartment maintenance responsibility which landlords in fact bear and which they nre 
expected (often in housing codes) to bear. 
If it is decided that landlords should bear these minor burdens which tenants could easily tnke 
care of themselves, it is probably because of the relative transiency of the leasehold tenant's 
interest compared with the landlord's "permanent" interest in the premises. In any case, if the 
custom-supported (or law-supported) tendency to "leave it to the landlord" becomes a hnbit, it 
can easily be seen how a tenant's first response to a disturbing neighbor will be to go to the 
landlord with the complaint, irrespective of the relative degrees of interest of lnndlord nnd tennnt 
in eliminating the annoyance. (Of course, once a "good" tenant complains of discomfort to the 
landlord, the landlord's interest in removing the disturbance, whatever that interest mny hnve 
been before, is suddenly enhanced.) 
Other reasons why tenants might take their complaints to the landlord are that the landlord 
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For whatever reasons, the fact is that tenants annoyed by their 
neighbors do not generally seem to resort for relief to legal proceedings; 
they will more likely seek "relief' by moving away, by informal 
pressure,45 or perhaps by simply habituating themselves to the an- 
noyance. But the fact that tenants seldom resort to legal proceedings 
for relief does not necessarily mean the perceived annoyances are not 
real, or irremediable, or not worth some trouble and expense in order 
to secure a remedy. It may mean only that the anticipated costs of 
obtaining judicial relief exceed either the value placed on being freed 
of the annoyance or the costs of an alternative solution, such as 
moving out. It is not hard to imagine that the anticipated burdens of a 
judicial remedy would usually exceed both of these; and this is 
especially so when one takes into account the magnifying effects which 
can result from uncertainty of outcome and lack of information about 
what would be involved in a lawsuit. 
The annoyance which neighboring tenants cause each other may 
thus represent a very considerable body of "submerged" costs which 
are almost always simply borne by those upon whom they initially fall 
and which are almost never shifted to those who, under applicable 
legal principles, ought to bear them.46 Unless there is some policy 
may seem more authoritative and that action by the landlord insulates the complainant from the 
discomfiture of direct confrontation with the objectionable neighbor. 
45. The effectiveness of what one commentator cdls "the socid force of neighborhood 
opinion" should not be entirely discounted. Note, Restrictive Regulations in Wisconsin Summer 
Colony Land Conveyances, i 9 5 0  Wis. L. Rev. 709, 710; see id. at  710-11. Obvio~slp, though, 
in the absence of empirical surveys, we can only make an impressionistic evaluation of the 
relative effectiveness and cost-efficiency of thii mechanism. No doubt the results will vary with, 
among other things, the possible variations in the mode of applying this 'social force." In the 
Note just cited, there was indication that in dealing with conscious violators it is helpful to h a w  a 
"focal point" for the application of the "social force," such ns a community sociat ion,  a common 
grantor or, one may assume, a landlord. Id. I t  was also observed that "many believe" a personal 
conference, in which "the nature of the restrictions is fully explained" to a prospective occupant, 
is the "best method to insure a minimum of trouble and unplensantness d ~ m d s . "  Id. at  711. 
Such a conference might serve not only an educative function but, probably even more 
significantly, a screening function as well. See Fuerst, Issues and Interpretntions, S Rcal Estate 
Rev. No. 1, at 10-11 (1975). 
46. This statement cannot be made without some assumptions about policy objectives that 
underlie or ought to underlie the "applicable legal principles." Several assumptions seem to be 
worthy of consideration. 
The first of these assumptions is that persons engaged in activities should, in general a t  l e~s t ,  
be caused to ultimately bear the "external costs" which result from the spill-over effects that such 
activities have upon neighboring premises. Accordingly, the occupants of the neighboring 
premises, who bear the burden of such spill-over effects in the first instance, should generally be 
able to shiit such cost-burden back to the person whose activities are the cause of the cost 
Put more specifically into the context of multi-tenant building, the assumption is that the 
space which is severally possessed by tenants in such buildings is not only allocated as to 
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reason for making the "wrong" people bear these costs, the possibility 
of indirect modes of shifting these costs, modes having greater cost- 
effectiveness, ought to be considered. Thus, the practical impediments 
which discourage tenants from themselves taking action against annoy- 
ing neighbors may be taken as a prima facie justification for giving 
landlords, who may act with great cost-effecti~eness,~' standing to 
take such action. 
entitlements to exclusive physical occupancv, but it is also allocated, in a more complicated way, 
as to entitlements to effectuate physical or psychological consequences. Each tenant entitled to 
occupy a portion of the building is unqualifiedly privileged (vis-Lvis the other tenants) to 
effectuate physical or psychological consequences within his exclusively occupied spnce. But no 
such tenant is unqualifiedly privileged to "use" the portions allocated to the occupancy of other 
tenarlts by engaging in activities that have spill-over effects creating burdens or costs, psychic or 
otherwise, which fall ultimately (recourselessly) upon the neighboring tenants. For a discussion 
supporting this assumption on economic grounds, see Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev.: Papers & Proceedings 347 (1967), reprinted in E. Furubotn & S. 
Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights 31 (1974); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
162 Sci. Digest 1243 (1968). This assumption is a recognition of the fact that the "environment" 
constituting a multi-tenant premises is in physical fact a common asset of all tenants. Sec notes 
9-10 supra and accompanying text. The use of this common asset, viz., the environment 
consisting of all neighboring premises, must be regulated to prevent its unequal appropriation by 
Any particular tenant. Absent such regulation of environment use, any tenant could act to assert 
ah absoluie right of use, placing a burden upon the environment disproportionate to his 
undivided, commonly shared, qualified right of use. 
This still leaves the problem of deciding which annoying tenant activities to tolerate, i.c., 
which spill-over effects will be permitted. A rational decision of this question, bused on a 
cost-behefit comparison (costs of annoying activities vs. the benefits thereof), will most likely be 
made only if the costs of the activities are ultimately borne by the persons engaging in the 
activities. 
I t  is assumed also that people will, if left to their own devices, act (individually or through 
transactions with others) to maximize the net benefits of their activities by reducing or shifting to 
others the costs, including opportunity costs, which are borne to obtain the benefits. Further, it is 
assumed that it is socially desirable to encourage the reduction (though not necessarily Uie 
shifting) of the costs of obtaining such benefits. 
However, the avoidance of costs itself involves costs (e.g., information, transaction, or 
analogous costs) and these "cost-avoidance" costs may themselves to a greater or lesser extent 
impede such cost reduction (and benefit maximization). Hence, the "applicable legnl principles" 
should be those calculated to minimize the impediment which such "cost-avoidance" costs may 
represent. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). (Presumably, there 
is no social goal of shifting wealth from nonannoying tenants to annoying ones; therefore, wealth 
distribution goals are irrelevant.) From these assumptions, it is submitted, one may proceed to the 
conclusion stated in the next two sentences of the text that, if giving tenants direct rights to relief 
is ineffective to achieve desirable cost-reductions, then giving an indirect (derivative) right to seek 
relief to landlords may be justified. 
47. The assumption that landlords can generally act with greater cost-effectiveness is critical 
to a determination that it is rational, and arguably that it is even desirable, to give landlords 
standing to act. The observations made in the text just preceding-that landlords may generally 
act more cheaply than t e n a n h i s ,  of course, directed a t  only one half the question of whether 
landlords can act with greater cost-effectiveness. The other half of the question is whether Ule 
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The justification is only prima facie. Its acceptance would have to 
be with all of the reservations which might be raised against allowing 
standing to persons other than real parties in interest.48 However, in 
the context of tenant conduct restrictions, the only pressing reservation 
would seem to be that the landlord, if he lacks a direct interest in the 
enforcement of the conduct restrictions, may exercise his enforcement 
benefits which are expected warrant the costs to the landlord of obtaining relief, and for this 
purpose it is only the beneftts which are expected by the landlord that arc d c v a n t  
The only direct benetits of terminating annoying tenant activities may be the bend~ts  which 
accrue to the neighboring tenants. The benefit to the landlord is u sudy  only indirect: contcnt- 
ment among existing tenants and attractiveness of his premises to prospective tenants. A 
discussion of whether these indirect benefits can, in themselves, supply a basis for standing 
follows in the next two sections. 
For present purposes, it is taken that landlords may indeed act with greater cost-effectiveness, 
as evidenced by the preponderance of landlord-initiated actions brought to enforce conduct 
standards on tenants. 
48. The reservations against allowing standing to a person not a red party in interest are 
somewhat similar to the policy considerations which underlie refusals to enforce use restrictions 
when no substantial benefit can be derived from the enforcement (e.g., Downs v. h e g e r .  200 
Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927); Piper v. Reder, 44 Ill. App. 2d 431, 195 N.E.2d 224 (1963) 
(compared relative hardships); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law 5 1951 (BlcICinncy 1963)). or when 
the restrictions are not calculated to benefit anyone (e.6.. Blitchell v. Leavitt. 30 Conn. 587, 590 
(1862); ICaczynski v. Lindahl, 5 bfich. App. 377, 380, 146 N.\fr.2d 675, 676 (1966) (liquor 
restriction upheld to preserve "aesthetic and saleable value of the remaining property"). Set also 
Minn. Stat. Ann. 1 500.20 (1947); \Vi. Stat. Ann. 5 700.15 (1975)). However, the latter policy, 
though related to the standing issue, is distinguishable insofar as it is rooted in the equitable 
notions of relative hardship. See, e.g., Downs v. Kroeger, supra at 74546, 254 P. at 1102-03. 
Relative hardship should have no relevance to the issue of standing per se so long ;~s it can be 
assumed that substantial injury has resulted to somebody. 
More closely related to the issue of standing per se are cases holding that a devclopcr, having 
parted with all lots in a development, may not have enforcement of use restrictions in the deeds 
by which hi purchasers took title. Bramwell v. Kuble, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (Dit Ct. App. 1958); 
Forman v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 114 hfd. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911). However, in the first place, 
the interest of an apartment landlord is considerably less remote than that of such a developer. 
Phiilipse Towers, Inc. v. Ortega, 61 hlisc. 2d 539, 541, 305 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (Yonkers City Ct. 
1969). Furthermore, it is more understandable (and likely) that apartment tenants will Iwk to 
their landlord to enforce lease restrictions than for grantees in fee simple to expect the dcvcloper 
to come back and enforce the deed restrictions. See note 44 supn. and accompan)ing t a t .  And 
this is to say nothing of the fact that the landlord does have a continuing interest in the leased 
premises even though possession, for the time being, is in others. 
Thus, more to the point perhaps are cases such as Neponsit Property Osr-nus' As'n v. 
Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938) and hlerrionette bfanor Homes 
Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11 Ill. App. Zd 186, 136 N.E.Zd 556 (19561, where community 
associations were held to have "representative" standing to assert deed covenant rights on behalf 
of the real parties in interest. See also Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913) where 
the original covenantee was allowed to enforce the restriction, even though not an owner of 
protected land, seemingly on the basis that "a contract is 3 contract" 
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powers only unevenlyg or even abusively.s0 Uneven enforcement 
would be unfair to the tenant unlucky enough to be singled out for the 
landlord's wrath. Abusive motivation is not only "unfair," but it may 
undermine unrelated policy objectives as well; i .e . ,  the landlord may 
be motivated to assert the restrictions 'mainly to promote some unre- 
lated unlawful purpose (e.g., racial discrimination) which he could not 
promote e x p l i ~ i t l y . ~ ~  However, the problems both of uneven enforce- 
ment and abusive motivation can be handled on other bases, without 
49. A past pattern of uneven enforcement of restrictions has sometimes been recognized as 
grounds for denying enforcement in a particular case. See, e.g., Kingsview Homes, Inc. v. Jarvis, 
48 App. Div. 2d 881, 369 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1975) (dictum) and cases cited in note 52 infrn, 
Other times it has been ignored. Taylor v. Parklane Hosiery Co., - App. Div. 2d -, -, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (2d Dep't 1976) ("no requirement that a landlord investigate the adherence of 
every commercial tenant . . . before seeking to enjoin the continued violation . . . by one of the 
tenants"); Brigham Park Cooperative Apts. Section No. 2, Inc. v. K m u s ,  28 App. Div. 2d 846, 
282 N.Y.S.2d 938 (2d Dep't 1967), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 941, 237 N.E.2d 86, 289 N.Y.S.2d 769 
(1968); Trump Village Sec. 3, Inc. v. Rothstein, 62 Misc. 2d 742, 309 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. City 
Civ. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 66 Misc. 2d 221, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. T. 1971). The presence in the 
lease of a provision that there should not be "waiver" because of landlord inaction may affect the 
question. Compare Mutual Redev. Houses, Inc. v. Balducci, 37 App. Div. 2d 943, 325 N.Y.S.2d 
765 (1st Dep't 1971) (provision effective) with Fritts v. Cloud Oak Flooring Co., 478 S.W.2d 8 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (provision ineffective). 
50. This usage of the word "abusive" follows the usage in Blades, supra note 15, at 1413. 
However, the much broader civilian concept of "abus des droits" may be cited as providing a 
more fully developed doctrinal reference for the notion of "abusive motivation." See R. 
Schlesinger, Comparative Law 514-34 (3d ed. 1970). For present purposes, a discretionary power 
would be considered to be exercised abusively when the motivation either Is unlawful or is to 
exert duress for a reason unrelated to the ostensible purpose of the discretionary power. 
Threatening to terminate a monthly tenancy in order to discourage tenants from asserting their 
legal rights, or to compel a tenant to accept an invitation for a date, would be examples of 
abusive motivation. A most characteristic instance of abusive motivation in the landlord-tenant 
field is retaliatory eviction. The leading case on the subject is Robinson v. Diamond Housing 
Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
51. One commentator has observed, undoubtedly correctly, that: "[Ilt is very possible that 
violation of a generally-unenforced lease term may be seized upon by a determined lpndlord as n 
means of concealing arbitrary action, discrimination, retaliation, or other impermissible motive 
for eviction. Naturally, the longer the list of obscure and trivial regulations, the greater the risk of 
such disingenuous action becomes." Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lense, 74 Colum. L. 
Rev. 836, 849 (1974) (footnotes omitted); cf. Llewellyn, What Price Contrnct7-An Essay in 
Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 736 (1931) ("A landlord . . . may never resort to his lronclnd 
document save when for extraneous reasons the other party proves unworkable."). 
At a later point, Bentley underscored this risk citing a case where the landlord apparently had 
almost no proof of a substantive basis for eviction but received judicial sympathy, and an eviction 
below, because there was a "personality conflict" between landlord and tenant (not a ground for 
eviction under the lease). Bentley, supra at 855 n. 115. The case was reversed on appeal. Aeillo v. 
Rivera (App. T.), in 171 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 7, 1974, at  21, col. 1. 
Evidently, it was a fear that improperly motivated landlords would rely on trivial regulr~tions 
to evict rent-control tenants that led to limiting such evictions to cases where the tenant's default 
was a nuisance or a violation of "a substantial obligation of his tenancy." See Park E. Land Corp. 
v. Finkelstein, 299 N.Y. 70, 74, 85 N.E.2d 869, 871 (1949). 
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resort to the imposition of limitations on fundamental standing. Un- 
even enforcement suggests such defenses as waiver,s2 est0ppe1,~s or 
laches.54 Abusive motivation, when there appears to have been poten- 
tially improper bases for taking action, is gaining recognition as an 
independent basis for withholding the assistance of the c o u r t ~ . ~ s  
52. See Radcliffe Associates v. Greenstein, 274 App. Div. 277. 82 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1st Dep't 
1948); Sol Apfel, Inc. v. Kocher, 61 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1946). affd mem., 272 App. Div 
758, 70 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1947) (but a tenant's mistake as to what tvas permitted %\*as not 
grounds for reformation) and cases cited in note 49 supra. The theov that a legal right m y  be 
waived by implication, as shown from a course of conduct, presents no difficulty. 5 S. Williston. 
Contracts 8 740 (3d ed. 1961). And there have been holdings to the effect that a pattern of not 
enforcing particular lease restrictions constitutes a waiver or evidence of an intention to waive 
such restrictions. See, e.g., Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering 
Co., 179 Md. 117, 17 A.2d 130 (1941); Morrison v. Smith, 90 bld. 76, 44 A. 1031 (1899); 6. 
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1111, 1140-50 (1949). But cf. Taylor v. Parklane Hosiery Co., - App 
Div. 2d -, 385 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d Dep't 1976). 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div 2d 140, 
338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972) (court enforced prohibition on pets despite other d o g  in 
building). 
In the analogous situation of uniform use restrictions in deeds, a pattern of nonenforcement tvill 
bar later enforcement in equity if the past laxity has been accompanied by a change in the 
character of the neighborhood rendering later enforcement of little b e n d ~ t  o anyone. LQgm r. 
Sprinkle, 256 N.C. 41, 123 S.E.2d 209 (19611; Romig v. Modest, 102 Ohio App. 225, 142 N.E.2d 
555 (1956); 6. DOU~N V. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927). See also N.Y. Real Prop. 
Actions Law 8 1951 (McKinney 1963) (codifying the principle and making it applicable to relieve 
against forfeiture for violation of use restrictions). 
It may occur, either by lease provision (see. e.g., Pollack v. J.A. Grcen Constr. Corp.. 40 App. 
Div. 2d 996, 338 N.Y.S.2d 486 (2d Dep't 1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 720, 297 N.E.2d 99, 34-1 
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1973)) or by statute (see, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. 8 521-31(a) (Supp. 1975)) that the 
landlord cannot, by inaction or perhaps otherwise, waive rights under the lease. \!%at effect such 
disempowering has on the issue of standing is problematical, especially since estoppel, laches and 
abusive motivation would remain, in any event, as possible (and presumably nonrelinquishablc) 
escape valves for the tenant. 
53. See Capital View Realty Co. v. hfeigs, 92 A.2d 765 (D.C. hlun. Ct. App. 1952,; \Veaver 
Bros. v. Newlin, 74 A.2d 65 (D.C. hlun. Ct. App. 1950); Vendramis \.. Frankfurt, 86 N.Y.S.2d 
715 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 903, 94 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1st Dep't 1950) (tenant paid 
higher rent in reliance on freedom from piano playing restriction); 10th & 5th. Inc. v. 
Arrowsmith, 186 Misc. 639, 59 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. City hlun. CL 19451, afTd, 186 hliic. 864, 
65 N.Y.S.2d 344 (App. T. 1946). But cf. Southbridge Towers, Inc. v. Rovics, 76 3iix. Zd 396, 
350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. T. 1973) (no estoppel for failing to notify tenant of the prohibition x t  
forth in the lease). Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a knov:n right whereas the (jst of 
estoppel is detrimental reliance, irrespective of intent See Berger, supra note 22. at 794-96. 
However, in the landlord-tenant area, as elsewhere, courts do not always take pains to 
distinguish the two. The cases just cited above are examples. 
54. An example is Valentine Gardens Cooperative, Inc. v. Oberman, 23; N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. 
Ct. 1963). The court refused to enforce a prohibition on pets because of the Imdlord's Imhcs in 
enforcing the prohibition. While the landlord delayed, the tenant's family had fallen in love with 
the dog, making its removal "harsh, unwarranted. and oppressive." Id. at 538; cf. hnnot., 12 
A.L.R.2d 394 (1950). 
55. As the court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 77 hIisc. Zd 962, 963, 357 N.Y S.2d 589, 
591 (App. T. 1974) (per curiam) stated: "[Plublic policy mould militate agdnst enforcing a 
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On balance, even if the landlord does not have any direct interest in 
the enforcement of tenant conduct standards, and therefore may not be 
considered a "real party in interest," there does not appear to be any 
overriding objection to lease provisions giving the landlord the power 
to enforce such standards. It would thus appear that the landlord 
should have such power on pure cost-effectiveness grounds. Moreover, 
as will be shown presently, the landlord normally does have a real 
interest in the enforcement of tenant conduct restrictions; therefore, 
stating the question as though he does not, makes it unrealistically 
difficult to reach the conclusion that lease conferred standing should be 
upheld. But the point of so stating the question is to make clear that 
cost-effectiveness alone can serve as an independent basis for allowing 
landlord intervention in controversies between tenants, especially 
when the less cost-effective alternatives (viz., direct actions by tenants) 
tend, because of their very burdensomeness, to be entirely deterred. 
2 .  The Landlord's Standing as Conferred by Law 
Even though the job of moving against a disturbing tenant seems in 
practice to be generally left to the landlord, the law has been distinctly 
ungenerous in conferring landlords with standing to take effective legal 
action against tenant misconduct. Under the traditional view, the 
leasing transaction is regarded primarily as a conveyance of an interest 
contractual right where it is being exercised in furtherance of an illegal end." The court 
accordingly denied the landlord's attempt to exercise a termination option in order to coerce 
compliance with landlord's price-fixing scheme, citing Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). Regrettably, it must be reported that on appeal the 
court was overruled on this point. 48 App. Div. 2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (2d Dep't 1975). Other 
cases recognizing abusive motivation as a basis for withholding enforcement of rights are: 
Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (retaliatory eviction); 
L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) (cancellation of malpractice 
insurance in retaliation against testimony by insured); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (discharge of employee motivated by bad faith, malice, retaliation). 
Other legal bases for protecting against abusive motivations in the employee discharge area nrc 
discussed in Blades, supra note 15, at  1410-19. See also 43 Fordham L. Rev. 300 (1974). 
As an alternative basis for withholding relief in cases of abusive motivation the courts might 
imply a duty of good faith, akin to Uniform Commercial Code 1 1-201(19), into leases. E.g., 
Volpicelli v. Leventhal, 48 App. Div. 2d 660, 367 N.Y.S.2d 541 (2d Dep't 1975); 57 I.;. 54 Realty 
Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. T.  1972); accord, 
Hawaii Rev. Stat. 8 521-10 (Supp. 1975). 
Perhaps the most compelling objection to limiting discretionary powers through u "doctrine" of 
abusive motivation is that the key operative fact in each case would be the subjective state of 
mind of the person exercising the discretion, a fact which is difficult to ascertain. Approaches to 
this problem have varied from requiring the person complaining of abuse to provide "clear and 
convincing" evidence (see Blades, supra note 15, at  1429-30) all the way to requiring the 
discretionary actor to show a lack of abusive motivation in exercising the discretion (see, e.g., 
Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., supra at 865). 
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in realty, and the landlord is considered to have little role in assuring 
that the premises will serve any useful purpose of the tenant.s6 The 
tenant is seen as an "owner" having the benefit of all the remedies 
available to any owner of a possessory estate in realty.s7 The landlord 
is traditionally not responsible to his tenant for acts of others even 
when those acts deprive the tenant of the very possession for which he 
had bargained.s8 In this state of the law, it may be logical to hold, as 
the courts generally have, that the landlord has no responsibilities in 
inter-tenant disputes (absent landlord complicity), and that the com- 
plaining tenant's recourse is against his fellow tenants, not against the 
landlord.sg Accordingly, it is perhaps also logical (cost-effectiveness 
aside) to deny the landlord standing in such inter-tenant disputes and to 
allow an effective remedy only to the offended tenant. 
I t  is perhaps logical, that is, provided that the offended tenant, and 
not the landlord, is the o?zly one adversely affected by the offending 
tenant's conduct. 
But since offensive tenant conduct, which may be illegal or a 
nuisance, can reduce the rentability of the landlord's property--and 
hence reduce the return-related value of his investment-it would 
rarely seem to be the case that the offended tenant would be the only 
one adversely affected by the offensive conduct. In the preponderance 
of situations, the landlord would probably also sustain injury due to 
the offensive conduct; thus, he too would appear to be a real party in 
interest with standing to move against such conduct, lease provision or 
no. 
The harm done by offensive tenant conduct, by reducing rentability, 
injures what might be called the landlord's "reputational" interest in 
the premises. Thus, insofar as injuries to such reputational interest 
palpably impair the value of the landlord's property (as a return 
56. See, e.g., Bowles v. hhhoney, 202 F.2d 320,324 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 V.S. 
935 (1953); Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450 (1873); Smithfield Improvement Co. v. Coley- 
Bardin, 156 N.C. 255, 72 S.E. 312 (1911). 
57. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 1 3.53. One case even held that the lmdlord, having no 
right to possession during the term, could not maintain ejectment against a wrongful possessor of 
the leased premises. Western N.Y. & P a  Ry. v. Vulcan Foundry & hfa~b .  Co.. X I  Pu 353, 
388-89, 96 A. 830, 832 (1916). 
58. See 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 3.53. Of course the lmdlord could be held liable if he 
were in complicity with such dispossessing acts of others (id.) or if the interference tsith possgsion 
were by a third party holding paramount title (id. at $8 3.47, 3.48). Furthermore, under one line 
of cases, the landlord may be liable to the tenant if the wrongful acts of others prevent the t m t  
from ever taking possession. Id. at $ 3.37; see the very ample discussion in Hannm v. D u d ,  154 
Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930). 
59. E.g., Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122 (1969) (tenant urinating on 
common wall); Katz v. Duffy, 261 hlass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927); see wses cited in 1 Am. L. 
Prop., supra note 3, 8 3.53 nn.11 & 12. 
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producing investment), such injuries are conceptually little different 
from physical waste.60 Both are acts of a tenant tending to reduce the 
value of the reversioner's retained interest. In any case, a direct injury 
to the landlord's reputational interest supplies, in addition to cost- 
effectiveness, a second ground for recognizing lease-conferred standing 
for landlords to control tenant conduct. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of physical waste, the landlord's re- 
course against a tenant whose conduct is illegal or a nuisance has been 
tightly circumscribed. 
a. Illegal Acts 
There have been occasional cases stating that the landlord may 
cancel the lease of a tenant who uses the premises for an illegal 
purpose,61 and statutes sometimes so provide.62 However, it may not 
be said that illegal conduct by the tenant constitutes a general basis for 
relief to the landlord, a t  least not unless he is protected by an 
agreement or unless he sustains some sort of "special" injury from 
which he is protected by the law of torts. 
b. Nuisances 
Although it has been said that the landlord may oust the tenant for 
committing a nuisance,63 in most cases where nuisance is alleged as a 
ground for eviction some other basis for asserting the forfeiture has 
apparently existed.64 Even when the landlord is willing to settle for 
60. That rental real estate may have a reputational value which, if injured, is compensuble 
was recognized in Martin v. Medlin, 8 1  Ga. App. 602, 59  S.E.2d 519 (1950) and Sullivnn v. 
Waterman, 20 R.I. 372, 39  A. 243 (1898). In  Martin v. Medlin, supra, which involved premises 
leased allegedly for use "as a one-family domicile," it was held that conversion of the premises to 
a house of assignation by the tenant, which "injured the value of the property," gave rise to 
liability for "any injury occasioned by [the] breach." 8 1  Ga. App. a t  605, 59  S.E.2d nt 521. The 
language employed by the court suggested that the court's theory of compensation was akin to the 
compensation theory which would apply in cases where waste by the tenant hnd resulted in 
deterioration in the capital value of the premises. Cf. Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 28 N.J. 316, 146 
A.Zd 458 (1958), in which the tenant's acts (in improving the premises) increased the property 
taxes and thereby caused injury to the landlord's interest in the "rental yield" of the premises. 
Analogizing to the law of waste, which is concerned mainly with injuries to the capital vnlue of 
the premises, the court held the tenant liable for the loss to his "rental yield" sustnined by t l ~ c  
landlord. Id. a t  327, 146 A.2d at 463. 
61. Schwartz v. McQuaid, 214 Ill. 357, 73 N.E. 582 (1905); Voght v. State, 124 Ind. 358, 24 
N.E. 680 (1890); see 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 9 3.43. 
62. E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 139, 8 19 (1972); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law 8 711.5 
(McKinney 1963). 
63. 2 Powell, supra note 24, C 247[1], at  372.103-04; see Hawaii Rev. Stat. 9 666-3 (1968) for 
a statute providing for eviction in cases of nuisance. 
64. E.g., Silberman v. Hicks, 231 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (waste); Mctropoli- 
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damages or injunctive relief, the existing authorities are not much 
more accornm~dating.~~ 
For a landlord seeking damages, the first analytical hurdle to 
overcome is establishing that the alleged nuisance is causing or has 
caused any compensable injury to the landlord. Although private 
nuisances are thought of primarily as invasions of the right to use land, 
a right which is incident to possession, it is recognized that damages 
may also be recovered by "owners of non-possessory estates in land 
which are detrimentally affected by interferences with the usability of 
the land."66 Thus, there does appear to be some authoritative basis for 
allowing a remedy for nuisance to a person in the position of the 
landlord, i .e . ,  to a reversioner. However, if the nuisance in question 
involves no waste (in the traditional sense) and if the only premises 
detrimentally affected are apartments leased to neighbors of the objec- 
tionable tenant, the possibilities for the landlord to have relief in 
damages for the nuisance are slight. 
The difficulty arises as a consequence of the general rule that, where 
two or more persons have interests in property injured by a 
wrongdoer, their respective entitlements to recoverable damages are to 
be commensurate with the injuries to their respective estates.67 Thus, 
the Iandlord may not recover damages for injuries to the tenant's 
estate.68 Those injuries to the landlord's reversionary interest which 
tan Life IN. CO. V. Greenberg, 185 hZisc. 122, 55 N.Y.S.2d 494 (App. T. 1945); see Roseman v. 
Day, 345 Mass. 93, 95, 185 N.E.2d 650, 651-52 (1962). For a discussion and collection of cves 
concerning the meaning of nuisance for purposes of World \Va I1 federal rent control regulations 
(which authorized eviction on the basis of nuisance), see Annot, 174 A.L.R. 989 (1948). 
65. It has been said that the tenant has an implied obligation not to injure the landlord by 
committing a nuisance on the leased premises. hfosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F.2d 364 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 677 (1931). However, this probably m e a s  nothing mom than that 
tenants, like everyone else, are restricted in the use of their premises to the extent prescribed by 
the tort law of private nuisance. As is developed in the text which follo~vs, the law of private 
nuisance is distinctly unhelpful to a landlord seeking standing to complain of annoying tenant 
activities unless the landlord is a possessw (as opposed to a lessor) of neighboring premises. 
66. Restatement of Torts 8 823(c) (1934); see Bly v. E d i i n  Elec. Illuminating Co., 172 N.Y. 
1, 64 N.E. 735 (1902); Kernochan v. New York Elev. R.R, 128 N.Y. 559,29 N.E. 65 (1891); 6A 
Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 28.31; 6. Sullivan v. Waterman, 20 RI. 372, 39 A. 243 (1898). 
67. Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 hld. 357 (1883); Nashville, C. 8: St. L. Ry. v. Heikens, 112 
Tenn. 378, 79 S.W. 1038 (1904); Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S.E. 266 (1896). 
68. When title to real estate is divided between the holder of a possessory interest and the 
holder of a future interest, it is sometimes held that the holder of the possessory estate may 
recover for injuries both on his account and on the account of the future interest owner a well. 
Rogers v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Co., 213 N.Y. 246, 107 N.E. 661 (1915); United Traction Co. v. 
Ferguson Contracting Co., 117 App. Div. 305, 102 N.Y.S. 190 (3d Dep't 1907). Contra, Jordm 
v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S.E. 266 (1896). However, recoveries by a landlord for injuries to 
the tenant's interest seem to be uniformly impermissible. Nashville, C. & S t  L. Ry. v. Heikens, 
112 Tenn. 378, 79 S.W. 1038 (1904); Jordan v. Benwood, supra; see 1916A L.R.A. 792. 805-1 1. 
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are compensable typically are described as the "permanent" or "con- 
tinuing" injuries.69 The tenant's compensable injuries are described, 
on the other hand, as those which are temporary or injurious to the 
"use and enjoyment."70 That is, in the traditional formulation, the 
landlord, as reversioner, may recover for the reduction of so-called sale 
value; the tenant's recovery is for the reduction of rental value caused 
by the nuisance. 
This division of recovery entitlements may at  first blush seem 
rational. Insofar as the landlord has, for the term of the lease, traded 
off his rights of use and enjoyment in exchange for rent, double 
compensation would result if the landlord were also to recover for the 
loss which the nuisance causes to the "use and enjoyment" value, i . e . ,  
rental value. It would be likewise unfair to the tenant if no damage 
recovery were available to the tenant for interferences with the rights 
of use and enjoyment which he has bought for the term of the leasee71 
However, for reasons generally unrelated to the division of recovery 
entitlements, most nuisances are classified as temporary rather than 
permanent  interference^.^^ The effect of this classification is to greatly 
narrow the range of situations in which the landlord, as such, may 
have a damage recovery based upon a nuisance. To an ordinary fee 
owner-occupier, the tendency to classify nuisances as temporary rather 
than permanent is a source more of inconvenience than of injustice, 
Such i n  owner-occupier is relegated to multiple lawsuits, periodically 
brought, to redress his loss as it accrues. But in the end he may 
69. See Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 270, 239 P.2d 625, 629 (1952); Cooper v. 
Randall, 59 Ill. 317 (1871); Akers v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 139 W. Va. 682, 80 S.E.2d 884 
(1954); 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 28.33, at  92; Restatement of Torts 9 823, comment d 
(1934). 
70. Union Cemetery Co. v. Harrison, 20 Ala. App. 291, 101 So. 517 (1924); Cooper v. 
Randall, 59 111. 317 (1871); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 524 (1861); 
D. Dobbs, Remedies 5 5.3, at  332-35 (1973). 
il. A corollary concern would be to avoid recovery by both landlord and tenant for the snmc 
injury. See Cooper v. Randall, 59 111. 317 (1871); Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 1230-31 (1950). 
72. See 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 28.33; D. Dobbs, Remedies 9 5.4, at  335-44 (1973); 
W. Prosser, Torts 5 90, at  602 (4th ed. 1971). A detailed discussion of the bnsis on which courts 
resolve the difficult question of "permanency" would not be apposite. Sufficc i t  to say thnt the 
determination seems to be less influenced by the factual characteristics of the nuisance than by a 
policy against legitimizing wrongs committed by persons willing to pay damages, permitting them 
to acquire rights by a sort of private eminent domain power. Id. This is not to sny, however, thnt 
there are not instances where the factual probabilities or policy considerations lead the court to 
regard the invasion as "permanent," permitting (or requiring) claims for present and prospcctivc 
injuries to be joined in a single action. Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 269, 239 P.2d 625, 
628 (1952); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 224, 257 N.E.2d 870, 874, 309 
N.Y.S.2d 312, 317-18 (1970); Akers v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 139 W. Va. 682, 80 S.E.2d 884 
(1954). See generally D. Dobbs, Remedies 9 5.4, at  335-44 (1973). But such instances, as stated In 
the text, are the exception rather than the rule. 
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theoretically be made whole. However, in the case of a landlord, who 
may never contemplate taking direct advantage of use and enjoyment, 
i.e., whose expected benefit is to be not possessory but derivative-in 
the form of rent which tenants are willing to pay-this classification 
preference can mean that recovery would, as a practical matter, be 
forever denied. 
Undoubtedly, the cases are correct which hold that the tenant in 
possession at the time a nuisance commenced should be the only one 
entitled to recover for the past injuries caused by the nuisance, if the 
nuisance has affected only that tenant's right of enjoyment.73 Since the 
landlord has previously shifted to the tenant the risk of obtaining the 
benefits of use and enjoyment during the term, it would be illogical 
and unjust to compensate the landlord for losses which have already 
occurred due to third party interferences with such use and enjoyment. 
Furthermore, if there are policy reasons preventing the allowance of 
prospective "use and enjoyment" damages for nuisances, even those 
likely to be "factually" permanent,74 these too may be accepted; their 
adverse effect on landlord recoveries may be regarded as merely an 
incidental application of a "good" general rule. 
What is not so understandable is why courts should extend this 
principle to deny compensation to the landlord even when the effect of 
a nuisance has been to palpably diminish the value of the one benefit 
which the landlord seeks to reap from the leased premises-their rental 
value. It may be readily seen how rental value might be affected by a 
nuisance in cases where the conduct constituting the nuisance had 
already been occurring prior to the time the directly offended tenants 
commenced occupancy; the offended tenants, as prospective tenants, 
may have been dissuaded by the nuisance from paying as high a rent 
or even from entering into leases at But rental value may also be 
impaired because existing tenants may be persuaded to leave, at or 
before the normal expiration of their leases, something which equally 
contributes to an impairment of the landlord's expected investment 
return and, hence, the value of his premises.76 
The loss to the landlord as a result of such tenant reactions may be 
perhaps better described as a loss of "profity' rather than of rental value 
per se, but the fact remains that the landlord suffers a loss in value of 
his property as a return producing asset. The loss of rental value or 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - 
73. E.g., Van Siden v. New York, 64 App. Div. 437, 72 N.Y.S. 209 (2d Dcp't 1901). 
modified on other grounds, 172 N.Y. 504, 65 N.E. 257 (1902). 
74. See note 72 supra and accompanying text 
75. Cf. Sullivan v. Watennan, 20 RI. 372, 39 A. 243 (1898) (lodging how).  
76. The analogy of such losses to physical w s t e  has dmady been mentioned. Set text 
accompanying note 60 supra. 
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profitability ultimately will reduce the sale or capitalized value of his 
property as well. The determination of the amount of loss would 
inevitably be complicated by questions of causal connection and con- 
jecture. However, even in situations when the causal connection and 
amount of loss are clear, such as where the landlord has been forced to 
accept a lower rental because of the nuisance, the courts have typi- 
cally, but not uniformly,77 refused to allow a recovery to the land- 
The landlord may well face similar frustrations in obtaining injunc- 
tive relief against nuisances by the tenant. Citing nuisance cases which 
77. E.g., Kernochan v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 559, 29 N.E. 65 (1891); accord, 
Hine v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 571, 29 N.E. 69 (1891); Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53 
N.Y. 152 (1873) (damages equal the difference in the rental value free from the stench and subject 
to it). See also Adams Constr. Co. v. Bentley, 335 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1960), which held, without 
discussion, that the landlord can recover loss of rental value. 
78. Miller v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 184 N.Y. 17, 76 N.E. 734 (1906); Van Siclen v. 
New York, 64 App. Div. 437, 72 N.Y.S. 209 (2d Dep't 1901), modified on other grounds, 172 
N.Y. 504, 65 N.E. 257 (1902); cf. Halsey v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 45 N.J.L. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1883). 
See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 1230-31 (1950) and Annot., 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 560 (1911) for 
additional discussion and cases. 
For a time, it appears, the New York courts did allow landlords to recover for diminished 
rental value resulting from a nuisance. Hine v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 571, 29 N.E. 69 
(1891); Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53 N.Y. 152 (1873). In Hine, the court carefully distinguished the 
landlord's claim for past damages, in the form of diminished rental value, from actions based on 
"any theory of the continuing nature of the trespass" or "predicated upon any anticipation of its 
continuance." 128 N.Y. a t  573, 29 N.E. a t  69. However, the position was reversed in Bly v. 
Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., !72 N.Y. 1, 64 N.E. 745 (1902), where the court distinguished the 
leading case espousing the older view, Kernochan v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 559, 29 
N.E. 65 (1891), stating that "Kernochan's case was not intended to be applied to the general law 
of nuisances but to a condition created by the construction and operation of the elevated 
railroads which has no exact parallel in any other department of our jurisprudence." 172 N.Y. at 
16, 64 N.E. at  749. Other New York authority, not involving elevated railroads, was less 
satisfactorily distinguished. The court's concern in Bly seemed to be to preserve the right of action 
of lessees who "come to the nuisance." 
Such tenants "who come to the nuisance" are generally protected, the rationale being that the 
cause of action arises not from the tortious act itself but from the injury which is presumed to be 
completed only when the tenancy begins. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 1230 (1950); cf. Bly v. 
Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 172 N.Y. 1, 64 N.E. 745 (1902); Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel & 
Supply Co., 254 Wis. 194, 36 N.W.2d 97 (1949) (purchaser). However, in attempting to protect 
possessors against injuries from nuisances, this reasoning seems to go too far. It assumes, 
probably unjustifiably, that the prior existence of the nuisance caused no reduction in the price 
which the possessor paid to acquire the possession. If the prior existing nuisance did cause such a 
price reduction, the possessor "who comes to the nuisance" has already been compensated by such 
reduction for the detriment which the nuisance involves. To allow a recovery by the possessor 
against the person committing the nuisance would be to double the compensation to the 
possessor. On the other hand, the landlord (or seller) who parted with possession nt a reduced 
price, and thus de facto has borne the financial loss resulting from the nuisance, is left 
uncompensated for such loss. 
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deny damage recoveries to landlords,79 courts have held that the 
landlord's entitlement to injunctive relief is likewise limited to injuries 
to the reversion, i . e . ,  to permanent injuries.80 The difficulty is, of 
course, that-for independent policy reasons-the tendency is to 
classify nuisances as temporary rather than permanentIsl and in any 
event a nuisance being committed by a leasehold tenant would seem to 
be temporary by definition. The landlord may possibly succeed in 
obtaining injunctive relief, even where permanent damages are un- 
available, by arguing that the nuisance, though not permanent is at 
least "continuing" or "recurring" or continues to be "threatened."s2 But 
at  bottom, whatever the nuisance's durational characteristics, the 
landlord's real task is to convince the court that the nuisance affects his 
reversionary interest rather than merely the current (and continuing) 
interests of his tenants. Courts have sometimes been convinced of 
this,83 and sometimes not.84 
* * * * 
Several conclusions may be garnered from the foregoing discussion. 
If the landlord is to have any reasonable assurance of standing to 
complain about nuisance-creating (or illegally acting) tenants, he must 
contract for that standing in the lease. Furthermore, lease provisions 
empowering the landlord to complain are not merely officious arroga- 
tions of policing authority, such as would well justify strict construc- 
tion or judicial avoidance wherever possible. Rather, they serve the 
legitimate objectives of (i) providing a more cost-effective alternative to 
countermeasures or proceedings initiated by the offended tenants 
themselves and (ii) protecting the landlord's genuine interest in the 
"reputational" (and hence return producing) character of his property. 
As such, lease provisions empowering the landlord to control tenant 
conduct supply an important and valuable mechanism for forestalling 
disputes between tenants, and for protecting the character of the 
buildings in which they reside. Seen in this light, such provisions 
deserve sympathetic consideration (though not rubber stamping) by the 
courts. 
79. E.g., Cooper v. Randall, 59 Ill. 317 (1871); hZiller v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 184 
N.Y. 17, 76 N.E. 734 (1906). 
80. E.g., Indianapolis, Bloomington & W. Ry. v. hlclaughlin, 77 Ill. 275 (18751, Sherman 
v. Levingston, 128 N.Y.S. 581 (Sup. Ct. 1910). See also Beir v. Cooke, 37 Hun 38 (N.Y. Sup. 
ct. 1885). 
81. See note 72 supra and accompanying text. 
82. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances J 158 (1971). 
83. E.g., Weakley v. Page, 102 Tenn. 178, 53 S.W. 551 (1899) (on grounds that rentability 
was adversely affected). 
84. See cases cited in note 80 supra. 
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3. Standing and the Implied Warranty of Habitability 
The discussion of standing might have ended with the preceding 
paragraph had the state of landlord-tenant law remained as it was at 
the beginning of the present decade. However, the growing accep- 
tance, at an avalanche rate (for property law), of the so-called 
"implied warranty of habitability"85 adds a new dimension to the issue. 
The implications of the implied warranty of habitability appear to 
supply a new (and perhaps the most compelling) basis for permitting 
landlord control of tenant conduct. 
The implied warranty of habitability has resulted from a rethinking 
and a reformulation of certain basic assumptionss6 underlying the 
fundamental landlord-tenant re la t ion~hip .~~ For better or for worse, it 
has resulted in an increased paternalization of that relationship. 
No longer is the landlord regarded as having almost no role in 
assuring that the premises serve a useful purpose of the tenant.88 
Rather, the implied warranty of habitability subsumes that the thing 
bargained for by the modern residential tenant is not just bare space 
but "a well known package of goods and services,"89 a place which is 
"livable."g0 For failing to meet this obligation, the landlord faces, 
among other things, loss of all or part of the rent,g1 loss of the tenant, 
who may be excused from the lease,92 or even punitive damageseg3 
85. Among the landmarks recognizing the implied warranty of habitability are Jnvins v. First 
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. 
Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 
N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Knn. 329, 
521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingwny, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Muss. 1973); 
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). The warranty is also being established by 
statute. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 8 554.139 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Real Prop. Lnw 5 235-b 
(McKinney Supp. 1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 5 59.18.060 (Supp. 1975). See also URLTA, 
supra note 13, 5 2.104(a)(2). 
86. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 429-34, 462 P.2d 470, 472-75 (1969); Tonelti 
v. Penati, 48 App. Div. 2d 25, 29, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (2d Dep't 1975). 
87. This is the case at least with respect to residential tenancies, to which the implied 
warranty has generally been limited. 
88. Compare text accompanying notes 58-59 supra. 
89. Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 925 (1970). 
90. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970). 
91. Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 
(1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). 
92. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Tonetti v. Pennti, 48 App. Div. 
2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1975). 
93. Kipsborough Realty Corp. v. Goldbetter, 81 Misc. 2d 1054,367 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y. City 
Civ. Ct. 1975). 
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There are already indications that the implied warranty of habitabil- 
ity will support holding the landlord responsible to tenants for the 
conduct of other tenants.94 Apparently the first case to tie the implied 
warranty of habitability directly to landlord responsibility for tenant 
conduct is Cohen v. Wernereg5 In this action for rent against an 
abandoning tenant, the tenant defended claiming that "noise emanat- 
ing from another apartment in the building was so great that [the] 
defendant could not continue to reside in his apar t~nent ."~~ The court 
found that the noise (of unspecified nature) was "so intense and so 
long-lasting as to render the apartment ~ninhabitable ."~~ Further, the 
court observed that "[wlhile plaintiff [landlord] did not cause this 
noise, he did nothing at all to try to stop it although he had ample time 
to do so . . . ."98 The court correctly stated that, under the traditional 
rules relating to constructive eviction, acts of other tenants, without 
any complicity on the part of the landlord, would not have justified 
the tenant's a b a n d ~ n m e n t . ~ ~  However, said the court: 
T h e  whole concept of the implied warranty of habitability rests on the undertaking 
of the landlord tha t  the premises will be  habitable. If i t  is not, then tlte tenonf is 
entitled to relief even if the landlord did not cause fire uninlrabifablity, at least i n  
situations where, as here, the landlord could have taken steps . . . but  chose to do 
nothing at all.loO 
Exactly what steps the landlord could have taken is unclear from the 
opinion; but the landlord's failure to take such steps relieved the tenant 
from liability under the lease when he quit the premises. 
94. Cohen v. Werner, 82 hlisc. 2d 295, 368 N.Y.S.Zd 1005 (N.Y. City Civ. C t ) ,  affd mem., 
85 Misc. 2d 341, 378 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. T. 1975); cf. Kline v. 1500 b k .  Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 
F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("impliedn obligation of landlord); Zamzok v. 650 Park Ave. Corp.. 80 
Mix.  2d 573, 363 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup. C t  1974) (landlord's r e s e n d  right to reenter upon 
neighboring tenant's premises to effect repairs constitutes "control" and prevents landlord from 
disclaiming liability for alleged nuisance on neighboring tenant's premises). See also Srunson v. 
Saginarv Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 hlich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975) (liability for common 
area); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 App. Div. 2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1975) (condition u w d  
by previous occupant); Rockrose Associates v. Peters, 81 hlisc. 2d 97 1, 366 N.Y .S. 2d 567 (N.Y. 
City Civ. Ct. 1975). 
95. 82 hlisc. 2d 295, 368 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.), a d  mem., 85 hlisc. t d  34 1, 
378 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. T. 1975). Cohen has already been followed in a case upholding an mtion 
against a landlord for compensatory and punitive damages baed upon the conduct of a noisy 
neighboring tenant. Pekelner v. Park W. hlanagement Corp. (Sup. Ct ) ,  in 176 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 
27, 1976, at 5, col. 3; see Fox, Landlord Sued by Ex-Tenant; Fled From Neighbor's Piano. 176 
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 3. 
96. 82 Misc. 2d a t  296, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1005. 
97. Id. a t  296, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1006. 
98. Id. 
99. Id.; see note 58 supra. 
100. 82 Misc. 2d a t  298, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1008 (emphasis added). 
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Although its holding was not totally unprecedented in New York,Io1 
Cohen definitely represents a departure from prior New York 
law in permitting an implied warranty of habitability to support what 
is, in traditional terms, a constructive eviction based upon a third 
party's acts. The holding is however squarely consistent with other 
recent cases, of which Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenzle Apart- 
ment Corp. '02 is the landmark, imposing liability on the landlord 
for foreseeable injury-producing acts of third persons generally.'03 
Perhaps even more directly in point is the recent case of Samson v. 
Saginaw Professional Building, Znc. lo4 where the landlord was held 
liable for acts of a tenant's psychiatric patient when the latter attacked 
another tenant's employee in a common elevator. The most extreme 
case of this genre is Uccello v. laud ens la ye^^^^ wherein the landlord 
was held liable for injuries which a tenant's guest received when 
attacked by the same tenant's dog. Although the oral lease (from 
month-to-month) did not prohibit the tenant from keeping the dog, the 
court pointed out that the landlord could have terminated the tenancy, 
getting rid of the dog; thus, the landlord retained a sufficient measure 
of control to be held liable. 
In neither Kline, Samson nor Uccello did the courts rely explicitly on 
an implied warranty of habitability theory. In  Kline and Samson, since 
the complained of conduct occurred in a common area, there was no 
need to.lo6 Similarly, in Uccello, the landlord's duty was based upon 
his power to "control" the presence of the dog on the demised premis- 
101. See Home Life Ins. Co. v. Breslerman, 168 Misc. 117, 5 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. T. 1938); 
Polk Arms, Inc. v. Kohler, 144 Misc. 326, 258 N.Y.S. 809 (App. T. 1932). There is real doubt 
that either of these holdings, predicated on a constructive eviction theory, would hnve cvithstood 
an appeal. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Sugarman, 264 App. Div. 240, 35 N.Y.S.2d 196 
(1st Dep't 1942). A little over a month before the Cohen decision, another New York City Civil 
Court held, based on an expressed undertaking to soundproof, that the landlord had precipitnted 
a constructive eviction when noise from neighboring tenants caused the nonresidential complnln- 
ing tenant (a psychotherapist) to move out. Rockrose Associates v. Peters, 81 Misc. 2d 971, 366 
N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1975). See also Neisloss v. Arter (App. T.), in 173 N.Y.L. J., 
March 10, 1975, at 17, col. 3. 
102. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); accord, Sherman v. Concourse Renlty Corp., 47 App. 
Div. 2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1975). 
103. The court in Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) held 
that the landlord was liable to the tenant for forseeable criminal acts committed by nn intruder in 
a common hallway of an apartment house. This holding also represented a depnrture from the 
previously generally accepted rule. See cases cited in Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972). 
104. 393 Mich. 393, 2: N.W.2d 843 (1975). 
105. 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
106. As a matter of common law, the landlord has traditionally had an affirmntive obligntion 
to exercise reasonable care with respect to common areas not in the possession of individual 
tenants. W. Prosser, Torts 5 63, a t  405-08 (4th ed. 1971). 
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es. Moreover, all three cases proceeded basically on a negligence 
theory;lo7 the landlord breached his duty of reasonable care rather 
than an implied warranty of habitability. But irrespective of which 
legal doctrine the landlord's duty is founded upon, the import of these 
cases is the same; there is a judicial expectation that landlords should 
act to protect their tenants against the acts of others (including fellow 
tenants), and the landlord who fails to do so will be responsible for 
losses which may ensue. In a very recent case following Colze?~, it has 
already been so held. 
It is not unreasonable that the implied warranty of habitability 
should be extended to impose landlord responsibility for tenant 
misconduct. The whole idea of the implied warranty, as the Cohen 
court noted, is to obligate the landlord " 'to maintain the apart- 
ment in a condition suitable for decent living.' "log An apartment is 
hardly habitable if surrounded by noisy or raucous neighbors, and it 
certainly is not if the neighbors perpetrate criminal acts upon their 
fellows. Moreover, it is in line with the assumptions underlying the 
implied warranty of habitability to extend its protection to cover acts 
of fellow tenants. The fact that the modern tenant is not a "jack-of- 
all-trades," able alone to keep his apartment livable, has justified 
shifting to the landlord the responsibility as to the plrysical characteris- 
tics of the premises. log Is the average residential tenant in any better 
position to control more subtle, but equally important, environmental 
characteristics such as the behavioral pattern of his neighbors? As 
already discussed, the relative cost-effectiveness of leaving this task to 
the landlordllO-together with the fact that tenants apparently seldom 
sue each otherlll-suggests that the tenant is not. 
If the implied warranty of habitability does make the landlord 
responsible for offensive tenant conduct-and particularly if it is 
desirable that it do so-then seemingly, as a corollary, standing for 
landlords to control tenant conduct should be generously and certainly 
not grudgingly bestowed. It probably should be bestowed as a matter 
107. Even so, the Kline court did refer to the landlord's obligation as being "implied in the 
contract between landlord and tenant." 439 F.2d at 485, citing Javins v. First Na'l Realty Corp.. 
428 F.2d 1071 @.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), the landmark implied warranty of 
habitability case. 
107a. Pekelner v. Park W. Management Corp. (Sup. Ct.), in 176 N.Y.L.J.. Aug. 27, 1976, a! 
5, col. 3; see note 95 supra 
108. 82 Misc. 2d at 297, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1007, quoting bforbeth Realty Corp. v. Velu,  73 
Misc. 2d 996, 999, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct 1973). 
109. Javins v. Fist Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cut .  denied, 400 
U.S. 925 (1970). See d s o  note 44 supra. 
110. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text. 
111. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
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of law, giving the landlord a right of action whenever a tenant's 
conduct substantially impairs the habitability-the suitability for de- 
cent living-of a neighbor's premises. I t  should in any event be 
recognized whenever the landlord, in the lease, has reserved such a 
power of control, unless the standards imposed are clearly "unrea- 
sonable."ll* Of course, landlords could be held strictly responsible for 
tenant conduct and yet still be kept powerless to do anything about it. 
But such a draconian course, apart from its "unfairness," would only 
tend to frustrate rather than promote the objective of providing livable 
homes for most tenants. l3 
B. Remedies 
The landlord's effort to obtain standing is of course only a step 
towards the main legal objective, namely, to obtain a remedy which 
affords effective protection against tenant conduct that is perceived to 
be offensive. And a lease may be drafted not only to confer the 
landlord with standing to complain against such conduct, but also to 
give the landlord a remedy, forfeiture, which the law does not pro- 
vide. H4 
Despite its obvious efficacy in providing protection, forfeiture is the 
remedy least likely to be available to the landlord as a matter of law. 
Except in cases of wasteu5 or of disclaimer by the tenant of his 
112. An attempt to identify the criteria to be observed in developing a definition of 
"reasonable" is made in section III(D)(2) infra. 
113. In Berlin Dev. Corp. v. Vermont Structural Steel Corp., 127 Vt. 367,250 A.2d 189 (1968) the 
question arose as to whether a landlord could recover damages from a tenant whose breach of the 
lease injured other tenants. Recovery by the landlord was denied, and it was said that the 
possibility that the landlord could be held liable to other tenants was not contemplated at Ule time 
the lease with the breaching tenant was made. If, however, the possibility of landlord liability 
weve contemplated when the lease with the breaching tenant was entered into (and an implied 
warranty of habitability suggested the appropriateness of imputing such contemplation), Ulen 
presumably the landlord ought to be able to recover for the losses arising out of the brenching 
tenant's defaults. Whether the landlord's recovery can include potential (but yet unpaid) liabililics 
to other tenants remains an open question. 
114. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 88 3.89, 3.94; 3A Thompson, supra note 19, 8 1324. 
115. To be technically accurate, in the case of tenants for years, the common law did not 
authorize forfeiture or any other remedy even for waste. Like the cause of action itself the remedy 
of forfeiture for waste was originally a statutory creation. The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 
5 (1278), repealed, Civ. P. Ace, Repeal Act, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 59 (1879) first supplied the 
forfeiture remedy (together with treble damages). In so doing, it expanded upon the previously 
enacted Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23, 8 2 (1267), which provided that tenants making 
waste should "yield full damage, and . . . be punished by amerciament greviously." Trnnslation 
from 5 Powell, supra note 24, 1 637 n.4. Neither the Statute of Gloucester nor its forfeiture 
provision was received as a part of the common law in most states; thus, the remedy of forfeiture 
as a matter of law exits, if a t  all, generally only by local statute. Id. ll 650. According to 
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landlord's titleYn6 the common law simply did not treat the tenant's 
unlawful acts on the premises (e.g., breach of a covenant or commit- 
ting a nuisance) as an occasion for terminating the lease.l17 If the 
landlord wanted the power to effect a forfeiture, he had to stipulate for 
it, either by a condition or a limitation on the lease.l18 Thus, a tenant 
who annoys his neighbors by committing nuisances or illegal acts on 
the premises may be liable for damages (to fellow tenants1 l9  or possibly 
the landlord120), may be subject to injunctionl*l or may be subjected 
to criminal penalties, but he could be virtually122 assured that his 
tenancy was safe, unless the lease provided to the contrary. And except 
where the rule has been modified by statute, such as statutes providing 
for eviction for illegal use,123 this is still the law.lZ4 Hence, it is 
Professor Powell, nineteen states have such statutes and one state, hhryland, recognizes 
forfeiture for waste by reception of the Statute of Gloucester. Id. 
116. This obsolescent basis for forfeiting a leasehold is said to have arisen as a consequence of 
the feudal idea that tenants owed fealty to their lords on pain of destroying the tenure. R 
Megany & H. Wade, Real Property 654-55 (4th ed. 1975); 3A Thompson, supril note 19. 55 
1316-17. The doctrine has been limited in its application (id.), but still receives judicial 
recognition (Port Arthur Towing Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 392, 402 (W.D. La. 
1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing rule and thereby according salvation after 
nearly 100 years of "Shepardarian damnation"); h1cNeill v. hlcNeil1, 456 S.W.2d 800, 804 (hlo. 
Ct. App. 1970)). Some courts have at best partially repudiated the doctrine. E.g.. hlc?rlichael v. 
Craig, 105 Ala. 382, 16 So. 883 (1895). 
117. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.94. \Vholly obsolete bae s  for forfeitwe, e.g., iortious 
alienation, are ignored. See 1 Tiffany, supra note 17, 5 189. 
118. See note 129 infra and accompanying text. A limitation on the lease, like a special 
limitation on a freehold, results in an automatic termination of the lessee's estate, whereas a 
condition (or condition subsequent) confers only a right of entry (or power of terminaxion) having 
no terminal effect on the lessee's estate until exercised by the lessor, either by reentry or 
ejectment. Cf. Conger v. Conger, 208 Kan. 823,828-30,491 P.2d 1081, 1056-87 (1972); 1 Am. L. 
Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.89. Both types of provisions operate to forfeit the tenant's right of 
possession, although local procedural considerations (such as the availability of summary proceed- 
ings) may recommend the selection of one over the other in actual drafting. Burnee Corp. v. 
Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 hGc. 435, 437-38, 230 N.Y.S. 239, 246 (App. T. 1928). Set 
generally hl. Friedman, Preparation of Leases 4344 (1962); Niles. Conditional Limitations in 
Leases in New York, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 15 (1933). 
119. See note 38 supra. 
120. See notes 63-78 supra and accompanying text. 
121. See notes 38, 79-83 supra and accompanying kxt. 
122. He could not be entirely assured that hi tenancy would be safe because of the possibility 
that a court might exercise its equitable powers to cancel the I w e  based upon the illegal use. See 
notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text. 
123. E.g., Mas. Ann. Laws ch. 139, 5 19 (1972); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law 55 711(5), 
715 (McKinney 1963). Some states also have statutes authorizing eviction for breach of l e a  
covenants even if the lease does not so stipulate. See note 129 infra. 
124. Rosernan v. Day, 345 hiass. 93, 94-95, 185 N.E.2d 650, 651-52 (1962); Common~rulth 
v. \Ventworth, 146 hiass. 36, 37, 15 N.E. 138, 141 (1888); hlcKenzie v. Carte, 385 S W.2d 520, 
529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See also 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant 5 1013 (1970). 
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customary, if not almost invariable, that the lease will provide that, in 
cases of tenant breach, the landlord may terminate, effecting a forfei- 
ture of the tenant's term.12s 
1. Remedial Alternatives to Forfeiture 
Forfeiture is by no means the only potential recourse available to the 
landlord who desires to enforce lease-contained conduct restrictions 
against a recalcitrant tenant. The compensatory relief of damages126 
125. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 3.94; M. Friedman, Preparation of Leases 43 (1962 ed.). 
126. If a tenant covenants in a lease to refrain from certain uses of the premises (or from 
certain conduct on the premises) and if the tenant then violates that covenant, the landlord may 
recover damages for the breach. Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) 
(cultivation restriction in agricultural lease); 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 3.40; Restatement of 
Property 8 528 (1944); for additional citations see 3A Thompson, supra note 19, 5 1325 n.1. 
However, the paucity of reported cases in which actual damages have been awarded or even 
sought makes it difficult to deduce an authoritative basis for measuring or allowing such 
damages. 
As a starting point, it may be presumed that the damage measure should be geared to 
compensate the landlord for the "net amount of the losses caused and gains prevented" by tlle 
breach (Restatement of Contracts 8 329 (1932)), i.e., to place the landlord in as good a position as 
he would have been in had the breach not occurred (Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329, 
332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) ("The measure. . . is the pecuniary loss shown to have been within the 
contemplation of the parties."); see D. Dobbs, Remedies 8 12.1, a t  786 (1973); cf. Riess v. 
Murchison, 503 F.2d 999, 1011 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975) ("Anything less 
is inadequate reparation [for breach of contract].")). However, the very fact that there are but few 
reported cases in point is no doubt indicative of the relative hopelessness of this aim. 
Nevertheless, assuming that the landlord's primary interest is economic, to preserve the net 
rental yield of his investment, the basic measure of injury to the landlord's interest can at least be 
seen in terms of the impact which the breach has on such rental yield; hence, the damages would 
be the amount by which the breach has diminished the rental value of the leased premises andlor 
adjacent premises also owned by the landlord. Or, analogizing to the damage measure applicable 
in the case of waste or of a nuisance causing permanent diminution in rental yield, the 
appropriate measure might be the capifalized value of the reduction in rentnl value, such 
capitalized value being reflected in a lowered sale value for the premises as a whole. See D. 
Dobbs, Remedies 8 5.4, at 335-44 (1973). See also Smith v. United Crude Oil Co., SO Cal. App. 
466, 469, 195 P. 434, 435 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920), on remand from 179 Cal. 570, 178 P. 141 (1919) 
(the damages would "be those which plaintiff would have suffered by reason of his property being 
injured by a depreciation in value being produced, or by some other injury which would naturally 
occur because of the nonpermitted use''). Under certain circumstances, some measure other than 
the "diminution in value" measure may possibly be appropriate. E.g., Sussmnn Volk Co. v 88 
Delicatessen, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (cost of restoration for breach of prohibition 
on alterations). However, it seems clear enough that it is the detriment to the lessor (rather thon 
any possible benefit to the lessee) which should serve as the basis for measuring the lessor's 
recovery for breach of the covenant. See Speck v. Cottonwood Coal Co., 116 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 
1940) (Montana statute); Smith v. Union Crude Oil Co., supra; cf. Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 
181, 189, 147 A. 390, 393-94 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929) (deed covenant). 
The "diminution in value" measure of damages finds support by analogy in at lens1 three types 
of cases, viz., those dealing with damages for breach of use covenants in deeds of fee interests, 
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those dealing with lease covenants restricting competition, and those dealing with contractual 
obligations which are related to the presewation of a reputational interest (e.g.. goodtvill) of the 
promisee. 
Use Cottenants in Deeds of Fee Interests 
A number of cases may be found stating that, for violation of a deed covenant restricting use, 
the measure of injury is the diminution in the market value of the parcel intended to be benefited 
by the covenant. E.g., Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 147 A. 390 (Ct. Err & App. 1929); 
Ackerman v. True, 175 N.Y. 353, 359-61, 67 N.E. 629, 630 (1903); see Womack v. Ward, 186 
S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944) (granting nominal damages with susestion that actual 
damages would consist of depression of either r e n d  or sales d u e  of property intended to bc 
benefited by the covenant). And, in an appropriate case, the "diminution in value" damagcs may 
be measured on a current (rental value) basis rather than upon a capitalized (sale value) b&. 
See, e.g., Stauber v. Granger, 495 P.2d 67 (Alas. 1972), a case which involved a deed restriction 
prohibiting certain multi-family dwellings. In Stauber, the covenantor violated this restriction by 
putting up prohibited structures with the result that the plaintiffs could "not enjoy the sunound- 
ings for which they had bargained [and were deprived of,] the privacy and quiet enjoyment which 
they would have had" were i t  not for the breach. Id. a t  69. Presuming that the restrictions would, 
by their terms probably terminate four years hence, the court assessed damages "based on a 
yearly loss of enjoyment." Id. at  70. 
On occasion, the actual amount of the award seems to have been arrived at quite arbitrarily. 
Stauber v. Granger, supra; Mock v. Shulman, 226 Cal. App. 2d 263, 38 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Dit. Ct. 
App. 1964) ($500 damages for violation of covenant not to interfere with tight and dr) .  And when 
the injury from the breach is too difficult to quantify monetarily, recovery may be denied 
altogether. See Sussman Volk Co. v. 88 Delicatwen, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1950) 
(lease covenant forbidding sale on premises of non-Kosher products). But see Binghamton Plaza. 
Inc. v. Gainsky, 32 App. Div. 2d 994, 301 N.Y.S.2d 921 (3d Dep't 1969) (per curiam) tallowing 
a t  least nominal damages for breach of a deed covenant). 
In applying the deed covenant cases by analogy in order to establish a damage measure for 
lease covenant cases, one potential difficulty might be identifying the parcel intended to be 
benefited by the covenant. Unlike the deed covenant cases, where the benefited parcel is usually 
obvious enough (generally being neighboring land retained by the grantor or his successon in 
interest), in lease covenant cases there exist a t  least three choices: (1) the benefited parcel may bc 
the demised premises themselves (especially where the prohibited conduct would be in the nature 
of waste), (2) the benefited parcel may be the larger premises of which the demised premises rue 
part (especially where the prohibited conduct would be in the nature of a nuisance), or (3) there 
may be no benefited parcel, i.e., the covenant may be personal (for example, whuc prohibited 
conduct would be an illegal activity, such as prostitution, for which the landlord may have 
statutory vicarious liability (see N.Y. hlult. Dwell. Law 55 35 1-60 (McKnney 1975)) or where the 
prohibited activity might expose the landlord to onerous civil liability under the 'public use" 
doctrine (see Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 359 (1965)). In setting forth restrictions on the 
tenant's use of the premises, the lease will seldom be explicit about which of the foregoing 
interests of the landlord the covenant is supposed to protect. However, when actually applying 
the "diminution in value" measure (or other measure), it hardy seems that thii inutphcitness 
should present any obstacle to recovery; for presumably, in extracting the use restriction 
covenant, the landlord intended to protect all of hi interests which might foreseeably be 
jeopardized by the tenant's breach. The usefulness of breaking down the possibilities is therefore 
chiefly to assure exhaustiveness in measuring the damages for breach rather thm to suggest any 
limitations on recoveries. 
Lease Covenants Restricting Competition 
Cases involving restrictions on competition are analogous insofar as such restrictions on "use" 
by one landowner are aimed a t  protecting the interests of persons holding nearby parcels. In such 
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cases, the diminution in the value (usually rental value) of the benefited parcel is a recognized 
measure of recovery for the breach (see 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.42; Note, Lessors' 
Covenants Restricting Competition: Drafting Problems, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1400, 1411-12 (1950); 
Note, Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 940, 950-51 (1959)) 
although in some cases a more direct measure of the breach induced injury (such as lost profits) 
may be employed to fix damages. Id. 
In considering the damage measure in restriction on competition cases as an analogy to use 
restrictions imposed on tenants, a t  least two possible distinguishing factors should be observed. 
First, in the competition cases, the courts are dealing with activities depriving the covenantee of n 
deliberately conferred economic advantage (having a certain degree of market exclusivity) by n 
person trying to shift that same economic advantage, in part, to himself. Thus, the goal of 
allowing damages in such cases is arguably concerned more with "restitution" than with 
"compensation." In use restriction cases, on the other hand, the concern is with compensating for 
a deprivation of an economic advantage (rights in a reversion or in neighboring premises) where 
the activities causing such deprivation do not necessarily tend to appropriate any part of that 
advantage to the person engaged in the depriving activities. However, since the competition cases 
themselves do not recognize the restitutionary or "disgorgement" measure of recovery (see Bnrr & 
Sons, Inc. v. Cherry Hill Center, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 358, 217 A.2d 631 (App. Div. 1966); 
Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4, 111-19 (1964)), this distinction should not be significant so far as damage 
measurement principles are concerned. 
Secondly, in the restriction on competition cases, it is often the injured neighboring tt~rant who 
is the complaining covenantee, and the landlord or other lessees of the landlord are the ones 
whose activities are complained of as causing injury to the tenant's interests. Although this L the 
exact reverse of the use restriction cases (where the landlord is complaining of breaches of the 
covenant by the tenant), the distinction should also not be significant so far as damage 
measurement principles are concerned. For in both types of cases, the injury involved is the 
adverse effect on one owner of an interest in land resulting from a breach of covenant by persons 
interested in neighboring real estate. 
Contractual Provisions Designed to Protect Reputation 
A last group of cases which may supply some analogy to the breach of use restriction situntion 
are those cases where a promisee claims damages for injury to his goodwill because of a breach of 
contract. The profitability of the landlord's investment is, of course, directly related to Ule 
rentability of the spaces in his premises, i.e., to the continuing attractiveness of such spaces to 
existing and potential occupants. Clearly, also, the activities of some occupants can-to the extent 
others are uncomfortably aware of such activities-reduce the attractiveness of the Iandlord's 
offerings in the market for rental space, i.e., the activities can "taint" the landlord's building, 
reducing its value. 
The appropriateness of allowing recovery for injury to goodwill flowing from n breach of n 
promise (as to the quality of goods being sold) has been recognized. E.g., Barrett Co. v. Pnnther 
Rubber Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1928); Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cnl. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 348 
(1951); General Riveters, Inc. v. Morse Chain Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 859, 224 N.Y.S.2d 746 (4th 
Dep't 1962). In supporting such recoveries, the relationship of goodwill to expected future returns 
has been pointed to. Id. One of the difficulties in allowing recovery for goodwill has, in fact, been 
the concern that the alleged loss (of profits) would be too speculative or remote. See Annot., 28 
A.L.R.2d 591, 593 (1953). This concern might apply equally to the landlord seeking recovery: 
unless it could be shown that there was indeed a proximately caused (and contemplated) decline 
in the rents received for his properties-attributable to the tenant's breach of covenant-the 
prospects for an award of substantial damages would seem to be slim. 
In this connection, there is the related question of whether and to what extent the landlord 
should be able to recover loss of profit or other consequential damages from a breaching tenant. 
For an indication that they may not be recoverable, see Gila River Pima-Maricopn Indir~n 
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and the specific relief of inj~nctionl*~ will usually be available as 
theoreticafalternatives. For in the usual case, the restrictions on tenant 
conduct d l  be found to be framed as both covenants and condi- 
tions.128 It is well settled at common law that damages and injunctive 
relief would not be available for breach of a mere condition, just as no 
forfeiture can be predicated on the breach of a mere covenant.129 But 
if the restrictions on tenant conduct are framed as both covenants and 
conditions, the choice of which recourse to take for breach--damages, 
injunction or forfeiture-will be, theoretically, at  least, up to the 
landlord. 
Sometimes, even though the tenant's default is both a breach of 
covenant and of condition, the landlord may prefer to enforce conduct 
standards by employing one of the ordinary contract remedies, viz., 
damages or injunction. The case of a basically sound and economically 
valuable long-term commercial lease is one example. However, in the 
great preponderance of situations, where the tenant's behavioral 
shortfall is of more than mere trivial interest to the landlord, removal 
of the tenant (via forfeiture of the tenant's possessory right) may 
Community v. United States, 467 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (Ct C1. 1972) (iivolviag bra& of 
undertaking to improve the demised premises in lieu of rent held, damages were difference 
between the value of the unimproved land and the value it would have had if improved as 
agreed, hut not 'lost potential profits."). However, even if loss of profit or other consequential 
damages are not recoverable, such types of damages should not be confused with a demonstrable 
loss of rental value which might, due to the tenant's breach, be experienced by the owner of the 
premises intended to be benefited by the covenant. Loss of rental value, insofnr as it dfects 
capital (sale) value fairly directly, would seem to be more appropriately treated as a "diminution 
in value" rather than a "loss of profitsn item of damages. 
127. E.g., Boh v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 128 F.2d 864 (5th Cu. 1942); 1 Am. L. Prop.. 
supra note 3, 8 3.40. 
128. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 3.94. Obviously, as a drafting matler, the lnndlord is in 
a position to provide himself with both contractual remedies (damages and injunction) as well as 
the forfeiture remedy, based on a condition or a conditional limitdion, for nonobservance of 
prescribed conduct standards, subject only to the negotiating strength nnd acumen of the tenant 
and hi counselors. The practice in form leases and negotiated written lemes is genually to 
provide that defaults by the tenant in the performance of covenants will not only be coneact 
breaches but will also be potential occasions for forfeiture (usually at the landlord's election). Id. 
Thus, the case of the landlord with a choice between damages, injunction, or forfeiture, may be 
fairly taken, it is submitted, as the usual case. 
129. For cases to the effect that breach of a condition will not give rise to an action for 
damages or injunction, see, e.g., Palmer v. Fort Plain & Cooperstown Plank-road Co., 11 N.Y. 
376, 389 (1854); 3 A. Corbin, Contracts 8 633 (1960); cf. New York Cent R.R. v. City of 
Bucyrus, 126 Ohio St. 558, 186 N.E. 450 (1933). For cases to the effect thnl b m c h  of a covenant 
will not in itself support a forfeiture, see, e.g., Kerr-blcGee Corp. v. Bokum Corp., 453 F.2d 
1067 (10th Cir. 1972) (New Mexico latv); Klinger v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 373 (Alas. 1971). 
However, the latter rule has been occasionally modified by statute. E.g., Aru. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9 
33-361 (1974); Cal. Civ. Code 8 1930 (West 1954) (authorizing rescission for b m c h  of a covenant 
concerning use). 
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constitute the only economically efficient method of enforcing the 
prescribed conduct standards.130 Removal of the offending tenant will 
be the only effective means of preventing interference with (or destruc- 
tion of) the values which are sought to be preserved or promoted by 
imposing the conduct standards in the first place. 
The damage remedy can usually provide only very imperfect com- 
pensation in lieu of the performance contracted for, especially where 
residential tenancies are involved. There the interests invaded (espe- 
cially those of the neighboring residents) are usually subjective inter- 
ests incapable of reduction to monetary equivalents. How much is it 
worth to have a good night's sleep, unmolested by the aural overflows 
from the neighbors' frolics, or to look forward to an evening of quiet 
contemplation at home? True, where the landlord is the moving party 
in a damage action, his interest may seem more quantifiable in 
monetary terms. After all, the landlord's interest is almost always 
purely economic. Nevertheless, even in assessing damages to the 
landlord, the measurement of compensation with anything approach- 
ing acceptable precision may be all but impossible. Even though the 
landlord's injury would be theoretically measurable by the revenue loss 
caused by the reduced attractiveness of his building to tenants,I3l in 
practice this measure may be insubstantial, especially if the offensive 
tenant's conduct has not persisted long enough to drive neighboring 
tenants away.132 The scarcity of cases in which the landlord seeks 
compensation in damages for a tenant's breach of conduct or use 
restrictions is an indication of the inadequacy of this remedy.133 
In any case, why should the landlord be forced to accept a unilater- 
ally imposed substitute form of revenue from his investment (damages 
instead of higher rents), and why should an offensive tenant be 
130. This statement is made with particular reference to breaches of conduct or use type 
restrictions, and it would not necessarily apply to tenant's breaches consisting of mere failures to 
pay money. Such a failure may obviously not be trivial from the landlord's viewpoint, but 
nonetheless, forfeiture may be neither necessary nor even conducive to compelling the desired 
payment. In any event, the practice has been to treat nonpayment defaults specially, particulnrly 
where mere tardiness of payment and not its omission entirely is the crux of the landlord's 
complaint. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.96. The matter is discussed further in text 
accompanying notes 200-06 infra. 
131. See suggested analogies discussed in note 126 supra. 
132. I t  may also be limited by the requirement of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 
(Ex. 1854), as to the foreseeability of such losses. Shachtman v. ~Mnsters-Lake Success, Inc., 14 
App. Div. 2d 584, 218 N.Y.S.2d 150 (2d Dep't 1961); Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S. W.2d 329 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969). See also Koutsourades v. Mericle, 80 Misc. 2d 561, 363 N.Y.S.2d 295 
(Dutchess County Ct. 1975) (damages for covenant to insure limited to premium, not loss due to 
fire); Berlin Dev. Corp. v. Vermont Structural Steel Corp., 127 Vt. 367, 250 A.2d 189 (1968). 
133. See note 126 supra. 
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supported in imposing such a substitution?134 Perhaps more to the 
point, the damage remedy can scarcely serve as an effective curative 
mechanism from the viewpoint of the neighboring tenants.135 And it is 
the neighbors' interests which are the ones most directly invaded by an 
offending tenant's conduct defaults. 
Injunctive relief would theoretically avoid the deficiencies of the 
damage remedy, but in practical application it too does not seem well 
suited to the enforcement of conduct restrictions. In the main, this 
unsuitability stems from the fact that, for violation of the court's 
directive, little can be done short of incarcerating the offender. The 
specter-and, one would hope, the unlikelihood-that a tenant might 
be jailed for failure to remove a dog, install a carpet or refrain from 
late night piano playing is enough in itself to indicate the shortcomings 
of the injunctive remedy. 
Thus, on balance, the remedial alternatives to forfeiture are proba- 
bly not generally effective in affording the protection, to the landlord 
or neighboring tenants, that conduct restrictions are supposed to 
achieve. Damages are not effective because they are difficult to assess 
accurately and probably do not truly compensate in any event. Injunc- 
tive relief can be ultimately effective only if we are willing to put lease 
violators in jail. Thus, it is fitting to consider whether some other 
remedy, supplied by agreement, would be more effective and appro- 
priate to enforce landlord-prescribed conduct restrictions. Forfeiture is 
such a remedy.136 
134. See Dunklee v. Adams, 20 Vt. 415, 421 (1848) ("How can it be said, that any particular 
sum of money will be a just compensation for the personal inconvenience and suffering 
occasioned by the breach . . . ?"). Obviously a person should not be permitted to take anything he 
wants simply because he is willing to pay for it. I t  is hostility to such private "eminent domain" 
with respect to "environmental" assets that, among other things, underlies the tendency to clmsify 
nuisances as temporary rather than permanent See note 72 supra. 
135. Courts should not be "controlled exclusively by money value, but may protect a home." 
hfles v. Hollingsworth, 44 Cal. App. 539, 519, 187 P. 167, 172 (Dit. C t  App. 1920). 
136. Conceivably there are agreement-based remedies, other than forfeiture. which a hnd- 
lord could resort to in order to enforce conduct restrictions on hi tenants. Provision could be 
made for explicit penalties or for other consequences of default (e.g., acceleration of m t .  
forfeitable security deposits) which are penalties in effect. These penalty-type remedies, though 
they may tend to induce tenant compliance, differ from forfeiture in an important respec& 
penalties may help to keep the landlord-tenant relationship from going sour, but only forfeiture 
gives the landlord a true "out" in the event it does go sour. The importance of the distinction is 
discussed in section III(B)(Z)(c)(iv) infra. 
Of course, the enforceability of penalty-type remedies mould be, under present law, extremely 
limited at best, subject to all of the objections (discussed infra) raked against forfeiture and 
probably then some. See Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L. Rev. 
495 (1962). Because of such objectionability, and because in practice landlords xldom resort to 
penalties in leases, they will not be discussed. 
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2. The Forfeiture Remedy and the Limitations on Its Use 
Compared with the remedial alternatives of damages or injunction, 
the forfeiture remedy provides an annoying tenant's neighbors-and, 
derivatively, the landlord-with protection that is very effective in- 
deed. Because forfeiture results in physical removal of the annoying 
tenant, it  is by far the remedy most likely to achieve the desired result 
of eliminating the annoyance. Moreover, if the author's survey of the 
reported cases is any indication, forfeiture is clearly the remedy most 
sought by landlords disaffected by a tenant's behavior. Yet, forfeiture 
is a remedy which the courts have been most reluctant to apply, even 
when expressly agreed to in the lease. Due to the unique effectiveness 
of the forfeiture remedy, and to what appears to be a (consequent?) 
preference for it among landlords, a review of the court-imposed 
limitations on the use of forfeiture is justified. For, given its efficiency 
and apparent preferability, these court-imposed limitations constitute, 
as a practical matter, the most serious restrictions on the landlord's 
power to control tenant behavior.I3' 
a. The Basic Enforceability of Lease Forfeitures 
It is an agreement138 which forms the basis for imposing the 
landlord's conduct restrictions on the tenant; therefore, the extent to 
which such restrictions are enforceable via the judicial mechanism can 
be expected to be limited, inter alia, by the factors limiting the 
enforcement of agreements generally.139 On the other hand, in the 
137. I t  has been observed correctly that "where legal sanctions are not ndequnte, [the] power 
of contract [i.e., freedom of contract] is curtailed," except where self-help or ngreed remedies are 
possible. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L. Rev. 495, 498 (1962). 
Thus, to the extent that the agreed remedy of forfeiture is, practically speaking, necessnry to give 
effective legal sanction to landlord-prescribed tenant conduct restrictions, the limitations on its 
availability may be seen as a de facto limitation on the landlord's power to control tenant 
conduct. 
138. The word "contract," if used in a very broad sense, might be preferable to Ulo word 
"agreement" since "contract" connotes legal enforceability whereas the word "ngreement" has a 
more neutral connotation. However, in order to prevent confusion and to be strictly nccurntc 
legally (see Acme Mkts., Inc. v. Dawson Enterprises, Inc., 253 Md. 76, 87, 251 A.2d 839, 846 
(1969), quoting 1A A. Corbin, Contracts $265 (1963)), the word "contractual" is avoided here; for 
insofar as forfeiture provisions are concerned, it is not narrowly speaking the contractual 
significance of such landlord-imposed norms but rather their "conveyance" significnncc, as 
conditions or conditional limitations on the lease, which underlies the landlord's clnimed powcr to 
forfeit. See notes 118 & 129 supra and accompanying text. 
139. E.g., the presence of fraud, incapacity, mistake, impossibility of performnnce, wdvcr, 
estoppel, or illegality, to mention some of the more usual ones. An ngreement's semantic 
effectiveness in communicating the parties' intent to the interpreter is also nn importnnt factor 
limiting the enforcement of agreements generally. These "interpretive" barriers to enforcement 
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absence of such factors, when a tenant defaults and the lease provides 
for forfeiture, the landlord's right to assert the forfeiture might be 
expected simply to follow: agreements which are intended to be 
binding ought, in general, to be enforced. And sometimes courts have 
simply so he1d.l4O Indeed, if effect is not given to the conditions on the 
tenant's rights under a forfeitable lease, the limited estate141 which was 
originally transferred to the tenant will be enlarged, in effect, at the 
landlord's expense. 142 
Furthermore, nonenforcement of the forfeiture may also mean that 
the offending tenant's limited estate143 will be enlarged at the 
neighboring tenants' expense. For if denial of forfeiture relief means 
often get mixed together with (or inappropriately substituted for) substantive gmunds for 
nonenforcement. See note 190 and text accompanying notes 16568 infre 
140. E.g., School Dit. R E 2 a )  v. Panucci, 30 Colo. App. 184, 490 P.2d 711 (1971); F i a t  
Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630, 638, 237 N.E.21863. 
871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725 (1968) (the "[sltability of contract obligation must not be undermined 
by judicial sympathy." (emphasis omitted)); hlobil Oil Cotp. v. Burdo, 69 hZisc. 2d 153, 159,329 
N.Y.S.2d 742, 750 (Dist. Ct. 1972) ("rights . . . may not be based on a consideration of the 
equities if . . . fixed by the plain language"); Caranas v. Blorgan Hosts-Harry Hines Boulevard, 
Inc., 460 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); see Feist & Feist v. Long Island Studios, Inc., 
29 App. Div. 2d 186, 287 N.Y.S.2d 257 (2d Dep't 1968); Dunklee v. Mams, 20 V t  415, 421 
(1848). 
Unsurprisingly, the principle that agreements ought to be enforced if intended to be binding 
usually seems to find expression in forfeiture cases only where the court is disposed to uphold the 
forfeiture being asserted. Query, however, does not the general judicial hostility to forfeiture 
indicate that the contrary presumption is more appropriate with respect to forfeiture agreements, 
viz., that forfeiture agreements ought not, in general, to be enforced in the absence of spedd 
factors? If such contrary presumption were more appropriate in the m e  of forfeiture agreements 
(and no position on the question is taken here), it is submitted thnt one special factor supporting 
their enforcement would be a purpose of controlling tenant conduct for the benefit of the grater  
number of tenants. 
141. T o  the purist, it might be preferable to talk of a "limited interest" rather than a "limited 
estate" in this context. For insofar as the forfeiture is predicated upon a condition (subsequent) 
rather than a conditional (special) limitation (see note 118 supra), the tenant's estate is not 
technically limited by the defeasance provision, though it is subject to being cut off. See 
Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 
Harv. L. Rev. 248, 274-75 (1940). Realistically, though, the distinction is "nonsense." Id. at  274. 
142. In  an analogous context, one court h w  recently observed thnt "v..hile equity does 
traditionally disfavor forfeitures, i t  does not license judicial eradication of rights . . . dearly 
vested by the contracting parties as part of their barpin." h a  Rippa Music, Inc. v. 
Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1975) (licensing of intellectual property). 
Of course, such enlargement of the tenant's estate might, under certain circumstances, be 
proper despite the implicit expropriation of one private interest (the landlord's) in favor of another 
private party. The presence of some of the factors mentioned in note 139 supra would, for 
example, justify such an enlargement with no violence a t  it to established notions of justice. 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize such enlargement (and expropriation) for what it is when 
deciding whether or not, in a particular case, it is to be countenanced as the lesser evil. 
143. See note 141 supra. 
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that no effective relief is available,144 then the offending tenant will 
succeed in appropriating an excessive share of the common environ- 
mental asset145 which was supposed to be shared by all tenants.146 
Nonetheless, forfeiture agreements have not been enforceable in the 
courts to the same extent as other agreements. The reasons why they 
have not may be divided into two general categories. First, there are 
reasons for nonenforcement which are applicable to agreements gener- 
ally but which, in the context of forfeiture agreements, seem to receive 
stricter application than they do in other contexts. Among these one 
might list waiver, strict construction against the draftsman and failure 
to perform what is, broadly speaking, a condition precedent to the 
agreed remedy. Secondly, there are reasons for nonenforcement of 
forfeitures which are somewhat special to the forfeiture remedy even 
though they may sometimes apply to other types of agreements as 
we11.14' These special reasons for nonenforcement remain (reflecting 
their origins) characteristically equitable in their nature. They reflect 
equity's early concern with the disproportionate hardship of allowing 
the enforcement of certain agreements valid a t  law, and they include (i) 
the adequacy of the tenant's actual performance, or of damages, to 
protect the landlord's bargain and (ii) the relative hardship which 
would result from a forfeiture compared with the hardship to others as 
a result of a substantial noncompensable breach of the particular lease 
requirement. 
These limitations on the enforceability of the forfeiture remedy will 
be discussed in turn below. 
b. Limitations on Fogeiture Which Are Applicable to Agreements 
Generally 
Forfeiture as a remedy for lease violations is frequently described by 
the courts as being "harsh" or "drastic,"148 a subject of judicial 
144. See note 46 supra and accompanying text and section III(B)(l) supra. 
145. See notes 9 & 10 supra and accompanying text. 
146. The situation would be little different from one in which a tenant partitioned off n 
portion of a common area for his own exclusive use. 
147. Sometimes their application to other types of agreements may be under another name, 
e.g., "unconscionability," or may be appropriate only for particular remedies, e.g., specific 
performance or an injunction. 
148. E.g., Fritts v. Cloud Oak Flooring Co., 478 S.W.2d 8, 11-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Feist 
& Feist v. Long Island Studios, Inc., 29 App. Div. Zd 186, 191, 287 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (2d Dcp't 
1968) (dissenting opinion); Moss v. Hirshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 406, 303 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451-52 
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969); Bernstein v. Bernstein, 210 N.Y.S. 539, 540 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other 
grounds, 214 App. Div. 790, 210 N.Y.S. 539, 541 (2d Dep't 192% aff'd per curiam, 213 N.Y. 
559, 154 N.E. 604 (1926). But cf. First Nat l  Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc., 
21 N.Y.Zd 630, 638, 237 N.E.2d 868, 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725-26 (1968) ("Should we hold 
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"abhorrence."149 Courts do not always articulate their reasons for these 
views of forfeiture, often offering vague comments such as " '[tlhe 
continuation rather than the extinction of grants is favored,' "IS0 " ' the 
right to retain property . . . is . . . sacred,' "Is1 or "the law provides 
other remedies more consonant with justice."lS2 Harshness, drasticness 
or judicial abhorrence has sometimes appeared to serve ips0 facto as a 
reason for refusing to enforce a forfeiture, for example in an occasional 
recent case decided on grounds of unconscionability.1s3 But the pri- 
mary impact of the courts' historical disfavor of forfeitures has been 
their resulting willingness to apply the ordinary reasons for nonen- 
forcement of agreements somewhat expansively so as to avoid forfei- 
tures. 
For example, the doctrine of waiver would support the nonenforce- 
ment of a forfeiture based upon failure to perform an agreement 
provided that there has been an inte?rtiotzal relinquishment of a known 
right.lS4 However, courts have frequently held that landlords have 
waived forfeitures even under circumstances where the intent, as 
objectively manifested, was rather obviously to enforce rather than 
relinquish the right to declare a forfeiture.lsS The general rule that any 
that the termination of this lease is harsh and inequitable. then the same condusian can be 
reached in every instance where a landlord esercises his contractual righu. and, in that event. the 
right of termination or any other right specified in a lease would be rendered me;uringless and 
ineffectual."). 
149. E.g., Tollius 1. Dutch Inns of America, Inc., 244 So. 2d 467, 472 (Fla Di t .  Ct. App. 
1970); 614 Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 297 hlinn. 395, 398, 211 N.W.2d 891, 894 (19731; Fly Hi 
Music Corp. v. 645 Restaurant Corp., 64 hlisc. 2d 302, 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. City 
Civ. Ct. 1970), aff'd mem., 71 hlisc. 2d 302, 335 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. T. 1972). In a similar vein, 
one commentator has said, "As restrictions for the benefit of other property, they [conditions] are 
crude weapons of the early law; their survival indicates a cultural lag." Goldstein. Rights of 
Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of h d ,  54 Han.. L. Rev. 248, 
250 (1940). However the focus of that Article was on conditions imposed on fees. Cf. text 
accompanying note 175 infra. 
150. 220 W. 42 Associates v. Cohen, 60 ,liic. 2d 983, 985. 302 N.Y.S.2d 4%. 496 (App T. 
1969), paraphrasing 57th St. Luce Corp. v. General hlotors Cotp., 182 h&c. 164, 168, 46 
N.Y.S.2d 730, 733 (Sup. Ct) ,  aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 978, 48 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1st Dep't), d ' d  
without opinion, 293 N.Y. 717, 56 N.E.2d 732 (1944). 
151. Mihans v. hxunicipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 484, 87 Cal. Rptr 17, 20 (Wi t  Ct. 
App. 1970), quoting Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio S t  12, 24, 41 N.E. 263, 265 (1899. 
152. hliller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 761, 260 P. 358, 360 (Dit. Ct. App. 1927). 
153. 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 hlisc. 2d 353. 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(App. T. 1972); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 72 h&c. 2d 6,338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (X.Y. City 
Civ. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 79 h&c. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. T. 1973); cf. 
Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 hlisc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Rockland County Ct. 1975). 
154. 5 S. iVilliston, Contracts 5 678 (3d ed. 1961); cf. Sessions, Inc. v. hlorton. 491 F.2d 854 
(9th Cir. 1974); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 
567 (1938); 3A A. Corbin, Contracts 5 757 (1960). 
155. E.g., Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 260 P. 358 (Dil. Ct. App. 1927); \ifooUard v 
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act recognizing continuation of the tenancy constitutes a waiver,ls6 
and its specific application to acceptance of rent which accrues after 
the breach, ls7 clearly evidence a judicial approach which exalts avoid- 
ance of forfeitures over determinations based on actual intent. Admit- 
tedly, this anti-forfeiture approach to waivers has not been uniformly 
followed,1s8 and one may only impressionistically attribute the ap- 
proach to the courts' "characteristic reluctance to enforce forfei- 
tures."lS9 However, it appears fair to conclude, on balance, that the 
courts have at  least sometimes stretched the doctrine of waiver in order 
to avoid forfeitures which they did not wish to enforce. 
Similarly, courts frequently avoid forfeitures by strictly construing 
the lease in order to hold either that there was no condition intended at  
all,l6O or that the condition was not breached.161 Sometimes a court 
may go so far as to " 'construe' language into patently not meaning 
what the language is patently trying to say."162 Although strict con- 
struction against the landlord is sometimes justified on the grounds 
that it was the landlord who was responsible for drafting the lease and, 
hence, for any ambiguities it contains,163 it  has likewise been suggested 
- - 
Schaffer Stores, Co., 272 N.Y. 304, 5 N.E.2d 829 (1936); Fairchild Realty Co. v. Spiegel, Inc., 
246 N.C. 458, 98 S.E.2d 871 (1957). 
156. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 3 3.95; 3A Thompson, supra note 19, $5 1328-29. 
157. See 3A Thompson, supra note 19, 5 1329 ("[Alcceptance by the lessor of rent accruing 
. subsequent to the breach of condition with knowledge of the existence of a cause for forfeiture Is a 
waiver thereof."); id. 1 1329 n.88 and cases cited therein; Woollard v. Schaffer Stores, Co., 272 
N.Y. 304, 5 N.E.2d 829 (1936). 
158. See, e.g., cases cited in note 154 supra. See generally 1 Am. L. Prop., suprn note 3, 5 
3.95; 3A Thompson, supra note 19, $1) 1325-29. 
159. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, $ 3.95, a t  383. Sometimes the court makes it clear that tlle 
abhorrence of forfeiture is the motivation for resort to the doctrine of waiver. See Duncan v. 
Malcomb, 234 Ark. 146, 351 S.W.2d 419 (1961); Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 260 P. 358 
(Dit.  Ct. App. 1927). 
160. See H. Tiffany, Real Property 8 96 (3d abr. ed. 1940); cf. Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, 
Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958). 
161. E.g., Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 260 P. 358 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Hughes v. 
Pallas, 84 Colo. 14, 267 P. 608 (1928); Branmar Theatre Co. v. Brnmar,  Inc., 264 A.2d 526 
(Del. Ch. 1970); Grassham v. Robertson, 277 Ky. 605, 126 S.W.2d 1063 (1939); Wenger v. 
Wenger, 58 Lancaster L. Rev. 111, 114 (Pa. C.P. 1962) (One pair of slippers does not a 
permanent place of abode make.). A careful draftsman can effectively prevent avoidance of 
forfeiture on the theory that a covenant and not a condition was intended. See text accompanying 
note 160 supra. I t  is somewhat harder, however, to draft a lease in a way which prevents a court 
from interpreting it to find that there was no breach of condition. For a further discussion, see 
note 190 infra. 
162. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 702 (1939). Apparent examples me 
Boyd v. Shell Oil Co., 454 Pa. 374, 311 A.2d 616 (1973) and Murphy v. Traynor, 110 Colo. 466, 
135 P.2d 230 (1943). See also discussion in Maginnis v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385, 
394, 88 N.W. 300, 302-03 (1901). 
163. Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526 (Del. Ch. 1970); Charles E. Burt, 
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that the lease should be strictly construed against the landlord even 
when drafted by the tenant.164 Judicial dislike of the forfeiture remedy 
seems clearly to be the more likely explanation for strict constructions 
against forfeiture, and courts often so concede.16' 
In  a similar vein, courts will strive to avoid forfeitures on the 
grounds that the procedural requisites andlor the conditions precedent 
to the remedy have not been met.lb6 
Thus, owing to its bad reputation in the courts, the remedy of 
forfeiture encounters pitfalIs in the course of enforcement that most 
agreements, though ostensibly subject to the same rules, usually do not 
encounter. This differential application of generaiized doctrines to the 
enforcement of forfeiture agreements is criticizable if only because it 
tends to disguise the norms which the courts are using in deciding 
whether to enforce a particular forfeiture or not.167 Worse, the over- 
resort to doctrines such as waiver in order to avoid forfeiture may be a 
cover for the fact that there are no articulable norms being utilized at 
all. The courts may simply be refusing to enforce agreements they do 
not like.16s Even apart from this criticism, however, the question may 
be asked whether the remedy of forfeiture is, in the leasehold contest, 
truly the harsh or drastic one that it  is assumed to be. 
Inc. v. Seven Grand Carp., 340 Mass. 124, 127, 163 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1959); Bevy's Dty Cleaners & 
Shirt Laundry, Inc. v. Streble, 2 Ohio St. 2d 250, 256, 208 N.E.2d 528, 533 (1965). 
164. Acme Mkts., Inc. v. Dawson Enterprises, Inc., 253 Md. 76, 89, 251 A.2d 839, 847 
(1969); d. Woodall v. Pharr, 119 Ga. App. 692, 693, 168 S.E.2d 645, 647 (19691, alf'd, 226 GL 
1, 172 S.E.2d 404 (1970). 
165. E.g., b l l e r  v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 761, 260 P. 358, 360 ( D i L  CL App. 19271 
("courts avoid enforcing covenants for forfeiture wherever possible"); B ramar  Theatre Co. v. 
Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526, 529 (Del. Ch. 1970) ("The disfavor in which forfeitures are viewed 
gives a special reason for invoking this general rule of construction against the [ d n f t s ~ ] . ' ' ) ;  
Woodall v. Pharr, 119 Ga. App. 692, 168 S.E.2d 645 (1969), alf'd, 226 Ga. 1, 172 S.E.2d 4W 
(1970); d. Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J.Eq. 435, 440, 56 A.2d 89, 93 (Ch.), alf'd, 
1 N.J. 508, 64 A.2d 347 (1948), quoting Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.J.Eq. 349,353, 16 A. 4 , 6  
(Ch. 1888) (" 'Conditions subsequent, especially when relied upon to work a forfeiture . . . are 
strictly construed.' '3. 
By interesting contrast, in a case where the lease xvzs a "gift Iwe"  (to a xhwl district), the 
court rejected the rule of strict construction and held that "the plain meaning of the words . . . in 
the ordinary sense" should control. School Di t .  RE-20) v. Panucci, 30 Colo. App. 184, 188.89, 
490 P.2d 711, 713 (1971). 
166. E.g., Woodall v. Pharr, 119 Ga. App. 692, 168 S.E.2d 645 (1969), df'd, 226 Ga. 1, 172 
S.E.2d 404 (1970); Giannini v. Stuart, 6 App. Div. 2d 418, 178 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dcp't 1958); 
see 3A Thompson, supra note 19, 5 1326. The common law requirement of a demand for rent, in 
cases of forfeiture for nonpayment, is a typical example. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.94. 
167. "Covert tools are never reliable tools," said Karl Llewellyn in criticizing the "intentional 
and creative misconstruction" of contracts. Llewellyn, Book Review. 52 H m ? .  L. Rev. 700. 703 
(1939). See also the discussion at note 190 infm. 
168. Berger, supra note 22, at 792. 
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Actually, when all relevant interests are considered, forfeiture may 
often, perhaps even typically, be the least drastic remedy available in 
offensive tenant cases. I t  neither threatens the offending tenant with 
jail (as would injunctive relief) nor, more importantly, does it let the 
tenant impose his idiosyncracies on his neighbors or the landlord. Nor 
do forfeitures of leaseholds necessarily involve the harsh deprivations 
of value which are associated with other kinds of f 0 r f e i t ~ r e s . I ~ ~  After 
all, the usual tenant pays rent only on a current basis, and what is 
inevitably lost by forfeiture-the tenant's benefit of bargain-will 
usually not be of substantial worth, especially in the case of residential 
tenancies.170 The objectionable tenant will, of course, have to bear the 
costs and inconvenience of the move. But these losses can hardly be 
seen as an unjustified imposition once the alternatives are perceived: 
either the objectionable tenant must move and bear these losses or his 
neighbors must move-or suffer. Because in such cases there are 
substantial but irreconcilable interests on the part not only of the 
landlord and the objectionable tenant, but on the part of neighboring 
tenants as well, there may be no solution which permits the avoidance 
of all inconvenience for all concerned. Consequently, a mechanism 
such as forfeiture, which a t  least minimizes the potential for incon- 
venience, may be the best solution under the  circumstance^.^^^ 
169. Forfeitures may, of course, dependent upon the facts, vury in the degree of harshness 
which they involve, and there may be cases, e.g., where the tenant has a very valuable lease, in 
which "the harsh operation of the law" would call very strongly for equitable intervention agninst 
forfeiture. Dunklee v. Adams, 20 Vt. 415, 425 (1848). 
170. The tenant's aggregate loss may also depend on the iandlord's success in reletting the 
forfeited premises. If, by virtue of a " s u ~ i v a l  clause" in the lease or local law, the forfeiting 
tenant remains liable on a promise to pay rent or damages (e.g., Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 
N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928)), the losses involved in a forfeiture could become substuntid, even 
for a residential tenant whose lease calls only for a "market" rental. The costs of substitute 
premises, when added to the "survival" obligations under the forfeited lease, could result in a 
total burden which is substantial indeed, especially if the landlord did not relet the forfeited 
premises fairly quickly. However, as noted in the text, the alternative to imposing these losses on 
the offending tenant may merely be to force them upon his neighbors who, discontented because 
of the disturbance, may be constrained to abandon their own premises in violation of their own 
leases. The "implied warranty of habitability" might come to the neighbors' rescue-as suggested 
in section III(A)(3) supra. But this rescue still cannot, in the present state of the law, be 
guaranteed. 
The loss to the forfeiting tenant may also be great if the tenant has a long-term lease at a 
favorable rental andlor has made substantial improvements in reliance upon a long-term tenancy. 
Neither of these is likely to be the case with residential tenants; however, a rent-control tenant 
whose possession is protected by law, and whose rent is kept below market by regulation, 
arguably stands to lose by forfeiture in the same way that a long-term commercial lessee stands to 
lose. For a discussion of "survival clauses," or the so-called "lessee's covenant of indemnity," see 1 
Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.97. 
171. See section III(B)(Z)(c)(iv) infra for a discussion of the relationship of relative hurdship 
notions to these issues. 
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Even on this basis, the forfeiture remedy can be criticized in that it  
does not solve the problem but only moves the problem to another 
location.17* Everybody has to live next to somebody. At least this is 
true in an urban setting. And unless we are to banish certain people 
from our cities a l t ~ g e t h e r , ' ~ ~  merely enforcing evictions now and again 
is arguably a solution to nothing. Perhaps one answer to this argument 
is that the threat of forfeiture, or a past eviction, will possibly have 
deterrent potential against offensive conduct; but on this basis forfei- 
ture could be more effective than damages or injunction only in that its 
threat may seem more real. Perhaps a better answer is that, given the 
varying sensitivities of people and their varying levels of tolerance, it is 
not generally realistic to assume that an evicted tenant cannot make a 
satisfactory substitute arrangement. Of course, it may be said that the 
neighbors too could probably make satisfactory substitute arrange- 
ments. But they could usually do so only at a greater aggregate cost. 
Moreover, since any judicial hostility toward forfeitures would apply 
equally to the neighbors' new premises, the refugees from one annoy- 
ing circumstance would be unprotected against encountering the same 
problems in their new place as well. Accordingly, even if forfeitures 
only move the problem around, this is probably more effective and less 
costIy (to say nothing of more "fair") than it is to move around the 
people who have suffered as a result. 
Of course, it  is true that the use of forfeiture as a solution implies 
that some people, whose conduct is considered objectionabIe by others, 
will be prevented from living in the environment of their choice--not, 
one must admit, a very libertarian prospect. But unfortunately, when 
consideration is given also to the ?zeiglzborittg tenants' interests in living 
in the environment of their choice, this illiberal implication appears to 
be in either event unavoidable. Therefore, opting in favor of permit- 
ting a certain degree of self-~egregation,'~~ and permitting the en- 
forcement thereof through lease forfeiture provisions, may be the only 
rational alternative to the random injustice of utter laissez-faire. 
What the foregoing seems to suggest, in terms of policy, is that 
instead of the judicial abhorrence of forfeiture (at least in leasehold 
- - -  
172. However, no case has been found where the court refused to enforce a forfeiture on thse 
grounds. Indeed, in one proceeding to evict a tenant who harbored roomers allegedly guilty of 
"narcotics addiction, prostitution, attempted tape, homicide and other ~ p u ~ b l e  oceurrenm." 
the court disregarded such arguments saying that they were not an "exculpator). shield against 
landlord's and the community's efforts to rid the area of this blight." Remedco Corp. v. Bnn 
Mawr Hotel Corp., 45 blisc. 2d 586, 587-88, 257 N.Y.S.2d 52.5, 527-28 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 
1965). 
173. A worry expressed by the dissenting judge in Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., 
Inc., 393 bfich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975), who questioned whether former mental patients, 
stigmatized by their pasts, could ever find places to live. 
174. See text accompanying note. 282-88 infra. 
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situations where behavioral standards are involved), forfeiture may 
indeed be the remedy of choice. Furthermore, despite judicial intima- 
tions to the contrary,175 the forfeiture of leaseholds is not properly 
comparable to the drastic business of, e.g., a condition subsequent on a 
fee. Leasehold forfeiture can be seen rather as merely a prearranged 
procedure for the cancellation of a mutual arrangement which has 
turned out to be bad. When the consequences to the neighbors of 
nonenforcement are considered, the harshness of lease forfeiture for 
breach of conduct or use restrictions is relative a t  worst.176 
c. Limitations ort Forfeiture Which Apply Somewhat "Specially" to 
Forfeiture Agreements. 
The harshness of lease forfeiture for conduct or use violations may at 
worst be relative, but the hardship to the tenant may still be, in many 
cases, entirely out of proportion to the benefit which the forfeiture is 
ostensibly asserted to p r 0 t e ~ t . l ~ ~  And in many cases, courts have 
expressly relied on this ground of disproportionate hardship in relieving 
against forfeiture. 178 
175. Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526, 528-29 (Del. Ch. 1970). 
176. For a further discussion, see section III(B)(S)(c)(iv) infra. 
177. Of course, a landlord might be tempted to assert a forfeiture even though the benefit 
which the power of forfeiture was supposed to protect is of no interest to the Iundlord. That is, 
the landlord may be simply motivated by a desire to resume control of the premises for rensons 
unrelated to the tenant's violations such as when the tenant's lease is at a below-mnrket rental or 
when an opportunity arises which the landlord believes would be more profitable than continuing 
with the existing tenant. Apparent examples of this are Bernstein v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 
790, 210 N.Y.S. 539 (2d Dep't 1925), aff'd per curiam, 243 N.Y. 559, 154 N.E. 604 (1926) (see 
lower court's opinion a t  210 N.Y.S. 539) and Norman S. Riesenfeld, Inc. v. R-W Realty Co., 
223 App. Div. 140, 148, 228 N.Y.S. 145, 153 (1st Dep't 1928); Llewellyn, What Price 
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 73637 (1931). Obviously, this does not 
mean that the relative hardship question is resolved by balancing the value of the tenant's 
possession against the value which possession would have to the landlord. Similarly, even if the 
tenant's lease violations are the landlord's motivation in evicting, the value to the landlord of 
resuming possession per se is irrelevant to the question of relative hardship. 
Incidentally, if the landlord is motivated to seek eviction by factors other than preservation of 
the benefit which the forfeiture was supposed to protect, the case would be one of "abusive 
motivation." See notes 50 & 55 supra and accompanying text. 
178. E.g., Beck v. Giordano, 144 Colo. 372, 356 P.2d 264 (1960); Tollius v. Dutch Inns of 
America, Inc., 244 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); H.K.H. Dev. Corp. v. Metropolitan 
Sanitary Dist., 97 111. App. 2d 225, 247, 240 N.E.2d 214, 225 (1968); Streeter v. Middlemns, 240 
Md. 169, 213 A.2d 471 (1965). The relative hardship rationale for relief against forfeiture is 
discussed in section III(B)(f)(c)(iv) infra and inferentially in the text accompanying notes 170-75 
supra. 
However, it was early held that the fact that forfeiture would cost the tenant nothing of 
economic value did not, in itself, prevent the court from relieving against the forfeiture. Taylor v. 
Knight, 22 Eng. Rep. 208 (Ch. 1725). The tenant was obligated to pay a so-called "rack-rent," 
i.e., a rent equal to the full (rental) value of the land, and therefore no net economic benefit 
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Thoughts of disproportionate hardship seem to have weighed heav- 
ily in the courts' thinking when, in England, equity began dispensing 
relief to tenants from forfeitures which their defaults had triggered.17g 
Equity granted such relief freely when the tenant's breach occasioned 
no damage or when full compensation in damages could be rnade.l8O 
Similarly, in cases of "little Damage"lgl or a "trifling deficiency"lg2 in 
performance, equitable relief from forfeiture would be granted.18J In 
all of these types of situations, of course, the hardship to the tenant of 
enforcing the forfeiture would appear to be disproportionate, either 
because the breach has caused little or no hardship to the landlord (in 
the case of little or no damages) or because any hardship to the 
landlord was merely transitory (in the case of a cornpensable loss). 
Disproportionate hardship to the tenant does indeed appear to be a 
very logical basis for equitable intervention to prevent forfeitures, 
echoing as i t  does the broader equitable principles that "equity seeks to 
do justice"184 and that equity will not assist in the enforcement of an 
obviously unbalanced bargainlg5 or a penalty. lg6 Moreover, compared 
with "harshness," "drasticness" or "abhorrence," disproportionate 
hardship is a somewhat more refined basis for relieving against forfei- 
ture, taking into account as it properly does the hardship to others as 
well as the hardship to the breaching tenant. Nonetheless, the question 
remains whether disproportionate hardship to the tenant is itself a 
sufficiently refined test for determining the appropriateness of relief 
from forfeiture. The presence of a potential for disproportionate hard- 
accrued for the tenant under hi lease. However, the court held that relief @nst forfeitures w;rs 
not limited to cases where beneficial leases were involved. 
179. Law courts may have long granted relief from forfeitures covertly under Lhe guise of 
interpretation (see text accompanying notes 160-65 supra), or of finding waivers by the landlord 
even where not actually intended (see text accompanying notes 154-59 supra). Howeuer, it r c a  
apparently the equity courts which were the first to openly relieve tenants from forfeitures. 
180. E.g., Sanders v. Pope, 33 Eng. Rep. 108 (Ch. 1806); Northcote v. Duke, 27 Eng. Rep. 
330 (Ch. 1765); Hack v. Leonard, 88 Eng. Rep. 335 (Ch. 1724); cf. tYafer v. bIocato, 88 Eng. 
Rep. 348 (Ch. 1724). 
181. Lovat v. Renelagh, 35 Eng. Rep. 388, 390 (Ch. 1814). 
182. Sanders v. Pope, 33 Eng. Rep. 108, 112 (Ch. 1806); accord Dor~ell v. Dew, 62 Eng. 
Rep. 918, 926 (Vice Chancellor 1842) (if "a tenant was to be ejected for a foul turnipfield, an 
unhinged gate, a broken shutter or small matters of that description, . . . there would seareely be 
a lease in existence throughout the kingdom."). 
183. Sometimes, a similar effect is achieved by statute. E.g., Cd. Civ. Code 5 3275 (West 
1970), as interpreted in Atkins v. Anderson, 139 Cal. App. 2d 918, 294 P.2d 727 (Dit Ct. App. 
1956); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law 1 1951 (RlcKinney 1963). 
184. Maxim quoted from Ballentine's Law Dictionary 413 (3d ed. 1969). 
185. H. McClintock, Equity § 71, a t  195-96 (2d ed. 1948). 
186. Id. 8 32, a t  81-82. See also 1, 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence $8 72, 433 (5th ed. 
1941). 
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ship appears to be inadequate as a general test for relief because, as a 
general criterion, i t  does not differentiate sufficiently among the appar- 
ent disproportionate hardship cases which are and are not deserving of 
relief. 
The hardship of enforcing a forfeiture may appear to be dispropor- 
tionate for several reasons: 
-The hardship may appear disproportionate because the tenant has 
substantially performed his obligation and, though a technical default 
has occurred, it (and its adverse effect on the landlord or others) is 
trivial; 
-The hardship may appear disproportionate where, despite a major 
default by the tenant, there has been no real injury occasioned by the 
breach; 
-The hardship may appear disproportionate where, even though 
the tenant has committed a major default, causing substantial injury 
or loss to the landlord or others, the payment of money damages will 
fully compensate such injury or loss; 
-Finally, the hardship may appear disproportionate even where 
money damages either cannot or will not, as a practical matter, supply 
adequate compensation for the substantial injury or loss to the landlord 
or others caused by a major default. In this fourth type of case (which 
is probably most typical of the cases where neighbors are seriously 
annoyed by conduct restriction breaches), the potential for dispropor- 
tionate hardship exists because the annoyance caused by the breach, 
though substantial, may still be less than the relative hardship of 
eviction. lS7 
Even though the hardship to the tenant may be disproportionate in 
each of these four types of cases, the four types differ radically in terms 
of the protection which is afforded to benefits bargained for by the 
landlord. In  the first three types of cases, the intended benefits of the 
breached agreement would be, we may assume, sufficiently, even if 
not fully, protected. In the fourth type of case, however, relief against 
forfeiture would mean no protection a t  all for the benefits that the 
tenant's compliance was intended to provide. This loss of protection, 
though certainly an important factor in deciding whether to relieve 
against a forfeiture,lS8 cannot be allowed alone to control the determi- 
nation of whether to grant such relief in a particular case. For even if 
- - - - - - - - - 
187. Notice that the comparison here is between the hardship of eviction as against the 
burden which the violator's breach causes to others. The relative hardship of eviction should bc 
carefully distinguished from the relative hardship of compliance, the latter being (arguably) 
relevant to the reasonableness and validity of the restrictions themselves as well as to the 
appropriateness of the forfeiture remedy. See note 315 infra. 
188. See 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 9 3.96; Note, Equitable Relief from Forfeiture of a 
Lease Incurred by Breach of Covenant, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1907). 
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enforcement of a forfeiture may be necessary to provide the landlord or 
others with a substantial benefit for which the landlord has bargained, 
the possibility remains that the cost of assuring that benefit (i.e.,  an 
eviction) is unjustifiably high given the value of the benefit protected. 
Other differences between the four types of cases, and their respective 
appropriateness for relief from forfeiture, are discussed below. 
i. Substantial Pe$ornzance: The case of substantial performance 
by the tenant should be an easy one for granting relief from forfeiture, 
and it is generally held that relief is proper in such cases.la9 Since the 
tenant's substantial performance will, by definition, provide virtually 
all that has been bargained for, it would be senselessly oppressive to 
extinguish the tenant's bargained-for benefits based upon a trivial 
performance shortfall. This is true even if the terms of the lease appear 
to require exact performance by the tenant as a condition to his 
continued possession.1g0 To the extent that the lease gives such a 
drastic effect to a trivial performance shortfall, without regard to the 
substantial performance already provided, it  is an obviously unbal- 
anced bargain suitable for equitable type intervention.I9l 
189. E.g., Hughes v. Pallas, 84 Colo. 14, 267 P. 608 (1928); Grassham v. Robertson, 277 Ky. 
605, 126 S.W.2d 1063 (1939); Intertherm, Inc. v. Structural Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 
1974); Ogden v. Hamer, 268 App. Div. 751, 48 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1st Dep't 1944); Norman S. 
Riesenfeld, Inc. v. R-W Realty Co., 223 App. Div. 140, 228 N.Y.S. 145 (1st Dep't 1928). 
190. Note that even where the lease appears to prescribe forfeiture for even trivial defaults, it 
may be fairly debated whether such an interpretation truly rellects what the parties r c d y  
intended. Cf. Atkin's Waste bkterials, Inc. v. bky ,  34 N.Y.2d 422, 314 N.E.2d 871, 358 
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1974). The rule that use restrictions are strictly construed against the landlord (see 
notes 23 & 25 supra and accompanying text) provides an appropriate bu is  for avoiding forfeitures 
in such cases. 
Sometimes, when a court refuses to enforce a forfeiture for an alleged tenant breach, it is 
difficult to tell whether the decision was reached on a "substantial performance" theory or by a 
strict construction of the lease provision allegedly in default E.g., Beck v. Giordano. 144 Colo. 
372, 356 P.2d 264 (1960); Grassham v. Robertson, 277 Ky. 605, 126 S.W.2d 1063 (1939); Phillipse 
Towers, Inc. v. Ortega, 61 Misc. 2d 539, 305 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Yonkers City Ct. 1969); Carbon 
Fuel Co. v. Gregory, 131 W. Va 494, 48 S.E.2d 338 (1918). That is, it is unclear whether the 
court relieved against the forfeiture despite a technical default by the tenant or whether. by its 
interpretation of the lease, the court concluded that there was no default at dl.  
Ideally, the question of whether to enforce a forfeiture in cues  of actual (albeit trivial) defaults 
ought to be kept analytically separate from the quite different question of whether or not there ~ 5 7 x 5  
a default at all. In the case of actual (though nonsubstantial1 defaulb, *e 1u1dov.i might still 
theoretically enforce the tenant's obligation by damage reco\ .I, ar, possibly, by injunction. He 
should not, of course, be entitled to any relief if there was no default at  all. Ho\vcvu, because of the 
difficulties in using damages or injunctive relief as enforcement techniques (see discussion in section 
III(B)(l) supra), it is often not significant, as a practical matter, that courts sometimes mny strictly 
construe a lease contrary to actual intention where the avoidance of forfeiture might be more 
appropriately justified on a substantial performance theory. 
191. See discussion of the analogous problem of overly strict conduct restrictions in section 
III@)(2)(c) infra. 
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ii. Absence of Real Injury: Not so simple is the second type of 
apparent disproportionate hardship case, where the tenant's perfor- 
mance falls substantially short of the promise, but no real injury is 
suffered by the landlord or others.192 An example might be the case of 
a tenant who plays an electronic piano with earphones in violation of 
a lease prohibition on playing musical instruments after 9:00 p.m. 
Obviously, if no one is truly damaged by the tenant's breach, there 
is little merit in imposing any hardship on the tenant for committing 
it.193 The case is effectively indistinguishable from one of substantial 
performance even though, literally, the tenant may have committed a 
total default with respect to the restriction in question. 
However, unless the landlord or other beneficiaries of the restriction 
are truly indifferent as to whether the tenant performs the particular 
obligation in default, it cannot be said that the breach has caused no 
injury.194 For, absent such indifference, the tenant's default would by 
definition disappoint the landlord's expectation that the bargained-for 
benefit of the tenant's performance would be forthcoming. This diso.p- 
pointed expectation may not be damage in the legal (i.e., tort) sense: 
i.e., i t  may be damnum absque injuria. But the fact that the tenant 
may not have been under a law-imposed duty to supply the defaulted 
performance might be precisely the reason the landlord bargained for it 
by agreement. For example, the landlord may have sought by agree- 
Another analogy, albeit imperfect, may be drawn to the rule of substantial performance with 
respect to conditions in contracts. There, a material breach of a condition is ordinarily required 
before the breaching party forfeits the quid pro quo for which he has bnrgained. However, In 
contract law, strict performance of an express condition is generally required, meaning that strict 
performance of lease conditions would be the rule if leases were treated as ordinary contracts. 
Another distinction between lease law and contract law is that contract conditions are usually 
conditions precedent whereas conditions in leases, being limitations on a conveyance of property, 
are, of course, conditions subsequent. See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts 55 138-40 
(1970). 
192. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bettigole, 301 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. App. 1973) (forfeiture allocved for 
breach of covenant not to use premises for any purpose reasonably objectionable to Inndlord; 
tenant had placed cardboard sign in apartment window); River Dev. Co. v. Ellsworth, 44 App. 
Div. 2d 902, 356 N.Y.S.2d 150 (4th Dep't 1974) (forfeiture allowed for breach of restriction on a 
particular type of commercial use). 
193. However, if the breach is willful or deliberate, the court may enforce the forfeiture even 
if the damage to the landlord was insignificant. See Bernstein v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 790, 
210 N.Y.S. 539 (2d Dep't 1925), aff'd per curiam, 243 N.Y. 559, 154 N.E. 604 (1926). 
194. Even if the landlord is less than totally indifferent he may still be virtually indifferent so 
that the injury is negligible. This sort of situation is probably indistinguishable from the no injury 
case. 
However, as the degree of inditterence declines, and the injury resulting from tenant defaults 
correspondingly grows, the case becomes one in which substantial hardship will potentially exist 
on both the landlord's side and the tenant's, depending on whether forfeiture is granted or not. 
The case becomes, therefore, one of relative hardship, discussed in section III(B)(l)(c)(iv) lnfra. 
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ment (e.g., prohibiting dogs-or snakes) to protect special or idiosyn- 
cratic concerns, of himself or of the greater number of his tenants, 
which the general law (e.g., of private nuisance) would not protect.Igs 
Or he may have sought to protect himself from injuries (e.g., to the 
rental yield of his building) which the law considers either too conjec- 
tural to compensate, or too remote to permit the recovery of damages 
by the landlord.196 If this is so, it would hardly do to say that the 
tenant had no obligation under his agreement just because he would 
have had no obligation in the absence of an agreement. Accordingly, in 
determining whether the tenant's default has resulted in no injury the 
notion of injury should not be limited to injuries ordinarily cognizable 
as a matter of law.197 Any performance as to which the landlord or 
other intended beneficiaries are not truly indifferent AI, if defaulted 
upon, result in injury.198 If so, the case cannot be one appropriate for 
195. See section m@) in fm 
196. A prohibition on signs in the windows is an example. See Cwley v. Bettigole, 301 
N.E.2d 872 @lass. App. 1973) and text accompanying note 132 supra. 
197. Courts sometimes express thii by saying that, even in the absence of cornpensable 
monetary loss, damages will be presumed for purposes of equity. Jos. Guidone's Food Pdace, 
Inc. v. Gardner & Guidone, Inc., 153 Ind. App. 9, 285 N.E.2d 834 (1972). 
198. Of course, thii is not to say that whenever a particular performance is called for by the 
lease any default in that performance will cause damage to the landlord. The lense may impose 
many requirements on the tenant as to which the landlord is totally indifferent. This mny occur 
because the parties do not bother to tailor a fotm lease to their specific situation, with the m l t  
that restrictive provisions are left in the form even though neither pnrty cnres to have them. In 
the case of residential tenancies, it is probable that the use of form leases almost dwabs results in 
superfluities of no concern to the landlord. See Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lase,  74 
Colum. L. Rev. 836, 847 (1974). Less commonly, tenant obligations under a I w c  may become 
immaterial to the landlord due to a change of circumstances. Cf. Dovms v. h e g e t ,  200 Cd.  
743, 254 P. 1101 (1927). 
Because the lease may well impose obligations on the tenant as to which the landlord is 
indifferent, if a landlord desires to cut short a tenant's estate for "improper" reasons, he may be 
tempted to avail himself of one of these superfluous provisions as a technical grounds for eviction. 
See note 177 supra. Analytically, such attempts may be considered to be cases of abusive 
motivation (see notes 50 & 55 supra and accompanying text); the absence of express language 
allowing termination without cause (see note 231 infra) jusNies the presumption that none was 
intended. 
The possibility of abusive motivation means that, absent damage cognizable as a matter of 
law, the court cannot simply take the landlord's word for the fact tha! he was injutcd by the 
tenant's breach. Neither can the court reliably utilize some sort of masonable man test to 
ascertain the existence of damage (or lack of indifference); to do so rsould destroy one of the most 
useful functions of private agreements limiting use, i.e., the proteqtion of specid or idiosyncratic 
concerns which the general law cannot take into account See W t  accompanying notes 339-41 
infra. However, because the proof to corroborate the landlord's claims of dnmagc will often be 
evidence of prior course of practice, the doctrine of rvaiver and the technique of strict (or 
practical) construction will also often be available as bases for avoiding the nssutcd forfeiture in 
cases of no injury. 
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relief from forfeiture on a "substantial performance" type of theory. If 
relief from forfeiture is to be available nonetheless, for example on 
relative hardship grounds, it must be despite the substantial hardship 
to others which will result. lg9 
iii. Substantial B u t  Compensable Breaches: The third type of case 
of apparent disproportionate hardship is where the tenant's default 
causes a substantial injury or loss but one which is fully and realisti- 
compensable. In this type of case, the landlord (or others) can 
have substantially the benefit bargained for (or its value) without the 
necessity of enforcing a forfeiture, provided only that the tenant is 
solvent and that the relief from forfeiture is conditioned upon the 
tenant's paying the full compensation due.201 When the tenant does 
make full payment, the case becomes, in effect, a case of substantial 
performance, appropriate for relief from forfeiture, as previously dis- 
cussed. 
However, two assumptions must be made in order to convert this 
third type of case into essentially a substantial performance case. First, 
it must be assumed that the forfeiture power is intended as security 
and not as primary value bargained for under the lease.z02 Second, it 
must be assumed that the bargained-for benefit can be effectively 
rendered by the payment thus secured.203 Where these assumptions are 
appropriate, forfeitures may be properly relieved against, on essen- 
tially a substantial performance theory, whenever the power of forfei- 
ture has served its purpose by inducing the payment due.204 In fact, 
these two assumptions probably do apply in the greatest number of 
199. See discussion in section III(B)(l)(c)(iv) infra. 
200. The word "realistically" is inserted here to take account of the fact that neighboring 
tenants may have no rights of compensation at  all in relation to the violative conduct (see notes 
38-39 supra), or that any rights they do have may be, as a practical matter, not enforceable (see 
text following note 40 supra). Incidentally, just because the leases in question preclude tenants 
from suing each other for breach of their provisions, it does not follow that tenants should not be 
regarded as beneficiaries of those provisions and entitled to their protection, for the purposes ljere 
under discussion. See note 39 supra. 
201. Of course, prior to the time that the tenant pays the full compensation, the landlord (or 
other beneficiaries) is deprived by the tenant's default of a substantial benefit for which the 
landlord has bargained. Meanwhile, however, the power of forfeiture is held by the landlord ns a 
powerful incentive to the tenant to perform and as an "out" in case the tenant does not. Cf. 
section III(B)(Z)(c)(iv) infra. 
202. See Maginnis v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385, 396, 88 N.W. 300, 303 (1901). 
203. See Cesar v. Virgin, 207 Ala. 148, 92 So. 406 (1921); Hill v. Barclay, 33 Eng. Rep. 1037 
(Ch. 1810). See generally 3 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 58 1732-37 (14th ed. 
1918); Annot., 69 L.R.A. 833 (1906). 
204. "[Tfie theory . . . all the way through [is] that there has been no real violation of the 
contractual intent of the parties." Maginnis v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 tVis. 385, 394, 88 
N.W. 300, 302-03 (1901). 
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landlord-tenant forfeiture cases, mostly involving the failure to make a 
payment (typically rent) as the event of default. It was apparently on 
the basis of these two assumptions, and by easy analogy to the rules 
applicable to mortgages (where they most clearly applied), that equity 
began relieving against forfeitures triggered by tenant defaults.20J And 
it  remains practically universally true that, for nonpayment of rent, 
relief from forfeiture will be granted provided only that the tenant 
make good on the arrearages.206 However, these assumptions do not 
apply in many situations of tenant default, notably including defaults 
in the observance of conduct restrictions or of use restrictions general- 
ly. The failure to distinguish those cases where they do not apply led to 
a generosity in relieving against forfeiture that, even at  an early date, 
"became in some degree alarming."207 
The reason that the assumptions do not apply to conduct restriction 
cases is that monetary damages are simply unsuitable to compensate 
for conduct restriction breaches, at least in the residential context.208 
Indeed, it is rare to find a case of this genre which even mentions the 
possibility of monetary recompense for past breaches in relieving 
against forfeiture.209 And in no known American case has a court even 
considered giving compensation to neighboring tenants who are dam- 
aged by a defaulting tenant's violation of a use or conduct restric- 
t i~n .~ lO The fact that the benefit sought by conduct restrictions is 
monetarily noncompensable means that denial of forfeiture for viola- 
tion of such restrictions will usually (subject to the effectiveness of 
205. See cases ated at note 180 supra. 
206. 'lThe covenant for forfeiture . . . was intended 'as a mere security' . . . ." Cedrom Coal 
Co. v. Moss, 230 Ala. 32,34, 159 So. 225, 227 (1935). See also Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 634, 
115 A. 219 (1921); Famous Permanent Wave Shops, Inc. v. Smith, 302 Ill. App. 178, 23 N.E.2d 
767 (1939); Farmer v. Pitts, 108 Neb. 9, 187 N.W. 95 (1922); 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5 
3.96. 
207. Eaton v. Lyon, 30 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1224 (Ch. 1798). "They got into the habit of 
construing terms and conditions of covenants as being only in kvorem . . . ," i.e., as a penalty to 
induce performance. Id. However, the English equity courts would withhold relief from forfeiture 
when compensation via damages did not appear possible. E.g., W a f v  v. M d o ,  88 Eng. Rep. 
348 (Ch. 1724); see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 5 1737 (14th cd. 1918). 
208. See section III(B)(l) supra. 
209. One example is Sussman Volk Co. v. 88 Delicatessen, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. C t  
1950). The court considered the possibility of damages, but denied recovery (while enjoining the 
complained of use) because the damages were too difficult to quantify monetarily. See also 
LVoollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272 N.Y. 304, 5 N.E.2d 829 (1936); Brooklyn Pmpertia, Inc. 
v. Cargo Packers, Inc., 1 App. Div. 2d 1040, 152 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1956) ((alterations of 
premises in violation of lease; damages allowed in lieu of forfeiture). In most use restriction cases 
where relief from forfeiture is given, there is simply no mention of compensation to the landlord 
for the prior breaches. 
210. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
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possible injunctive relief) frustrate the obtaining of the benefits, to 
himself and to others, bargained for by the l a n d l ~ r d . ~ "  This belies one 
of the two above assumptions which are required in order to justify 
relief from forfeiture on a "substantial performance" type of theory, 
namely that the bargained-for benefit can be effectively protected by a 
payment. 
Moreover, since the breach of conduct restrictions is generally 
noncompensable monetarily, it is highly doubtful whether there is any 
justification for the other of the two assumptions, namely that forfei- 
ture powers are intended to give the landlord merely a security. The 
unsuitability of the damage remedy makes i t  pointless to provide 
security for the monetary payment which it contemplates. Of course, 
when applied to the obligation to pay rent, or to perform other acts 
which have quantifiable monetary significance to the landlord, a 
power to forfeit can indeed operate like a security, much as a 
mortgage. If the payment required is not forthcoming, the landlord 
(like a mortgagee) has recourse to a valuable asset (possession for the 
remainder of the lease) in order to get something that is a t  least 
comparable to what he had originally bargained for. However, when 
applied to conduct restrictions, the power of forfeiture cannot serve 
even a similar purpose.212 Hence, the other of the two above assump- 
tions is belied. The power of forfeiture cannot be assumed to be 
intended as security, at least as applied to breaches of conduct restric- 
tions. 
Thus, in conduct restriction cases, it is doubtful that we can accept 
either of the assumptions necessary to convert a "compensable breach" 
case into a "substantial performance" type case. Accordingly, where a 
forfeiture is asserted for a breach of conduct restriction, i t  is unlikely 
that the theoretical possibility of compensation by money damages 
would in itself ever justify relief from forfeiture. 
iv. Substantial Noncompensable Breaches: If, as just asserted, 
forfeiture powers are not useful (and probably not intended) to serve as 
"security,"213 i .e. ,  a secondary right to secure some other, primary 
2 11. In effect, this may mean that the power to prescribe use restrictions is itself limited, since 
the absence of an effective remedy to enforce use restrictions means that the "rights" or benefits 
which they purport to confer are more apparent than real. See Macneil, Power of Contract nnd 
Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L. Rev. 495, 516 (1962). 
212. The realization that a power of forfeiture cannot serve as a security in such cases seems 
to have been behind the eventual English rule which was generally to deny relief from forfeitures 
when the tenant's breach was of a "collateral covenant," e.g., a covenant to repair, to insure, or 
to use for a particular purpose. See Hill v. Barclay, 33 Eng. Rep. 1037 (Ch. 1810); 3 J. Story, 
Commentaries on Equity Jurispmdence $5 1734-35 (14th ed. 1918). However, American courts 
have been considerably less rigid in refusing relief from forfeiture in "collaternl covenant" cascs. 
See 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 3.96; Annot., 69 L.R.A. 833, 853-58 (1906). 
213. In the conduct restriction context. 
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value bargained for under the lease, the question may then be asked: 
What purpose are such powers to serve? An obvious possibility is that 
forfeiture powers are created to work as penalties, operating in tu- 
rorem against a tenant contemplating a default. 
Although courts relieve against forfeitures both because they are 
considered to be "merely security"214 and to be penaltiesY2ls and 
although the two functions often overlap, they &e different. As 
security (e.g., for rent), forfeiture gives the landlord a collateral backup 
in case the agreed performance fails; a penalty gives him only a 
weapon to coerce the agreed performance itself. And whereas a 
security is generally enforceable whenever necessary to protect the 
interest secured, the enforcement of a penalty would raise rather 
dramatically the issue of relative hardship. For a penalty, by defini- 
tion, imposes a burden which is disproportionate to the loss from the 
breach which is penalized.216 Indeed the whole idea that relative 
hardshipz1' should justify relief from forfeiture is at bottom a reflection 
of the penalty nature of forfeitures. And courts have tended, for at  
least three centuries, to view a landlord's forfeiture powers as being in 
the nature of a penalty.218 
Most people, based on introspection and perhaps "common howl-  
edge," would probably agree that the threat of eviction exerts a 
deterrent effect on tenants who would violate their leases. Fur- 
thermore, it is probably fair to assume that landlords, when they think 
about it, consider that their powers of forfeiture exert such a deterrent 
effect. Indeed, if one may talk about the purpose of landlords in 
inserting forfeiture provisions in leases, the purpose may probably be 
said to be more to promote compliance than to supply a basis for 
evicting violators. After all, a Iandlord gets no return from empty 
apartments. 
I t  may be speculated that the coercive effect of forfeitures, in 
214. See discussion in section III(B)(2)(c)(iii) supra. 
215. See following discussion in this section. 
216. H. McClintock, Equity $ 32, a t  81-82 (2d ed. 1948). 
217. The reference here is to relative hardship of the remedy compared with the hardship to 
others resulting from noncompliance. As is elsewhere pointed out, the relntive hardship of 
compliance (compared with the hardship resulting from noncompliance) presents an entirely 
different set of questions. See note 315 infra. 
218. See note 207 supra. More recent expressions of thii tendency include Fly Hi hlusic Corp. 
v. 645 Restaurant Corp., 64 h&c. 2d 302, 304-05, 314 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. City Civ. C t  
1970), aff'd mem., 71 h k .  2d 302,335 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. T. 1972); 51C C.J.S. h d o r d  and 
Tenant 8 102 (1968); 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity $ 459 (5th ed. 1941); 3 J. Story, Commentaria on 
Equity Jurisprudence 8 1732 (14th ed. 1918); Bentley, An Alternalive Residentid W e ,  74 
Colum. L. Rev. 836, 847 (1974). For the observation that courts often fail to distinguish between 
penalties and forfeitures, see Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L. 
Rev. 495, 515 (1962). 
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is a policy which, by its exceptions, implicitly recognizes the deterrence 
flavor of forfeiture but which permits a very free imposition of the 
"penalty" nonetheless. 
Given the definite penal aspect of lease forfeitures, it  may be asked 
why courts enforce them at  all. 
One reason may be historical. By the time equity began relieving 
against forfeitures (beginning with mortgages), the concept of defeasi- 
ble estates may simply have been too well entrenched228 to permit a 
general prohibition on them. 
There are, however, important policy reasons for enforcing forfei- 
tures as well. Defeasance for certain acts, e.g., committing waste, may 
be the only practical way to protect a future interest holder from the 
acts' adverse consequences. The same may be said of defeasance 
conditioned on activities which many may find objectionable but 
against which the ordinary remedies of law and equity do not effec- 
tively protect.229 In eliminating such objectionable conduct, forfeiture 
may operate penally, both in terms of its coercive effect and of the 
disproportionate burden which it imposes on the evicted violator. But 
the only alternative to permitting the use of the forfeiture mechanism 
for protection may be to license the objectionable conduct uncondi- 
tionally. 230 
Finally, though, the question may be appropriately asked whether in 
the conduct or use restriction context it is proper to treat forfeitures as 
penalties at all. 
Like security, a private penalty is a secondary right which is 
bargained for, not for its own sake, but in order to help assure 
protection of some other primary value. In the case of conduct 
restrictions, the primary value so protected would be the tenants' 
conformity to conduct standards designed to promote a desired in- 
trabuilding environmental condition or character. By deterring non- 
compliance, a penalty (or more precisely, its threat) can promote the 
achievement of this primary value. 
However, it does not follow that a power of forfeiture is merely a 
penalty in the sense of a secondary right bargained for only to help 
assure some other value which is primary. The power of forfeiture may 
be viewed as being itself a primary value, bargained for as an 
alternative, similar to a commercial-lease termination clause.231 
228. Conditions on the continuation of estates apparently date back to the y c ~  1250 and 
before. See Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates, 18 Iowa L. Rev. 425, 44 1 (1933). 
229. See section m(B)(l) supra. 
230. Assuming that neither damages nor injunctive relief offers effective or nppropriate 
recourse. See id. 
231. For example, a clause calling for termination on sixty days notice, if the landlord should 
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Commercial-lease termination clauses take account of the fact that, 
at the beginning of a long-term arrangement, it is sometimes impossi- 
ble to predict accurately the future course of events. Accordingly, it is 
logical to make a sort of prearrangement for rescission in case certain 
events, anticipated but not necessarily expected, should arise, making 
continuation of the basic arrangement undesirable to the party who 
bargained for the right to rescind. This prearrangement for rescission 
may be seen as precisely the function which forfeiture powers, tied to 
conduct restrictions, serve. They are a solution to an otherwise insolu- 
able problem of proximity. 
The author has found no case which purports to treat commercial- 
lease termination clauses as penal, probably because their operation is 
usually triggered by events outside the tenant's I t  is only 
when the tenant's own acts can trigger the termination that the 
resulting loss of possession can logically be considered a deterrent or 
"penal. "233 
However, the possible deterrent effect of lease forfeiture powers tied 
to conduct restrictions should not cause one to lose sight of the fact 
that, like commercial-lease termination provisions, they also represent 
a bargained-for alternative right. The alternatives are (i) continuation 
of the landlord-tenant relationship so long as it is mutually satisfactory 
as defined in the lease and (ii) termination of that relationship if, as 
events develop, it turns out not to have been propitiously entered into 
in the first place.234 
decide to sell the premises or if some other unanticipated commercid contingency should occur. It 
has been said that such a dause creates "a tenancy for years with a special limitation" (Indlan 
Ref. Co. v. Roberts, 97 Ind. App. 615, 634, 181 N.E. 283, 290 (1932)) and such clauses seem to 
receive routine enforcement (2 R. Powell, Real Property ll245[1] (Supp. 1975). See also Cleveland 
Wrecking Co. v. Aetna Oil Co., 287 Ky. 542, 154 S.W.2d 31 (1941); Acme Mkts., Inc. v. 
Dawson Enterprises, Inc., 253 Md. 76, 251 A.2d 839 (1969); 1A A. Corbin, Contracts 5 265 
(1963); 1 Tiffany, supra note 17, 5 149). 
232. See Sabinson v. Jelin Prods., Inc., 55 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ("The 
[termination] agreement did not provide f0r.a forfeiture."). But cf. Shell Oil Co. v. Mnrinello, 120 
N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Super. Ct. 1972), modified, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (l973), 
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974) (termination of gas station franchise); Mobil Oil Corp. V. Lione, 
66 Misc. 2d 599, 322 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Dist. Ct. 1971). 
233. In the commercial-lease termination situation, it does not make sense to say that the 
tenant is being "punished" (although he may be greatly inconvenienced) for the external events 
triggering termination; it is only in the conduct related forfeiture case that the tenant is in a sense 
punished by the forfeiture--in the sense that it a t  least may have once been in the tenant's power 
to avoid the forfeiture triggering conduct. But the fact that the tenant could hnve nvolded the loss 
of possession by simply doing what he said he would do (as one of the inducing factors to the 
lease), seems if anything to give even more reason for routine enforcement of conduct related lense 
forfeitures, in the manner of commercial-lease terminations. At least it would not follow that the 
enforcement of such forfeitures should, in the manner of ordinary penalties, be limited to crises 
where the degree of harm done or guilt justifies the punishment. 
234. I t  may be objected that, in the typical residential form lease, only the lnndlord has the 
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In any event, to deny effective enforcement of landlord-imposed 
conduct restrictions prevents the landlord from giving his tenants legal 
protection for the environmental benefits which, among other things, 
may have induced the tenants to enter into their leases. The landlord 
can offer the tenant legal protection against wrongdoers' interferences 
with the physical benefits offered in exchange for the rent, including 
benefits (e.g., air conditioning) which the tenant is not entitled to as a 
matter of law. There appears to be no reason in principle why the 
landlord should not likewise be able to offer effective protection for 
psychic benefits (e.g., a tasteful setting or freedom from neighboring 
piano players) which the law does not obligate the landlord to give.23s 
Moreover the fact that the lease may not legally require the landlord to 
supply the particular benefit or protection does not suggest in any way 
that he should not be pemitted to supply both the benefit and the 
protection if he so desires. However, whenever conduct restrictions are 
not effectively enforced, the result may be to prevent the landlord from 
assuring his tenants important benefits which attracted them to the 
building in the first place. 
The only practical alternative for tenants denied such benefits (but 
who desire to have them) may be to move to another building, one 
having conditions or character better suited to their needs. Again, 
though, absent legal protection of such benefits, the new building may 
itself become unsuitable, requiring another move, ad i t f ini t~rm. And to 
the extent that tenant conduct restrictions cannot be effectively en- 
forced, it is entirely likely that any new building which appears at first 
to be suitable will, eventually, become unsuitable, since there would 
be little legal deterrence to prevent prospective tenants, who plan to 
violate the conduct restrictions, from moving in. 
If a competition between irreconcilable interests cannot be resolved 
without hardship to somebody, and if forfeiture resolves that competi- 
tion with the least overall hardship, then the hardship which forfeiture 
does cause should be disregarded. To do would be to 
deprive others (neighboring tenants and derivatively the landlord) of 
power to terminate the relationship when it turns out not to have been propitiously entered into. 
But this is beside the point. Whether or not a bargain is fair is not measured solely by the degee 
of identity (or content reciprocity) of ~ t s  terms. Beyond this, it may be added that the applicability 
of the implied warranty of habitability may well make the power of termination "mutual," 
whether the lease says so or not. See section III(A)(3) supra. 
235. Courts have occasionally recognized that a landlord should be permitted to impose 
restrictions which protect only psychic benefits, and to have enforcement by forfeiture. Fin- 
kovitch v. Cline, 236 Mass. 196, 128 N.E. 12 (1920). See also Caoley \.. Bettigole, 301 N.E.2d 
872 ofass. App. 1973) (signs); Triangle hianagement Corp. \-. Inniss. 62 hlisc 2d 1095, 312 
N.Y.S.2d 745 (hT.Y. City Civ. CL 1970). 
236. In the absence of adequate substitute remedies. See section III(B)(l) supra. 
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benefits which the landlord bargained for in the lease-benefits which 
the breaching tenant agreed to provide. Instead of having the intended 
benefit of being either free of or rid of objectionable neighbors, the 
beneficiaries of the conduct restrictions would be required either to 
suffer the annoyance or move out themselves.237 Thus, in refusing to 
enforce a forfeiture on grounds resembling disproportionate hardship, 
that "the punishment [should] fit the crime,"238 the court would be 
virtually licensing the nonperformance of both parts of a two-part 
promise, viz., that the defaulting tenant comply with certain restric- 
tions and that his possession should terminate in the event of non- 
compliance. If neighbors feel compelled to move away from a vio- 
lator's annoyances, the persons to be protected by the first part of the 
promise would, in effect, end up suffering the punishment prescribed 
by the second. In any event, the neighbors would suffer some punish- 
ment due to the breach. 
Due to the fact that, given a substantial noncompensable breach, the 
neighbors would almost inevitably suffer some punishment in any 
event, there are good reasons for disregarding the hardship which 
forfeiture does cause, even if it may be disproportionate. This is 
because, as will be developed more fully in a later section,239 there is 
simply no way of measuring whether the relative hardship to the 
tenant facing eviction exceeds the burdens of his noncompliance on the 
neighbors whom he has annoyed. Certainly, in determining relative 
hardship, the interests of all affected parties should be taken into 
account, and the hardships should be weighed not only in terms of 
their individual burdens but also in terms of the numbers of people on 
whom the burdens fall. This suggests in itself that on balance the 
relative hardship will probably be greater in aggregate for the 
neighboring tenants (if only because of their usually greater number) 
thus favoring enforcement of the forfeiture. But there is no way to be 
sure. In this relativistic morass of multilateral comparative hardships, 
the only island of certainty is the offending tenant's two-part 
agreement-to comply or to leave. The enforcement of this agreement 
according to its terms would be, i t  is submitted, the only way to assure 
"just" results in the usual case, where the burdens of noncompliance 
fall on many. And this is so even though, in extraordinary cases, such 
enforcement may work injustice to a tenant whose substantial noncom- 
pensable breach did not bother the neighbors enough to make them 
wish that they did not have to put up with it.240 
- - - 
237. Or, in the landlord's case, sell out. 
238. Fly Hi Music Corp. v.  645 Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 755, 
738 (N.Y. City Civ. c{. 1970), aff'd mem., 71 M i c .  2d 302, 335 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. T. 1972). 
239. See section IIT(D) infra. 
240. It may also be argued that relative hardship is an inappropriate basis for relieving 
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Thus, it is suggested that the irony of punishing the protected may 
be avoided only by frankly recognizing forfeiture provisions not as 
being penalties, or relative hardship cases, but rather as being 
bargained-for alternatives-analogous to commercial-lease termination 
clauses. Despite the deterrent effect of such powers, they also serve as 
an important bargained-for alternative right to get out of an arrange- 
ment gone sour. 
d. Conditional Stays to Mitigate the Harshness of F d e i t u r e  
Although forfeiture may be the least harsh remedy when all of the 
relevant interests, including the neighbors', are taken into account, 
forfeiture remains a harsh remedy nonetheless. I t  may not involve the 
futility (and consequent unfairness to the protected parties) of the 
damage remedy or of the injunction-without-contempt remedy; nor 
does it involve the potentially extreme harshness of civil contempt, if 
that were to follow a violation of an injunction. But even though ' 
forfeiture may be the best solution to a difficult problem of incompati- 
bility, it is still a bad solution. 
I However, much of the harshness of forfeiture could be eliminated, 
while preserving most of its benefits, if court-ordered evictions were 
not absolute in their terms but rather were conditional upon the 
tenant's future failure to comply with the lease. Courts have frequently 
used this technique to avoid forfeitures, typically by staying the order 
of eviction for, say, thirty days and providing for dismissal of the 
landlord's dispossess. action if the tenant ceases within that time to be 
in default.241 Of course, such conditional stays can be effective only to 
forfeitures because a full quid pro quo for the potential inconvenience of a forfeiture is impliat in 
the rental level (or some other landlord-provided consideration) prescribed in the l a c .  Un- 
doubtedly, in intelligently negotiated commercial leases, the landlord's retention of a termination 
right is a factor bearing on the rent which he can require. In the wse of residential lases. 
particularly in a tight housing market, the presence of consideration in thii form may be xen as 
being far more problematical. But even in a tight housing market, a tenant could undoubtedly 
find a landlord who would forego his forfeiture powers provided that the tenant a p e d  to a high 
enough rental. In thii sense, paying only the market rental for the standard market lease (i.e.. one 
which provides for forfeiture) can be said to be a way of receiving consideration in exchange for 
the forfeiture power. 
241. E.g., Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. C t  App. 1973); 
930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972); Southbridge 
Towers, Inc. v. Rovics, 76 Misc. 2d 396, 350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. T. 1973); Lnvanant v. Love 
lace, 71 Misc. 2d 974, 337 N.Y.S.2d 962 (App. T. 1972), aff'd mem, 41 App. Div. 2d 9OS, 343 
N.Y.S.2d 559 (1st Dep't 1973); 30-88 Steinway S t ,  Inc. v. H.C. Bohack Co., 65 Bfisc. 2d 1076, 
319 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. City Civ. C t  1971). aff'd rnem., 42 App. Div. 2d 577, 344 N.Y.S.2d 
205 (2d Dep't 1973); Triangle hhagement  Corp. v. Inniss, 62 h k .  2d 1095, 312 N.Y.S.2d 745 
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970); Trump Village Sec. 4, Inc. v. Cooper, 61 hiisc. 2d 757,306 N.Y.S.2d 
759 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). aff'd mem., 66 h&c. 2d 220, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. T. 1971); 
Mideast Holding Corp. v. Tow, 60 b&c. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. City Civ. CL 1969. 
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protect the landlord or others from the consequences of the tenant's 
prospective defaults; there is no way the tenant can cure past conduct 
defaults, and no remedy (except possibly damages) can do much about 
those. However, as to future defaults, such conditional stays on 
eviction can be enormously effective (if forfeiture is as harsh as 
everyone says) and, after all, the incentive to assert a forfeiture can 
only be to prevent the prospective consequences of default in any 
event. 242 
Under some circumstances (cg., tenant is simply unable to comply), it 
may not be appropriate to subject the forfeiture to a conditional stay. 
But if the tenant's violation is of a conduct or activities restriction, and 
if the tenant is not unable or unwilling to correct the violation as to the 
future, then the ordering of an eviction subject to a conditional stay 
would seem usually to be both appropriate and useful. 
Nearly all of the cases which I have found using the conditional stay 
technique have arisen in New York. Perhaps this is because, in other 
jurisdictions, opinions are not so frequently reported in the trial level 
cases in which such stays would be granted. Curiously, though, the 
New York cases243 appear to be directly contrary to a 1968 holding of 
that state's highest The Court of Appeals then held that once 
the lease had terminated by operation of a conditional limitation,24s it 
could not be "revived" by the courts. Hence, said the court, the lower 
court's attempted twenty day conditional stay of eviction was beyond 
the courts' powers "absent a showing of fraud, mutual mistake or other 
acceptable basis of reformation."246 While this may now be New York 
(albeit a rule which is largely ignored by the subordinate 
it certainly is not a rule which traditional precedent would 
have required. 
The alleged difficulty with relieving against forfeitures framed as 
conditional limitations (as opposed to those framed as conditions) is 
242. Arguably, asserting forfeitures can also be motivated by a desire to deter pre-forfeiture 
defaults on the part of other tenants. However, the routine granting of forfeiture subject to stays 
would probably not undercut any such deterrent purpose, and such a purpose is therefore nn 
irrelevant consideration here. 
243. See examples cited in note 241 supra. 
244. See First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630, 237 
N.E.2d 868, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1968). 
245. For the distinction between conditions and conditional limitations, see note 118 supra. 
246. 2 1  N.Y.2d a t  637, 237 N.E.2d at 870-71, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 725. 
247. The rule was recognized but distinguished unconvincindy in Lewis v. Clothes Shack, 
Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 621, 322 N.Y.S.2d 738 (App. T. 1971) and Fly Hi Music Corp. v. 645 
Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302, 314 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970), aff'd mem., 71 
Misc. 2d 302,335 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. T. 1972), and it was sidestepped in 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. 
v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. T. 1972). 
248. See cases cited in note 241 supra. 
Heinonline - -  45 Fordham L. Rev. 290 1 9 7 6 - 1 9 7 7  
19761 LANDLORD CONTROL OF TENANTS 291 
that, by operation of the conditional limitation, the lease will always 
have already been terminated "automatically" before the case even 
comes to There is nothing left for equity to save. However, 
courts exercising equitable jurisdiction have historically relieved 
against forfeitures despite the fact that the lease and the tenant's 
interest had been quite terminated before reaching the TO 
prevent the forfeiture effect, the landlord was simply required to grant 
a new lease for the remainder of the old term.2s1 And in relieving 
against forfeiture, equity could of course impose equitable conditions 
on its relief,252 hence the validity of co?zditiotzal stays on eviction. In 
sum, there appears to be no historical or theoretical objection (outside 
of states like New York) to conditional stays of eviction in order to 
give the tenant a chance to cease his default and return to good 
standing under his lease. 
Moreover, the granting of such conditional stays on eviction seems 
eminently sensible. It gives both the landlord and the tenant (to say 
nothing of the neighbors) an opportunity to establish a satisfactory 
mutual arrangement such as was presumably contemplated in the first 
place. It avoids unnecessary dislocations of tenants who may have 
been objectionable but are willing to try to get along, and it still 
permits the landlord and the neighbors to be free of a tenant who 
simply refuses to conduct himself in a non-bothersome manner. 
Moreover, despite the fact that courts sometimes say they prefer 
injunction as a less harsh alternative than forfeiture,2s3 the fact is that 
the granting of forfeiture subject to a conditional stay is actually better 
suited than injunctive relief to attaining the agreed protection objec- 
tives with minimum hardship. All that the landlord or neighbors 
presumably want from a noncomplying tenant is either for him to 
comply in the future or to leave. Nobody wants him to be held in civil 
contempt or, worse, in jail (assuming it  could come to thatzs4). Thus, 
249. See note 118 supra; Beach v. Niion, 9 N.Y. 35, 36 (1853); Burnet Corp. v. Uneeda Pure 
Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435, 230 N.Y.S. 239 (App. T.  1928). See also Jabbour Bros. v. 
Hartsook, 131 Va. 176, 185, 108 S.E. 684, 68687 (1921); Niles, Conditional Limitations in 
Leases in New York, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 15 (1933). 
250. E.g., Taylor v. Knight, 22 Eng. Rep. 208 (Ch. 1725); cf. Dendy v. Evans, [I9101 1 K-B. 
263, 266-67. See also 3 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 5 1736 (1'Jtb ed. 1918); 
16 Halsbury's Laws of England 0 1447 (4th ed. 1976). 
251. Id. 
252. See Howard D. Johnson Co. v.  hladigan. 361 Xlass. 454, 280 N.E.2d 689 (1972). See 
also 930 F i  Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972). 
253. .Cf. note 315 infra. 
254. Of course, it is almost unimaginable that, for default under a lease, even in violation of 
an injunction, a tenant would be sent to civil jail like a common alimony dodger. This is p d d y  
the problem with injunctive reliek the threat is so drastic that it does not seem ( a d ,  hopefully, is 
Heinonline - -  45 Fordham L. Rev. 2 9 1  1 9 7 6 - 1 9 7 7  
292 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
forfeiture subject to a conditional stay is not only logical (in that it 
gives the aggrieved parties the alternatives they really want) but it is 
far more "reasonable" than the injunctive relief alternative as a remedy 
for disturbing tenant conduct. 
In  conclusion, where the possibility exists for enforcing an asserted 
forfeiture subject to a conditional stay to cure (and the possibility 
would almost always exist in cases of conduct or activities defaults), 
forfeiture would seem to be the best of possible remedies for a situation 
where no remedy is perfect. But, it should be added, even if it is not 
possible or appropriate to grant forfeiture subject to such a conditional 
stay,2SS forfeiture may still, as previously argued, be the remedy of 
choice. 
C. Objective Standards 
In  the absence of an agreement imposing limitations upon tenant 
conduct, the only applicable limitations would of course be those 
imposed by law. As has already been observed,256 such limitations 
include those imposed by the doctrines of waste, nuisance and negli- 
gence, and by the substantive law of torts generally; to these might be 
added limitations imposed by the statutory law, especially the criminal 
law. 
However, if the landlord is to enforce any of these limitations, he 
must generally do so in reliance upon special lease provisions confer- 
ring him with standing to complain.2s7 Furthermore, if he is to enforce 
these limitations effectiv~ly, he must probably have a power of forfei- 
ture, which must also be provided for in the lease.258 Yet, even with 
standing to complain and a power of forfeiture a t  his disposal, the 
landlord may still find it difficult to efficiently enforce even the 
law-imposed limitations on tenant conduct. This difficulty will arise 
because the law-imposed standards-especially those based on waste, 
nuisance or negligence doctrines-are too imprecise in their formula- 
tion and too unpredictable in their application to permit anything like 
efficient, low cost enforcement.259 The subjectivity of these standards 
may mean that no enforcement at all is feasible where, as is charac- 
not) real. Incidentally, no cases reporting the incarceration of recnlcitrant tennnts have been 
found. 
255. Perhaps particularly so if the objectionable tenant's recalcitrance is the cause of the 
inappropriateness. 
256. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra. 
257. Except, of course, the landlord always has standing to sue for wnste, and he would hnve 
standing to sue for negligence whenever the duty of care was owed to him. 
258. See section m(B) supra. See generally section m(A) supra. 
259. See notes 38 supra, 260-62 infra and text accompanying notes 264-75 infra. 
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teristic in the residential landlord-tenant context, dollar amounts are 
relatively small and the relevant factual backgrounds of the cases are 
not, as an evidentiary matter, always so clear-cut or easy to elucidate. 
Consequently, lease provisions concerning tenant conduct can increase 
protection in a third important way: by providing objective standards 
of conduct, susceptible to easier proof of noncompliance, in place of (or 
in addition to) the subjective and relativistic standards of tort law. 
The formulations of the substantive tort norms, such as those 
regarding nuisance and waste, are unsuitably vague to serve as stan- 
dards for most specific landlord-tenant relationships precisely because 
they are designed rather to serve the broad generality of cases. Since 
the many particular fact-situations cannot be predicted, the law of 
torts must be flexible, for it  could not possibly prescribe the pecise 
behavioral requirements which are to be applicable in particular cases. 
Thus, the conduct which constitutes a nuisance,260 negligencez6' or 
260. As w d  here and throughout this Article, the word nuisance refers to tho% wrongs 
consisting of substantial invasions of another's property interest in the private use and enjoyment 
of hi land. See Restatement of Torts 8 822 (1939). Although it is probably impossible to arrive at 
any precise definition of nuisance, or even of so-called private nuisance (see W. R o m r ,  Torts 
$5 86-87, 89 (4th ed. 1971); 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts 5 1.23 (1956)), the sort of wrongs hem 
under discussion may be broadly described as "a condition . . . maintained on one property which 
is an illegal burden or servitude upon another." Zamzok v. 650 Park Ave. Corp.. 80 hlise. 2d 
573, 576, 363 N.Y.S.2d 868, 873 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
In  order for the complained of activities to constitute actionable nuisance, there must be a 
"substantial" interference with the quiet enjoyment of the complainant's interest as a consequence 
of such acts. Restatement of Torts I822  (1939); 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, $9 28.22, 28.25. 
Furthermore, even if the invasion of the interest in question is intentional, to be actionable it 
must also be "unreasonable." Restatement of Torts $5 826-31 (1939); 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 
3, $9 28.25-.28. 
The two key prerequisites of nuisance (substantial interference and unwon;lbleness) are 
deliberately imprecise in their content; whether or not there is a nuisance in a puticular instance 
"must be determined by reference to all the conditions of the parties, the arcurnstances of the 
situation, and the balancing of advantages and disadvantages incident to the defendant's conduct 
for all concerned." 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra, 9 1.24, a t  71. Tbus, activities othenvkc 
lawful may be a nuisance if performed in an inappropriate location or if the resultant h u m  could 
have been more effectively avoided (6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 28.26); and even intention- 
al invasions of another's use and enjoyment may be privileged if the utility of the harmful activity 
outweighs the gravity of the harm done. Restatement of Torts 8 826 (1939). 
The precise behavioral requirements of the norms of nuisance are in fact probably the least 
predictable of all the subdivisions of torts; for not only are the defendant's conduct, situation, and 
knowledge taken into account, but also unknown (and unknorvable) factors concming the 
plaintiff and the public a t  large can weigh heavily or decisively in the relativistic analysis. The 
relevance of so many factors in the balancing process can make convincing proof of nuisance a 
somewhat difficult and tedious process. 
261. The formulaic definition of negligence, designed to account for the "infinite variety of 
situations which may arise," is hardly unique in its application to the property context and need 
not be recounted here. See W. Prosser, Torts I 32, at 150 (4th ed. 1971). Assuming damages are 
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waste262 is necessarily relative and circumstantially determined. The 
relativism of circumstances lies a t  the heart of the fundamental ques- 
tion of whether or not the defendant breached or even owed a duty to 
the plaintiff. The words which define the standards themselves pro- 
vide only the roughest sort of guidance. 
However, for a landlord seeking to protect his own genuine interests 
and those of neighboring tenants, reliance on relativistic tort standards 
is neither desirable nor necessary. The prospective relation between a 
given landlord and a given tenant does not present the wide variety of 
possible circumstances that indicates the need for a flexible standard. 
Rather, the kinds of problems likely to arise in a given landlord-tenant 
relationship may be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy, and the 
behavioral norms appropriate to deal with (or forestall) those problems 
may be readily prescribed in the lease. The uncertainty of the stan- 
dards which results under relativistic tort analysis, an uncertainty 
which invites litigation, may thus be replaced by lease-prescribed 
objective standards of greater specificity and susceptible to easier 
determinations of compliance or noncompliance. It is indeed a function 
of written agreements to supply such certainty.263 
The need for objective standards is particularly acute in the case of 
conduct of a nuisance-like nature. Reference has already been made to 
the difficulties involved in proving actionable nuisance, resulting from 
the fact that the definition of nuisance is couched in necessarily 
proven, the three key elements of negligence liability-that the defendant had a duty, that the 
duty was breached (failure to use reasonable care) and that the breach was the proximate cause of 
the injury-are all, of course, circumstantially determined. And how much care is "reasonable 
care" is relative, depending on the degree of risk involved, gravity of possible harm, etc. The 
precise behavioral norms of negligence law are perhaps more predictable than those of nuisance, 
but they too are often unpredictable, and the results of the circumstantial and relativistic annlysis 
are often open to controversy. Compare majority with dissenting opinion in Samson v. Saginaw 
Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975). 
262. Although i t  is generally true that any destmctive acts of a tenant are actionable as waste, 
a t  least if the damage is substantial, in the case of omelioralive waste-modifications which 
arguably intprove the value of the premises-the analysis in modern cases is becoming more and 
more relativistic and circumstance-oriented. See Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 28 N.J. 316, 146 A.2d 
458 (1958); 5 Powell, supra note 24, 640; 5 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 20.11; 
Niehuss, Alteration or Replacement of Buildings by the Long-Term Lessee, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 386 
(1932). The length of the lease, the materiality of the modification, the anticipation of obsoles- 
cence and the probable intent of the parties all may enter into the determination of whether 
particular "improvements" do or do not constitute waste. Id. Thus, with waste, as with nuisance 
and negligence, the precise norms are circumstantially determined and it may often be impossible 
to reliably predict whether any particular effect on the premises is or is not waste. 
263. Trump Village Sec. 4, Inc. v. Cooper, 61 Misc. 2d 757, 759-60, 306 N.Y.S.2d 759, 
762-63 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 66 Misc. 2d 220, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. T .  
1971). See also Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631-32 (1943). 
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imprecise terms.264 However, in the offensive tenant context, where 
the injuries are more likely to be psychic than monetary, the most 
formidable problem may be showing that the persons affected by the 
nuisance are not simply hypersensitive or idiosyncratic. For the law of 
nuisance does not protect against every discomfort caused by a 
neighbor's acts, but only against those which would cause annoyance, 
inconvenience or offense to a person having "ordinary sensibilities" 
and tastes.26s 
There is, as might be expected, no little difficulty in determining 
from the cases exactly what is unbearable to an ordinarily sensitive 
person and what, on the other hand, would be objectionable only to 
the hypersensitive. For example, music produced by highly skilled 
musicians may be sufficiently objectionable to constitute a nuisance.266 
At the same time, the apprehension of immolation, caused by sparking 
trains passing a nearby fuel dump, apparently is not.267 Still, conduct 
inducing an unfounded fear may be a nuisance.268 Obnoxious odors 
may269 or may not270 be sufficiently disturbing to constitute a nui- 
sance. Proving noise as a nuisance seems to involve particular difficul- 
ties, probably because almost dl human activities produce some noise 
and must, to a degree, be tolerated. However, for a residential tenant, 
a tinsinith next door may be adequate cause for complaint, though an 
all-night rumbling from above,271 a whirring sewing machine or "the 
discord of ill-played music" is not adequate ~ a u s e ~ ~ ~ - - e v e n  if the 
"music" is played twelve hours per day273 or is the work of an amateur 
drummer.274 It has been suggested that, to constitute a nuisance, the 
264. See note 260 supra. 
265. See Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 hfass. 486, 488-89, 101 N.E. 371, 373 (1914), 
quoted in 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts 8 1.25, a t  75 (1956). See also Rogers v. Elliott, 146 
blass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888); Krocker v. Westmoreland Planing BE11 Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 A. 
669 (1922); 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 8 28.25; J. & H. Joyce, Nuisances 8 20 (1906); W. 
Prosser, Torts 8 87, at 577-78 (4th ed. 1971). 
266. Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 hfd. 6-41, 197 A. 146 (1938). 
267. Harper v. Standard Oil Co., 78 hfo. App. 338 (1899). But see Hendrickson v. Standard 
Oil Co., 126 Md. 577, 95 A. 153 (1915). 
268. Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910). 
269. \Vashiigton Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Albrecht, 157 hfd. 389, 146 A. 233 (1929); Taylor 
v. Mayor & Council, 130 Md. 133, 99 A. 900 (1917) (distinguishes nuisance from taking in 
eminent domain). 
270. Wade v. Miller, 188 &lass. 6, 73 N.E. 849 (1905). 
271. See Pool v. Higginson, 8 Daly 113 (N.Y.C.P. 1878). 
272. Id. a t  117-18. But recall that well played music ntoy be o. nuisance. See text accompany- 
ing note 266 supra. 
273. Twin Elm Management Corp. v. Banks, 181 hfisc. 96, 46 N.Y.S.2d 952 (N.Y. City 
Mun. C t  1943). The court admitted that hearing the practicing may have been "nerve racking." 
Id. a t  97, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 953. 
274. Douglas L. Elliman & Co. v. Karlsen, 59 hiisc. 2d 243, 298 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. City 
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noise must be of such a character as to produce actual physical 
discomfort to persons of ordinary s e n s i b i l i t i e ~ . ~ ~ ~  What that may 
mean, short of convulsions or worse, is left (like most of the law of 
nuisance) to judicial discretion. 
As may be deduced from the foregoing, the inherent practical 
problems of proof and advocacy must substantially diminish the 
likelihood that anyone would bring a nuisance action, much less win 
it. This alone would motivate landlords to provide for restrictions on 
nuisance-like conduct which are better defined than the relativistic 
rules which the law supplies. But it is the facilitation of mlt-of-cozrrt 
resolutions of tenant conduct disputes which is probably the greatest 
contribution made by objectively worded, lease-contained supplements 
to the law of nuisance. 
By having in the lease a set of clearly delineated standards, which 
can be pointed to in the event of controversy, many or most tenant 
conduct disputes can probably be resolved simply by negotiation with 
the offending tenant.276 This may be especially true where the viola- 
tion occurs as a result of a mistake or a misunderstanding. Moreover, 
if the objective wording of a restriction on nuisance-like conduct 
makes obtaining judicial enforcement easier and more certain, the 
mere prospect of judicial enforcement may well exert a back-pressure 
on the compliance negotiations with the offending tenant, and it may 
thereby make actual resort to the courts unnecessary. By contrast, a 
flexible conduct standard (e.g. ,  nuisance), offers the offending tenant 
greater promise of opportunities to delay or frustrate enforcement, or 
to escape it entirely. The harder and more uncertain the judicial 
enforcement, the less credible is its threat. On the other hand, if it is 
easy to show (to the tenant or, eventually, to the court) that the tenant 
has not complied with a specifically worded rule, the offending tenant 
should have little incentive to actually force a showdown in the court 
before agreeing to comply. 
Civ. Ct. 1969) (wall-piercing drum beats). For a further discussion and a more complete catalogue 
of cases, see 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts 3 1.25, at  74-77 (1956). 
275. Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938). AS a 
more objective test of whether the conduct complained of affects persons of ordinary sensibilities, 
one might suppose that the effect of the conduct on the market value of the premises might 
control: the predilections of the fastidious few should hardly have a significant market impact, 
whereas a substantial depressive effect on value would signify that, in objective contemplation, 
the conduct oversteps the bounds of what is bearable. Some courts have indicated the relevnncc 
of impact on market value (Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933); 
Weakley v. Page, 102 Tenn. 178, 53 S.W. 551 (1899)) but it has also been said that the 
diminution of market value of adjacent property does not itself make objectionable conduct a 
nuisance (Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 89, 109 P. 788, 789 (1910)). 
276. See Note, Restrictive Regulations in Wisconsin Summer Colony Land Conveyances, 
1950 Wis. L. Rev. 709. 
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Thus, even if lease-contained conduct restrictions do nothing more 
than supply objective content to the norms of nuisance, they may be 
valuable or even practically indispensable to administrative efficiency 
in controlling offensive tenant conduct. 
D .  Protection of "SpecialJ' Co~tcevtrs 
The discussion thus far has focused on improving upon the protec- 
tions supplied by law through agreements that provide for standing, 
remedies and better defined conduct norms but without (theoretically 
at  least) imposing any greater restrictions on tenant activities than are 
already implicit in the law. However, the activity restrictions already 
implicit in tort law may themselves be inadequate to serve the land- 
lord's purpose of protecting himself and his tenants from possible 
objectionable conduct on the part of other tenants.277 People may wish 
to live in a building where no one practices musical instruments, or 
where no one operates a television or stereo so it is audible by others, 
or where there are no dogs, or no children or no residents less than 
forty years of age. Indeed, every case in nuisance which is lost on the 
grounds that there was no nuisance may be considered to represent a 
case of "special" concern. 
Merely because such concerns are not protected by law, it does not 
follow that they are not real, and are not sought after. Thus, for his 
particular case, the landlord may seek to improve upon the generalized 
balance and protections of tort law by obtaining agreements from 
tenants to observe even stricter standards, involving even greater 
restrictions on activities, than the law would otherwise impose. That 
is, the landlord may seek to protect special concerns of his own or of 
the greater number of his tenants, for which the law of torts, with its 
generalized assumptions concerning "normal" factual contexts and 
values, provides no protection. It is a normal function of contracts to 
provide a legal basis for such additional protections.278 And it is a 
normal function of leases279 to serve as the vehicle for gaining special 
277. As previously observed (see text accompanying no& 26-33 supra), tort law may leave 
special concerns unprotected because (i) tort rules necessarily crrn reflect only a generalized 
balance between protecting activities on one hand and protecting others from the impact of 
activities on the other, and (ii) the balance subsumed in tort la\s as dtsirable is a societally 
determined function of the relative values placed by society, not by specific individuals, on the 
interests (freedom, protection from activities) which are involved. 
278. As one court has said: "Sensitive persons who would shield themselves from contact with 
disagreeable neighbors should either move out, or protect themselves by covenant" bG1e.s v. 
Lauraine, 99 Ga. 402,405, 27 S.E. 739, 740 (1896); accord, Lyon v. Bethlehem Eng'r Corp., 253 
N.Y. 111, 170 N.E. 512 (1930). 
279. In addition to provisions for stricter conduct standards contained in Icaes themselves, 
landlords often adopt "rules and regulationsn for tenants, dehors the l a c ,  but pursuant to a 
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protections desired by a landlord for himself and for the greater 
number of his tenants. 
Attempts by landlords to impose conduct (or similar) standards 
which are stricter than the law raises a potential for emotionally felt 
objection and controversy not present where the landlord has merely 
bargained for standing, remedies or better defined conduct standards. 
Stricter-than-law standards imposed in a lease will expand the scope of 
what is wrongful and thereby diminish legal freedom; such standards 
do not, unlike standing, remedies and better definitions, merely in- 
crease the chances or consequences of the "come-uppances" tvhich may 
accrue to the tenant for transgressing traditionally recognized law- 
imposed freedom limitations.280 
Moreover, stricter-than-law conduct norms in a lease are suspect as 
a sort of private legislation. If freely consented to by all concerned, 
private lawmaking for private relations should usually be unobjection- 
able;281 but if behavioral norms are de facto unilaterally imposed-by 
landlord on tenant-the effect is antagonistic to the aims and assump- 
tions of an egalitarian society. When personal freedom to act is 
curtailed by adhesion contracts, the call for intensive scrutiny seems 
even more compelling. 
In considering whether the law should lend its support to landlords' 
attempts to improve on the protections which the law itself provides, 
two questions must be faced squarely. Why should landlords be 
permitted a t  all to prescribe tenant conduct standards which are 
stricter than those imposed by the law itself? Secondly, assuming that 
landlords should be afforded some power to prescribe tenant conduct 
standards, what limitations should be placed on that power; that is, 
what kinds of conduct standards should be legally impermissible and 
hence invalid? 
provision therein. See Luna Park Housing Corp. v. Besser, 38 App. Div. 2d 713, 329 N.Y.S.2d 
332 (2d Dep't 1972); Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 836, 846-51 
(1974); Berger, supra note 22, a t  833. The former Article is especially critical of such rules. 
280. Perhaps the chief virtue of making this distinction is to make clear thnt the concern of 
protecting freedoms which may weigh against recognition of stricter standnrds should hnve no 
relevance to the question of whether recognition should be accorded to contmct-provided 
standing, remedies or better defined standards. Admittedly, by making for more effective 
enforcement, th&e tend to cause a diminution of freedom just as realistically as stricter standards 
do. But contractions of actual freedom due to more efficient enforcement of existing legal 
limitations should hardly be a cause for complaint-unless the non-redress of wrongs because of 
administrative inefficiency is a value to be preserved. 
281. "Les conventions legdement form& tiennent lieu de loi B ceux qui les ont fnites." C. 
Civ. art. 1134(1) (7Se ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1975). 
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1. Justifications for Norm Prescription by Landlords 
In justifying stricter-than-law norm prescription by the landlord, it 
is the starting assumption that most people would like to live in an 
agreeable surrounding.282 At the same time, the precise characteristics 
and prerequisites which make living surroundings agreeable will, to 
different people, vary as widely as the variations in the tastes, habits 
and tolerance of the people themselves. Also to be taken into account is 
the fact that perfection, in leasehold premises or anything else, is 
seldom achievable or really expected. But incompatible factors can 
coexist with overall agreeableness only to a limited (and, unfortu- 
nately, subjectively defined) extent. To what extent they can so coexist 
is a function, in part, of the nature of the incompatible factors 
themselves and, in part, of the sensitivity of the people in question. 
People tend, in their day-to-day lives, to separate themselves from 
disagreeable things and, one must assume, to separate themselves from 
disagreeable people.283 Thus, in renting an apartment, most people 
will probably try to find a residential setting which they hope to be as 
282. The focus of this Article is on residential leasehold tenancies; hence the following 
discussion will be in terms of "living" in an agreeable surrounding. However, there is apparently 
no authoritative basis for concluding that courts purport (for purposes presently discusxd) to 
apply any different set of standards when the tenant's contemplated purpose in lasing is 
commercial rather than residential. Cf. Note, Commercial Versus Residential L e s s :  A New 
Double Standard?, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 901 (1974). The purpose of the tenancy seems to be at 
most one of a number of relevant factors, and for this reason cases involving commercial 
tenancies have been freely cited in thii Article wherever believed to be relevanl 
However, two factors present in commercial tenancies probably make the resolution of the 
issues under discussion less difticult in the case of such tenancies than in the c u e  of residential 
tenancies. 
First of all, when entering a commercial lease, the parties are probably more likely to 
consciously try to anticipate how the intended use of the premises may affect the legitimate 
interests of others. Thus, the terms of the lease (and, indeed, the decision to enter into it in the 
first place) can reflect and forestall later controversies arising out of the tenant's activities on the 
premises. Moreover, the greater likelihood that the commef881 lease will be preceded by real 
give-and-take negotiations between the parties not only helps tb issure against the possibility of 
surprise, i t  also justifies a more rigorous application of the standards of conduct finally agreed to. 
Secondly, to a far greater extent than with commercial leaseholds, the imposition of conduct 
standards in residential leases involves an impairment of personal freedom as distinguished from 
commercial freedom. The burden of restrictions on a residential tenant does not lead to merely a 
moderation of profit or a business inconvenience. Rather, it may impinge on the tenant's vety 
freedom in expressing and acting out hi own personality. Since the impact of the burden is 
personal and not merely monetary-since the tenant's personal freedom is at shkc-it is perhaps 
more difficult, psychologically if not logically, to countenance the imposition of the burden, even 
when the competing interests (which also may be "personal") are clear. 
283. I t  is not anticipated that anyone will contend that people generally seek out u n p l m t -  
ness in preference to agreeableness, or that indifference is generally shown in this regard. 
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compatible as possible with their psychic needs. In any event, it does 
not seem farfetched to assume such tendencies exist as people deliber- 
ately avoid what they do not like, whether it be dogs, swinging singles, 
the elderly, children or piano players. Moreover, it is probably likewise 
true that people whose activities will have unavoidable spill-over 
effects will tend to seek settings for their activities where the neighbors 
will be more tolerant and less likely to cause trouble for them. The 
result is a sort of self-segregation in which people having different 
characteristics, activity objectives, sensibilities and tolerances adjust 
their patterns of mutual proximity to maximize the environmental 
agreeableness (or minimize the disagreeableness) to all.284 
Assuming that such a tendency to self-segregate does exist generally, 
a heavy burden should lie on the person who would contend that the 
values being sought in such self-segregation are not legitimate, or that 
seeking these values should be condemned.285 For example, some 
people like dogs and some do not. Some people who have no dog do 
not mind that their neighbors do have one. But i t  does not follow thnt 
every apartment building should permit dogs.286 Similarly, some 
284. In  a recent report financed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, housing 
shared by tenants of various ages and lifestyles was blamed for much of the increased vandnlism, 
muggings and burglaries in apartment complexes. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1976, at 42, col. 7. As a 
partial solution to the crime problems, the author of the report, Oscar Newman, advocates thnt 
multi-tenant buildings should be occupied by families that are as dike as possible. Furthermore, 
"buildings should be designed to meet the needs of the particular types of occupants," (id.) 
and presumably selection and control of the type of occupant should be legnlly permissible. 
See generally 0. Newman, Dkign Guidelines for Creative Defensible Space (1975). 
285. At the outset it should be emphasized, lest the thrust be misunderstood, that pnrticultu 
types of self-segregation (e.g., based upon race or religion) must not and presumably will not be 
condoned or supported. See section III(D)(Z)(d) infra. To  suggest that there are legitimate and 
commonly sought after values in self-segregation is obviously not to suggest that these are the 
only values to be sought or protected. It is not even to suggest that such values, relative to some 
others, rank particularly high. See note 374 infra. On the other hand, just because the interest in 
self-segregation may at  times clash with other important policies, even the most paramount 
policies (e.g., preservation of human dignity irrespective of race), it does not follow that seeking 
the values inherent in self-segregation should be condemned even when no such clash is involved. 
At the same time, only the utterly oblivious could ignore the potential of self-segregation, if not 
subject to proper constraints, to defeat quite directly the national policy of promoting cerloin 
types of integration (particularly racial), as developed during the last two decades. The matter is 
reconsidered in greater detail in section IIl(D)(2)(d) infra. Suffice it to say for now, that (I) 
whatever may be the heuristic function and effectiveness of law, the law must also deal with and 
regulate existing behavioral patterns or else abandon some areas of human interchange to 
self-help and random injustice pending the prospective utopia, and (2) supporting sonre types of 
self-segregation while prohibiting and even punishing others should be no more difficult than, 
say, limiting recoveries for mental distress to those who are entitled to such recoveries. 
286. Blakely v. Housing Authority, 8 Wash. App. 204, 505 P.2d 151 (1973). See nlso Triangle 
Management Corp. v. Inniss, 62 Misc. 2d 1095, 312 N.Y.S.2d 745 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970). 
Nor, most emphatically, does it follow that dog-owners who dislike other people's dogs ought to 
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people like big parties, children, or hard rock music occasionally 
played loudly; others do not. And some (perhaps most) who do not like 
these things can nonetheless tolerate them. But even if these things are 
not legal nuisances, it does not follow that they should be permissible 
in every apartment building; it does not follow that those who find 
these things intolerable should be permitted no escape. 
Essentially, the protection of special concerns is the protection of 
those who have particular sensitivities which others, in general, may 
not share. It is, if you will, providing a home for the hypersensitive, a 
place of resort for those who are ignored by the law of nuisance.287 In 
permitting and enforcing stricter-than-law conduct restrictions, we are 
allowing even the hypersensitive to get away from what they do not 
like. And because there are probably few who are not hypersensitive to 
at  least some acts of others, and given that attitudes as to what is 
ordinarily tolerable changes with the times,288 we cannot un- 
derestimate the importance of the values sought in self-segregation 
simply because we do not always share the sensitivity of those seeking 
escape from particular annoyances. 
Although the values sought in self-segregation may be very impor- 
tant to those who seek them, the ease of protecting those values may 
vary radically depending upon the circumstances. Compared with 
patterns of residential housing, the seating arrangement on, say, a bus is 
trivial and uninteresting. The physical mobility of all concerned 
(coupled with the transitory nature of the whole affair) permits read- 
justment without much constraint on freedom or dislocation to any. 
And so it is with most instances where the characteristics and conduct 
of those in physical proximity play a role in an individual's internal 
tranquility. But translated to congested rental housing or other more or 
less permanent neighbor relationships, the interest in avoiding freedom 
constraints or dislocation becomes so large as to offer serious competi- 
tion to the interest in agreeable surroundings. In resolving this compe- 
tition, there may inevitably have to be losers who lose much. 
In  the absence of prior agreements to resolve the competition, it will 
have daim to a special privilege of keeping a dog. Still, it may be quite rational for an individual 
to wish that such double-standards could apply for hi own benefit; hence. it seems not 
unreasonably cynical to assume that in many objectionable tenant cases, even the objectionable 
tenant would desire the protection of the restriction were he on the receiving end of the annoying 
activities. 
287. As had been noted earlier, the law of nuisance seeks to protect only the interests of 
persons having ordinary sensitivities (see text accompanying notes 265-75 supn)  and does not 
protect the hypersensitive or idiosyncratic. 
288. The tolerability of smoking is a notable recent example of changing attitudes toward 
what is ordinarily tolerable. The once prevalent attitude that smokers had to be tolerated seems 
rapidly giving way to exactly the opposite view. 
Heinonline - -  45 Fordham L. Rev. 301 1976-1977 
302 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
probably be resolved according to the law of private nuisance. The 
inability of nuisance law, geared to the generality of cases,289 to 
respond satisfactorily to many specific situations, coupled with the 
pressure to accommodate the environmental concerns of all land users, 
form the core of justification for land use restrictions ranging from 
zoning to rules and regulations in leases. The legality and enforceabil- 
ity of the freedom constraints which all of these involve are based 
either upon the police power, in the case of publicly imposed restric- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~ ~  or upon individually created property or contract rights in the 
case of private restrictions. 
Since the privately created restrictions are based on contract or 
property rights, and since such rights are normally enforced, cases only 
rarely mention whether a landlord should have the power to prescribe 
special conduct norms for tenants.291 If the restrictions are not simply 
enforced,292 the grounds for nonenforcement are at least consistent 
with (though perhaps hostile to) the landlord's basic power to pre- 
scribe.293 However, as was true in the case of standing,294 there may 
easily be doubt as to whether landlords should have such power; 
therefore, it may be useful to review some of the justifications for 
conceding such power to them. 
Assuming that stricter-than-law conduct standards are necessary to 
protect special concerns, perhaps the most compelling reason for 
allowing the landlord to prescribe such standards is that, compared 
with the tenants themselves, the landlord is in the better position to do 
so. First of all, the landlord, on the basis of his (or his attorney's) 
experience, is more likely to be able to anticipate the sorts of restric- 
tions which may be desirable given his building's other characteristics, 
location, intended quality, and so forth. Furthermore, assuming that 
the landlord enters into a formal lease agreement with every tenant 
anyway, it is logical and convenient to make conduct restrictions a 
part of that agreement. But perhaps most importantly, the landlord is 
in a uniquely favorable position to obtain agreement to the conduct 
restrictions from every tenant by making such agreement a precondi- 
tion to getting an apartment in the building. In  a way, this last 
289. See note 260 and text accompanying notes 259-75 supra. 
290. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
291. One case which did mention the issue was Moss v. Hirshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 405, 303 
N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
292. See note 140 supra and accompanying text. 
293. Such grounds for nonenforcement include strict construction against restrictions on 
property use (see notes 23 & 25 supra), interpretation so as to avoid forfeiture results (see notes 
148-68 supra and accompanying text) and relative hardship or harshness of enforcement (see text 
accompanying notes 177-240 supra and section III(D)(2)(a) infra). 
294. See note 36 supra. 
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argument cuts two ways, for it concedes that the landlord has de facto 
a heavy power to prescribe and one might well worry that such power 
can be abused to create unreasonable restrictions. However, the prob- 
lem of unreasonable rules can be handled directly, without questioning 
the general power of the landlord to prescribe any rules at  On 
the other hand, as a practical matter, it  is only through the landlord 
that a pattern of uniform buildingwide conduct restrictions can be 
achieved. Because a single tenant's objectionable activities can cause 
substantial unpleasantness for many, uniformity of restrictions (and 
hence of protection) may be necessary to achieve the protection which 
stricter-than-law freedom constraints are intended to provide. There- 
fore, permitting the landlord to require tenants to agree to conduct 
restrictions as a precondition to entry may be the only \+ay to make 
stricter-than-law conduct restrictions serve their desired purposes. 
Another reason for recognizing a power to prescribe in the landlord 
is that such a power is consistent with the usual pattern of "gross" 
leasing arrangements,296 and it is therefore probably consonant with 
the expectations of most tenants. When leasing an apartment in a 
building of a given character, most tenants probably expect that the 
landlord and not the tenants themselves will be responsible for main- 
taining that character, not only as it is affected by the building's 
physical attributes, but as it is affected by the nonphysical attributes as 
well. Such expectations may only recently be receiving the reinforce- 
ment of but they are real nonetheless. Tenants neither desire 
nor expect that they must negotiate among themselves to create an 
environment suitable for their special concerns which the law may not 
otherwise protect. If the building seems "right1' in the beginning, they 
assume that it will stay that way, and that the landlord will see to it 
that it  does.298 
Lastly, the landlord himself has an interest in the character of his 
building and tenant conduct can affect that interest.299 The landlord 
may wish to establish a building catering to the elderly, or to singles, 
or he may wish to assure his tenants that no neighboring apartments 
will be used for the practice of musical instruments. The protection of 
this interest from injury-even injury which may be damttzcnr sine 
injuria at  law-is a further justification for giving the landlord the 
295. See section III(D)(2). 
296. See note 44 supra. 
297. See section III(A)(3) supra. 
298. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cut. denied, 
400 U.S. 925 (1970) ("Since the lessees continue to pay the same rent, they were entitled to expect 
that the landlord mould continue to keep the premises in their beginning condition during the 
lease term."). 
299. See text accompanying notes 60, 73-78 supra. 
Heinonline - -  45 Fordham L. Rev. 303 1 9 7 6 - 1 9 7 7  
3 04 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
power to prescribe conduct standards which prospective tenants must 
agree to observe as a precondition to leasing. The landlord-tenant 
relation is (outside of marriage) the most enduring legal relationship 
that most people are likely to enter, and it is one involving a valuable 
asset of the landlord. Should not the law allow the landlord the power 
to prescribe reasonable ground rules for the protection of that asset, 
even if the protection sought may be more than the law itself would 
otherwise provide? 
I t  has already been observed300 that denying effective enforcement 
of conduct restrictions will prevent the landlord from giving his 
tenants legal protection for environmental benefits which were among 
the factors which induced them to enter into their leases. The same 
may be said, with perhaps even greater force, of denying the validity 
of the restrictions entirely. Denying such validity will not prevent 
prospective tenants from selecting residences in buildings appearing to 
have environmental conditions and character appropriate to their 
psychic needs. Such denial will only prevent the landlord from assur- 
ing that such conditions or character will continue throughout the term 
and renewals of the tenant's lease.301 Unless the law forces noncomply- 
ing tenants to keep their promises, it will likewise prevent the landlord 
from keeping his promises, implicit or otherwise, to the majority of his 
tenants. The losers, ultimately, will be the complying tenants them- 
selves.302 
a. The Contract of Adhesion Problem 
Whatever the benefits derivable from landlord prescription of con- 
duct standards, allowing such a power to prescribe to landlords may 
nonetheless be objected to because of the adhesive character of the 
leases which give the standards their legal force. The difficulty is that 
the basic enforceability of the landlord's prescriptions is grounded in 
contract, and to the extent that the tenant has not undertaken to 
accept their burden "willingly," the very rationale for enforcing the 
standards is undermined. 
I t  is true that residential tenants usually have at best only a limited 
300. See text following note 234 supra. 
301. See note 298 supra. Even if the landlord has made no explicit, legally enforceable 
promises to the other tenants concerning the tenant-affected environmental conditions or charac- 
ter of the building, the impact of the implied warranty of habitability may force such promises on 
him nonetheless. See section III(A)(3) supra. If the objectives of this implied warranty are not to 
be frustrated, it may be indispensable to concede to the landlord the power to prescribe and 
enforce conduct restrictions applicable to his tenants. 
302. "To have removed the pet clause would have been as unfair to tenants who were 
opposed to pets as the retention of the pet clause is claimed to be to tenants who favor pets." 
Blakely v. Housing Authority, 8 Wash. App. 204, 212, 505 P.2d 151, 156 (1973). 
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opportunity to negotiate the conduct or use restrictions to be contained 
in their leases. The tenant may have no choice but to either accept all 
of the freedom curtailments which the lease prescribes or to reject the 
lease entirely. And if the housing market is tight, or if most landlords 
use more or less standardized forms, the latter choice may be unrealis- 
tic. Hence, the conduct restrictions which the landlord prescribes may 
well seem to have more the character of unilaterally imposed obliga- 
tions rather than the freely undertaken duties presupposed in the 
ordinary enforcement of contracts.303 
However, even though the conduct or use restrictions in the usual 
residential lease are largely nonnegotiable, it is probably also true that 
any reasonable restrictions would be agreeable to most tenants any- 
way. At least, most tenants would like to have their ?reigttbms bound 
by such restrictions, and it is h-ard to sympathize with anyone who 
would seek exemption only for himseK304 Indeed, if most tenants were 
not willing to comply with the usually enforced restrictions on tenant 
conduct, one would expect that attempts to evict tenants for objection- 
able activities would be more frequent than the unusual occurrences 
which they are. 
In order to denominate lease-contained conduct restrictions as adhe- 
sive, it is necessary of course to assume that, due to the widespread use 
of standardized forms or whatever, the prospective tenant has no 
realistic choice but to accept them as part of his lease. On the other 
hand, if the usually enforced conduct restrictions are so pervasively 
required as to deprive the tenant of any realistic choice, this very 
pervasiveness tends to underline the restrictions' desirability and gen- 
eral acceptability. For example, if no landlords permitted nighttime 
piano practice, and if this restriction were unacceptable to many, it 
would likely be in the interest of some landlords to break the 
pattern-for no better reason than to obtain the higher rent which 
insistent home practicers would pay for the freedom. If no landlord 
were willing to relent and permit a particular activity, the indication 
would be that the activity is so intolerable (to other tenants, or perhaps 
to the landlord directly) that no one wants to put up with it in 
exchange for the available trade-offs.305 Of course, a local housing 
shortage, especially if coupled with rent controls, may reduce or 
303. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield hlotors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); k l u ,  
Contracts of ~ d h e s i & S o m e  Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 
(1943); Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 130 (1962). 
304. See note 286 supra. 
305. In the landlord's case, the most likely available trade-off would be a higher rent which 
would be paid in exchange for deletion of the restriction. In the wse of neighboring tenants, the 
most likely available trade-off would be the reduction in rents which would be required in order 
to induce them to endure the annoying activity. 
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eliminate landlords' incentive to "bid" for tenants through offers of 
relaxed conduct restrictions. At the same time though, the presence of 
a housing shortage makes it all the more oppressive to arbitrarily 
subject the hapless neighboring tenants to the annoying activities from 
which most in the building are willing to refrain. Thus, "adhesive" 
conduct restrictions may be the only way to protect the preponderance 
of tenants from the random discomforts caused by the nonconforming 
few. However, even if a particular tenant were unwilling to accept 
certain conduct restrictions, there are still other good reasons to 
enforce them if he nonetheless signed the lease which contains them. 
First of all, there is the argument of convenience which, in the 
economic context, boils down to one of cost. The tenant knows (or 
should realize) that when entering a lease he is getting a unified 
package of benefits and detriments. It is much as the buyer of a car 
knows that the car is put together as a package, some aspects being 
desirable (e.g., a motor size he likes), others, perhaps, undesirable 
(e.g., wrong color seats). Of course, the package constituting the lease 
theoretically can be taken apart by negotiation, with benefits and 
detriments added or removed, tailoring it to the tenant's exact desires. 
So can the car; e.g., by taking out the wrong color seats and installing 
others. However, the landlord (like the automobile dealer) may quite 
reasonably have only a limited willingness to rearrange the basic 
package which is offered. The costs, in time and perhaps also legal 
services, may militate against such rearrangement, especially in the 
case of residential leases. And a landlord who has paid for a carefully 
thought out, lawyer-drawn lease would be understandably reluctant to 
tinker with a document whose significance he does not fully com- 
prehend. Hence, a landlord may allow minor modifications of the form 
(e.g., to permit limited subletting), but i t  should not be surprising that 
even an understanding landlord would insist that all leases either be on 
his basic routinized form or not a t  all. 
In any event, it begs the question to say that a tenant is unwilling to 
accept certain lease provisions just because, in the abstract, he would 
prefer not to agree to them. The tenant faced with the landlord's usual 
package has the choice of accepting or rejecting it. If he accepts, 
despite undesired provisions, there is no reason to assume that he did 
so for any reason other than that he perceived the benefits to outweigh 
the detriments. Having made this determination, and having con- 
tracted on this basis, it is hard to see what claim the tenant has to 
relief from certain of the detriments, especially insofar as the detri- 
ments were accepted as part of the quid pro 4210 for the benefits. Thus, 
though the tenant may have been unwilling in some abstract sense to 
accept certain conduct restrictions, if the tenant was willing on balance 
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to accept them as part of a package which he deemed to be desirable 
overall, the restrictions are not properly considered n o n c o n s e n ~ u a l . ~ ~ ~  
In fact, to relieve the tenant of the restrictions, while holding the 
landlord otherwise to the lease, would be to force the lattdlo~d to 
contract on terms which the landlord found unacceptable.307 Thus, to 
refuse to enforce restrictions on grounds of unwillingness will not avoid 
the enforcement of a nonconsensual contract; it will merely shift the 
unwilling adherence from the tenant's side to the landlord's.a08 
Finally, though, so far as conduct restrictions are concerned, there is 
an even more important reason for the landlord to refuse to negotiate. 
Differences in restriction patterns would defeat the buildingwide uni- 
formity of protection and the value of self-segregation that the conduct 
restrictions are supposed to provide. Hence, unless the law is to 
withdraw from protecting special concerns which people strive to 
preserve, there may be no alternative to allowing landlords the power 
to prescribe stricter-than-law conduct standards and to enforce the 
306. I t  should be observed that, in the real world, al l  benefits have costs, if only opportunity 
costs. Thus, in order to maximize benefit, people are forced to make trade-offs, accepting certain 
detriments in order to get associated benefits. However, it makes no sense a t  all (absent 
circumstances of duress or the like) to say that such acceptance of detriment is nonconsensud. 
Likewise, it makes no sense to say the tenant's agreement to observe conduct restrictions or. for 
that matter, to pay rent is nonconsensual-and hence adbesive-just because he could not have 
gotten possession unless he made such agreements. 
307. The result would be, in effect, a form of duress against the landlord. Epslrin. 
Unconsdonabiity: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. Law & Econ. 293, 297 (1975). 
308. I t  is assumed in the foregoing discussion that the tenant, in entering the lease, is aware 
of a t  least the general tenor of the conduct restrictions contained therein. This awareness may be 
the result of reading the lease or, it would reasonably seem, by observing the character of the 
building which is affected by or consistent with the observance of the restrictions. Cf. Sanborn v. 
McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925). I t  would a p p w  to be a \ v d  ucuse that the 
tenant was unaware of the restrictions if such unawareness was due to a refusal to read the lease 
(unless, of course, the landlord encouraged him to sign without reading). Yet, the question arises. 
should the tenant's lack of notice (actual or constructive) of the restrictions relieve him of their 
burden? 
Indicating that lack of notice is not a ground for relief, one court has held that the landlord has 
no duty to call the restrictions to the tenant's attention. Southbridge Toivers, Inc. v. Rovics, 76 
Misc. 2d 396, 350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. T. 1973). However, the landlord who fails to do so would 
seem to be opening himself to claims of mistake, implied agreement, estoppel or even fraud in the 
inducement. On the other hand, it does not very well serve the purpose of the restrictions if 
tenants do not know their content. Hence, there is some incentive to landlords.to encourage 
tenants to read their leases. Whether anyone very often acts on this incentive is, however, 
problematical. 
The question of lease provisions empowering the landlord to promulgate r u l e  and reylations 
outside the lease (see note 279 supra) presents a different problem. Courts sometimes have wid 
that, to be valid, such restrictions must be "reasonable." See text accompan)ing notes 310-11 
infra. What reasonable may or should mean in this context will be described infra. However, for 
present purposes, the question arises whether this limitation on extra-lease restrictions is sufficient 
to save such restrictions from invalidity due to their overly "private legislative" character. 
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standards prescribed even against tenants who would not find the 
standards agreeable. 
For the law to withdraw from protecting these special concerns 
would simply be bad policy. The necessary inadequacy of generalized 
law prescribed norms has already been described, and it is doubtful 
that the law could ever offer standards which are sufficiently finely 
tuned to particular cases to replace the functioning of privately agreed 
norms. If the law refuses to enforce the privately agreed norms, the 
result will not be the elimination of special concerns themselves or the 
values perceived in protecting them. I t  will mean merely that this 
entire area of human interchange and potential conflict will be left to 
the pressures and self-help of laissez-faire. As a consequence, the 
protection will be arbitrarily uneven, depending upon how well these 
extra-legal protection mechanisms work in particular cases. Worse, the 
extra-legal attempts a t  protections will be unscrutinized for abusive 
motivation, unreasonableness of regulation and other grounds for 
protection of the regulated party. 
I t  is hard to see how a limited amount of private legislative authority 
(if that is what it is) could be more detrimental to the general welfare 
than the law's abdication which the complete rejection thereof entails. 
Especially, this is true where the "private legislation" is agreed to- 
albeit perhaps as the "bad part" of an overall good deal-by all who 
are subject to it. 
* * * * 
Thus, the prescription by landlords of stricter-than-law conduct 
standards performs an important, perhaps irreplaceable, social func- 
tion. And the law's enforcement of such standards is, broadly speak- 
ing, justified even though the contractual basis for the enforcement is 
to a degree undermined by the adhesive character of the leases which 
give them their force. This is not to say, however, that the law should 
not place some limits on the de facto norm-creating authority which is 
conceded to landlords. I t  is only that the general welfare may be best 
served if such limits are not applied with a presumption of invalidity 
where stricter-than-law norms are prescribed. 
2. Appropriate Legal Limitations on the Conduct Standards Which 
Landlords May Prescribe 
Assuming that landlords are to have the power to prescribe conduct 
standards to be agreed to and observed by tenants, the question arises 
as to what limitations should be placed on that power. That is, what 
kinds of landlord-prescribed conduct standards should be legally im- 
permissible and hence invalid? 
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It may be helpful to note that lease-contained conduct restrictions 
are, like zoning laws, a response to the inability of nuisance law, 
geared to the generality of cases, to adequately protect special concerns 
which may exist in many specific situations. However, the substantial 
body of judicial expression delineating the permissible types and extent 
of regulation via zoning has not been reproduced in the area of private 
land use restrictions. Although litigation has produced a rather well 
developed body of rules concerning the possible ntechataisttrs atrd 
procedures for effecting private land use restrictions (vis., negative 
easements, implied reciprocal equitable servitudes, covenants and the 
like), little judicial attention has been drawn (explicitly at least) to the 
appropriate limits on the permissible character of private restrictions. 
In  the landlord-tenant context, courts have traditionally been content 
to observe that a landlord "has a legal right to control the uses to 
which his building may be put and may do so by appropriate provi- 
sions in a lease."309 Use restrictions, if contained in the lease, as 
opposed to collateral regulations made pursuant to the may 
not even have to be reasonable,311 and in any event specific guidance 
as to possible criteria for reasonableness seems virtually nonexistent. 
About all that may be concluded from the existing case law is that (i) 
lease-imposed restrictions do not necessarily lose their validity simply 
because they limit freedom more strictly than the substantive norms of 
tort (especially nuisance) law,312 and (ii) regulations made pursuant to 
a Iease for purposes of restraining trade or violating some other 
recognized public policy may be imperrnis~ible.~'~ 
What is needed is to develop a somewhat more concrete definition of 
reasonableness, to suggest those considerations which ought (and ought 
not) to be taken into account in applying a reasonableness test of 
validity. Perhaps the term reasonable is itself an unfortunate one, 
echoing as i t  does the relativistic analysis of nuisance determina- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Clearly, it would not be desirable to test lease-prescribed 
309. Lyon v. Bethlehem Eng'r Corp., 253 N.Y. 111, 113-14, 170 N.E. 512, 513 (1930); see 
Luna Park Housing Corp. v. Besser, 38 App. Div. 2d 713, 329 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dcp't 1972) 
(rules and regulations); 30-88 Steinway St., Inc. v. H.C. Bohnck Co., 65 hlisc. 2d 1076, 319 
N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 197 lj,  aff'd, 42 App. Div. 2d 577,344 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Zd Dep't 
1973); 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5 3.40; hl. Friedman, Preparation of Leases 105-07 (1962 
ed.). 
310. See note 279 supra; Southland Der. Corp. v. Ehrlcr's Dairy. Inc., 468 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. 
1971); Modern Amusements, Inc., v. New Orleans Pub. Srv . ,  Inc., 183 La. 898, 165 So. 137 
(1935); Thousand Island Park Ass'n v. Tuchr ,  173 N.Y. 203, 211-12, 65 N.E. 975, 977 (1903). 
311. Irving Inv. Corp. v. Gordon, 3 N.J. Super. 385, 401, 66 A.2d 54, 61 (Super. Ct.), di'd, 
3 N.J. 217, 69 A.2d 725 (1949); Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio S t  183, 70 N.E.2d 447 
(1946); American Legion Holding Corp. r. Hurowitz, 72 S.D. 59. 30 N.\\'.Zd 9 (1947). 
312. See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text. 
313. See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions $5 182-84 (1965). 
314. See note 260 supra and text accompanying notes 265-75 supra 
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conduct restrictions by the same objective balancing that applies in 
private nuisance litigation; to do so would render it legally impossible 
to protect special concerns and needs of the hypersensitive which the 
general law itself does not protect. 
However, even given the legitimacy of protecting special concerns, it 
is obvious that some stricter-than-law conduct restrictions will be 
appropriate for judicial enforcement while others will not. The prob- 
lem is to find a principled basis for distinguishing one from the other. 
The following is a discussion of several possible bases. 
a. Relative Hardship 
Among the factors possibly relevant to the reasonableness of a 
conduct restriction, one might suggest relative hardship, in this case, 
the relative hardship of observing the conduct restriction compared 
with the benefits which accrue to others as a result of its being 
observed.315 The equitable methodology of "balancing the equities," 
taking into account the relative hardships involved in granting or 
denying relief,316 is commonly employed in cases involving use restric- 
tions on fees.317 The relatively greater hardship involved in enforcing a 
restriction has likewise been relied upon by courts in cases involving 
leaseholds.318 
- -- 
315. The relative hardship discussed here must be carefully distinguished from the compari- 
son of relative hardship discussed earlier in section III(B)(l)(c)(iv). The focus here is upon relative 
hardship as it bears on the "reasonableness" of the restriction per se. Accordingly, the appropriate 
comparison is between the hardship of compliance versus the hardship to oth'ers resulting from 
noncompliance. The relative hardship of enforcing a forfeiture for noncompliance (which was 
discussed earlier) is a wholly different matter, and it involves a wholly different balancing (the 
hardship to others resulting from noncompliance vs. the hardship of eviction). 
I t  is quite conceivable that, in a particular case, noncompliance with a restriction will result in 
hardship to others which is sufficiently great to justify enforcement of the restriction (e.g., by 
injunction) but which is insufficient to justify a forfeiture. See, e.g., Howard D. Johnson Co. v. 
Madigan, 361 Mass. 454, 280 N.E.2d 689 (1972); Feist 81 Feist v. Long Island Studios, Inc., 29 
App. Div. 2d 186, 190, 287 N.Y.S.2d 257, 261 (2d Dep't 1968) (dissenting opinion); 930 Fifth 
Corp. v. King, 71 Misc. 2d 359, 336 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. T.), rev'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 
N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972); Fly Hi Music Corp. v. 645 Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302, 
314 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970), aff'd mem., 7 1 Misc. 2d 302, 335 N.Y.S.2d 822 
(App. T. 1972); Madison 52nd Corp. v. Ogust, 49 Misc. 2d 663, 268 N.Y.S.2d 126 (N.Y. City 
Civ. Ct.), aff'd, 52 Misc. 2d 935, 277 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. T. 1966). It is only when the relative 
hardship to the violator justifies neither forfeiture nor any other form of redress that the 
restriction can be said to be itself unreasonable and hence, invalid, on the grounds of relative 
hardship. 
316. H. McClintock, Equity §§ 144-45 (2d ed. 1948). 
317. Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927). The balancing methodolorn is 
sometimes a statutory requirement as well. E.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law $8 1951-53 
(McKinney 1963). 
318. Piankay Realties, Inc. v. Romano, 271 App. Div. 104, 62 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 
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Invalidating conduct restrictions on the basis of relative hardship 
appears at  first to be quite defensible. Indeed, if reasonableness is a 
test of the validity of such restrictions, it seems to be highly unreason- 
able to enforce a restriction if observing it causes considerable incon- 
venience but offers little benefit to those supposedly protected thereby. 
However, several objections may be posed against using relative 
hardship as a basis for determining the reasonableness and validity of 
lease-prescribed conduct restrictions. 
The first objection is that any attempt to treat relative hardship as a 
criterion of unreasonableness would tend to defeat the substantive 
objective of protecting the special concerns which law-imposed behav- 
ioral norms ignore. For resorting to the sort of relativistic analysis 
which a relative hardship theory entails is to convert every conduct 
restriction case into something of a case of nuisance. 
The appropriateness of relativistic analysis may be clear enough 
when the gist of the landlord's action is tort; for in tort analysis, the 
relativism of circumstances lies at  the heart of the fundamental ques- 
tion of whether the defendant's conduct constituted a tort at all.319 It  is 
certainly less clear why relativistic analysis should have any role in 
deciding whether to enforce the terms of a contract. For contract 
methodology is essentially the application of positive standards estab- 
lished by the parties The primary task in contract is not 
to weigh competing interests, policy objectives and the like for the 
purpose of deciding whether the duty to observe a particular behav- 
ioral standard is one that the law should create. The behavioral 
standard has already been created by the undertaking of the promisor. 
The duty to observe the standard is imposed by law on the basis of 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 920, 73 N.E.2d 39 (1947); Jerome Realty Co. v. Ymkovich, 37 hlisc. 2d 
433, 23.5 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 71 hfisc. 2d 359, 336 
N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. T.), rev'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1952). 
Unfortunately, since a preponderance of lease restriction cases arise as actions ta enforce a 
forfeiture, it is often hard to tell, where the court grants relief from forfeiture, whether the 
relative hardship of the restriction itself or merely of the remedy was the mason for the court's 
holding. 
319. See notes 260-62 supra and accompanying text 
320. The contract may of course define the duty in relativistic terms (e.g., "tenant shall not 
use the demised premises in any objectionable manner" or "tenant shall make only such use of the 
included utilities as is consistent with residential use"), and if the contract does es tab lh  a 
relativistic standard, then relativistic analysis will of course be necessary in deciding tvhether, in 
each instance, particular acts or conduct are prohibited or mandated by the standard. This still 
does not mean that the tort standards au toma t idy  apply, for the objective of contract 
interpretation should remain primarily the ascertainment and effectuation of the parties' inten- 
tions. Nonetheless, a reference to a tort concept in the contract (e.g.. "tenant shall not suffer m y  
nuisance on the demised premises") should indicate that the ordinary tort standard rvould prima 
facie apply. 
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policies (concerning the social utility of enforcing agreements) which 
are independent of the substantive content of the standard itself. Thus, 
the question of whether, on balance, it was desirable to create the 
standard has no bearing on the issue of whether to enforce it. The 
question is solely: Did the promisor do what he has undertaken? 
The determination of whether or not the contractual duty was 
breached may perhaps require interpretation of intention (and therein 
a certain amount of s~b jec t iv i ty~~ l ) ,  but essentially the process is one 
of simple comparison-comparing the behavioral requirements of the 
contract with the provable conduct of the promisor. This process 
should not require or even admit of any sort of balancing of interests of 
the kind characteristic in defining torts; this is especially true if 
avoiding uncertainty-of standards and of proof-was a reason for 
creating particularized conduct standards in the first place.322 
Of course, comparing agreed behavioral requirements with provable 
conduct is not the only function performed by courts in contract cases, 
even though i t  is the primary one. The court must be satisfied that 
enforcement of the agreed behavioral requirement is not inconsistent 
with some policy more important than the policy of enforcing con- 
t r a c t ~ . ~ ~ ~  This does require some balancing by the though in 
most traditional cases of nonenforcement (e.g., on grounds of illegality 
or fraud) the outcome of the balancing is so obvious as not to be open 
to dispute. While historical precedent does not strictly speaking sup- 
port nonenforcement of contracts on the grounds of relative hard- 
ship325 (not a t  law, a t  least326), the more recent trend-particularly 
through the expanded application of "unconscionability~' notions- 
seems to be to legitimize relative hardship (in its more extreme 
manifestations) as a ground for contract invalidity. That is, the policy 
321. The subjectivity involved in the interpretation process may not be limited to subjective 
conclusions concerning what is, purely speaking, intent. As has been earlier noted (see notes 162 
& 190 supra and accompanying text), courts sometimes make conscious modifications of the 
substantive meaning of contracts under the guise of "strict interpretation." 
322. See text accompanying notes 257-63 supra. 
323. For example, courts will not enforce a contract calling for illegal acts by the breaching 
party. 6A A. Corbin, Contracts 8 1375 (1962). 
324. See section III(D)(Z)(d) infra, especially note 374 and text accompanying notes 383-88 
infra. 
325. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts 58 55, 56 (1970); 1 A. Corbin, Contracts 1 127 
(1963). See also Blakeley v .  W. T. Rabon, 266 S.C. 681, 221 S.E.2d 767 (1976); 3 J. Pomeroy, 
Equity Jurisprudence 5 928 (5th ed. 1941); 1 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 8 
245 (13th ed. 1886). 
326. Id.; cf. 5A A. Corbin, Contracts 1s 1164-65 (1964). 
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of avoiding relative hardship is perhaps becoming a policy which 
outweighs the general policy of enforcing contracts.327 
If avoidance of relative hardship in contract enforcement is indeed a 
transcendent policy, its inclusion as a criterion of unreasonableness for 
conduct restrictions would seem appropriate as would the relativistic 
analysis which it entails. 
However, although compliance with lease conduct restrictions can 
result in relative hardship, it turns out on analysis to be most unlikely 
that, consistently with protecting special concerns, relative hardship 
can serve as a basis for holding particular restrictions invalid. 
In order for compliance with a conduct restriction to cause relative 
hardship, such compliance must result in burdens to the obligor which 
are out of proportion to the benefits to the beneficiaries of the 
restriction. However, this disproportionality would not occur, in an 
objective sense, where the obligor's duty to comply was knowingly and 
willingly assumed in exchange for corresponding duties assumed by 
other obligor-beneficiaries of the restriction.328 Suppose, for example, 
that one of two knowledgeable bargaining neighbors willingly relin- 
quishes something (e-g., the right to practice a trombone a t  home) in 
exchange for, say, $100 paid by the other. The fact of exchange is 
objective evidence that the trombone player considered the benetlt of 
practicing at  home to have a value of less than $100 and the other 
neighbor considered the burden of such home practice to have a 
negative "value" of more than Although the absolute values of 
the benefit and burden are unknown, the relative burden and benefit 
of the restriction agreement are demonstrated by the exchange transac- 
tion, viz., the fact of the exchange shows that both parties bargained to 
reap a net benefit from the restriction agreement and, hence, the 
agreement results in no relative hardship to either. Similarly, if each of 
two neighbors willingly relinquishes a right (e.g., to hold large parties 
a t  home) in exchange for a corresponding relinquishment by the other, 
we have objective evidence that, for both, the right relinquished was 
considered less valuable than the right (restraint in party-giving by the 
other) which was received. Again, we do not know the absolute values 
which either neighbor placed on the rights relinquished or received. 
- - - - --- 
327. For a discussion of this trend, stressing the myopia of its assumptions, see Epstein, 
Unconsaonabiity: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. Law & Econ. 293 (1975). 
328. Cf. the language quoted in note 302 supra 
329. One or both of the two values might also be equal to $100. In that case the exchange 
would result in no net benefit or burden to either or both of the two parties; but still, them rvould 
be no relative hardship, since each party would be getting a value which w i ~ ~  at least the 
equivalent of that which he had given up. 
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But we do have objective evidence to show that each placed a. higher 
value on the other's restraint than the other placed on freedom from 
the restraint. Otherwise, they would never have willingly made the 
exchange.330 
By parity of reasoning, if every tenant willingly and knowledgeably 
agrees with the landlord to observe certain conduct restrictions, with 
the substantial expectation that compliance with like restrictions will 
be required of all other tenants, we have objective evidence to show 
that each tenant places a higher value on conferring upon the landlord 
the power to limit certain freedoms of others than he (or any of the 
others) places on having those freedoms himself.331 Hence, the univer- 
sal agreement for restrictions is-objectively-of net benefit to all, and 
i t  may be concluded that the agreement would not result in net 
hardship to anyone.332 Objectively, there is no relative hardship 
which could constitute an appropriate basis for holding such restric- 
tions either unreasonable or unenforceable; where the restrictions 
apply universally333 to all tenants by virtue of their willing and 
330. Once again, any two or more of the values (on restraint or freedom from restmint) might 
have been equal and the voluntary exchange might still have occurred. However, just as in the 
case in note 329 supra, the presence of equality of values would mean, a t  worst, tliat the 
transaction resulted in neither net benefit nor net burden (and, hence, no relative hardship) to 
either party. 
331. Landlord-imposed conduct restrictions do pose a case distinctive from the previous two 
hypotheticals set forth in the text insofar as tenants are disabled by the lease or the law from 
enforcing conduct restrictions contained in other leases. See note 39 supra and accompanying 
text. The difference is that, in exchange for the assumption of conduct restrictions, the tenant 
gets, not a right to enforce like restrictions on other tenants, but rather an expectation that the 
landlord will provide such enforcement. However, this difference does not ipso facto deprive the 
restrictions of their reciprocal character since the benefit which each tenant gets as his quid pro 
quo for assuming the restrictions is still identical to that received by the other tenants for their 
assumptions. If all willingly agree to the restrictions in exchange for such expectntion, we can still 
conclude that there is no net burden, and no relative hardship, in enforcing the rcstrlctions. 
332. Obviously, enforcement of the exchange causes some "disadvantage" to the party agdnst 
which it is enforced, because such enforcement prevents him from having the performance of the 
other party while he himself does not perform. But the "disadvantage" of not being able to breach 
a contract and still have the quid pro quo is hardly the kind of hardship which kindles fires in the 
heart of equity. 
333. For convenience of exposition, it has been assumed that the conduct restrictions in 
question are uniformly applicable to all tenants. However, the result is the snme even if the 
restrictions are nonuniform. Of course, if the restrictions are not uniform, it cannot be said that 
the restricted tenant receives the expectation of comparable restrictions on others as his quid pro 
quo. But if the tenant willingly and knowingly entered the lease, it may be assumed that there 
were other offsetting counterbenefits to the tenant which induced the tenant's overall satisfaction. 
See the discussion of "willingness" in note 336 infra and section III(D)(l)(a) supra. An obvious 
example is a lease to a pharmacy restricting use to drug sales. The pharmacist would hardly 
desire like restrictions to apply throughout the building, but he might like the other tenants to be 
restricted to, say, the practice of medicine. Cf. Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 
21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942). 
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knowing agreements, there is objectively no hardship a t  
But even though agreement-based universally applicable conduct 
restrictions cannot result in any relative objective hardship, the poten- 
tial for relative subjective hardship, which is the "real" relative hard- 
ship, remains. Consider, for example, a prohibition on large parties at  
home. Whatever may be the burden of such a prohibition and what- 
ever may be its benefit to others, if every tenant gets both the benefit 
and the burden, then compliance with the prohibition gives no tenant 
an advantage or disadvantage which is greater or less, in an objective 
sense, than that of the others. Subjectively, however, the differences in 
advantage may be considerable. A gregarious party-giver may find the 
prohibition a great burden with little special benefit, and his intro- 
verted neighbor may find it  a tremendous boon causing no inconveni- 
ence whatsoever. As a result of these subjective differences, which are 
based on the different values and special concerns of different people, 
the "real" hardship of compliance could, in many cases, exceed the 
hardship to others resulting from a breach. There could, in other 
words, be real subjective relative hardship in complying. 
There are several possible explanations for this disparity between 
"real" or subjective relative hardship and the relative hardships which 
are evidenced objectively by the fact of agreement. One of these is that 
the agreement may not have been entered into " k n o l ~ i n g l y . " ~ ~ ~  An- 
other is that it may not have been entered into " ~ i l l i n g l y . " ~ ~ ~  A third 
The point, vrhich may be generalized, is that in determining the relative hardship of 
agreements, the relative burdens and benefits of the entire agreement must be considered, and the 
focus cannot properly be limited only to particular terms while ignoring the rest 
334. To reiterate from notes 329 & 330 supra, for some tenants the values placed upon some 
lost freedom and getting corresponding protection may be equal, in rvhicb w e  there would be 
neither net burden nor benefit. Still, however, there would be no relntive hardship in enforce- 
ment. 
335. That the restrictions were not assented to "knowingly" suggests such standard excuses 
for contract nonperformance as fraud, mistake and the "unfair surprisen aspect of unconscion;lbil- 
ity. See R. Nordstrom, Sales 5 44, a t  127-2s (1970). The common feature of these o r c u ~ s  for 
nonperformance is that they offer relief from enforcement of an a p p m n t  ngreement where the 
objective manifestation of assent is belied by evidence of facts sufficiently compelling to justify 
resort to the subjective or L'real" mental state of the parties involved. However, lack of knor.:ledge 
in this sense, though it may lead to real (subjective) relative hardship, is irrelevant to tbe 
reasonableness of particular restrictions per se. Such lack of knowledge goa  at most to the 
appropriateness of enforcing the restriction in a particular w e .  But cf. Southbridge Towus, Inc. 
v. Rovics, 76 b&c. 2d 396, 350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. T. 1973) (no duty on landlord to notify tenant 
of dear language of lease). And, if relief from enforcement is appropriate in a particular w e .  the 
relief should be conferred without invalidating the restriction per se. Fbther, recourse should be 
had to one of the legal doctrines mentioned above pursuant to which enforcement m y  be refused 
despite the restriction's basic validity. 
336. That the restrictions were not assented to "willingly" also suggests several standard 
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reason is that, in making their agreements, tenants do not necessarily 
act "rationally. "337 
None of these reasons for the objective-subjective disparity offers 
any grounds for questioning the "reasonableness" of particular restric- 
tions per se; they go, not to the substance of the restrictions them- 
selves, but only to the agreement process which gives the restrictions 
their legal force. Obviously, defects in the agreement process may 
contractual defenses based on lack of "real" consent, including duress, overreaching and the 
"oppression" aspect of unconscionability. See R. Nordstrom, Sales 5 44, a t  128-30 (1970). The 
whole problem of willingness may be viewed broadly as a consequence of the fact that many 
leases, especially residential leases, tend to be contracts of adhesion, offered on a take-it-or-leave- 
it basis by the landlord. Whether lease-contained conduct restrictions ought not to be enforced 
because they constitute contracts of adhesion has been discussed in greater detail under section 
III@)(l)(a) supra. Suffice it to say here that, for purposes of determining reasonableness by 
reference to relative hardship, it can be assumed that the conduct restrictions were "willingly" 
entered into if the lease as a whole was satisfactory to the tenant and "willingly" entered into 
despite the undesired term. More particularly, even though a tenant may not have desired a 
particular nonnegotiable conduct restriction in his lease (e.g., because the freedom constraints on 
others were not worth the freedom restraints on himself), if the tenant accepted the lease 
anyway--deciding to take the good with the bad-it may be assumed (given knowledga and 
rationality) that there was some other benefit in having the lease which made the overall 
exchange beneficial to the tenant. See note 333 supra. Thus, even though the burden of 
complying with the restriction is not outweighed by the benefits of compliance with it by others, 
there would be no overall or net hardship when one takes into account the other benefits which 
the tenant gets under the same lease. 
337. That the restrictions were not assented to "rationally" suggests perhaps the traditional 
excuse of incapacity or incompeDnce. But the traditional notion of incapacity would have to be 
extended almost beyond recognition in order to make all "irrational" undertakings voidable by the 
promisor. 
There is, to be sure, a tendency among contracting parties to not think about nll of tlie 
consequences of an agreement, to trade off values which may be very important in exchange for 
countervalues which are not, subjectively speaking, comparable. Thus, the tenant may give up 11 
particular freedom (e.g., to keep a dog) not realizing that it may be more importnnt to him or his 
family to have a dog than it is to live in a building where the neighbors have no dogs. Or 
circumstances may change unpredictably, after agreement, modifying the tennnt's relative values. 
In  these sorts of cases, the apparent values which the tenant placed on elements of his exchange, 
as demonstrated by the willingness to enter the exchange, do not correspond to the red subjective 
values which he placed, or now places, upon them. Thus, the enforcement of the tenant's 
agreement may cause a real net burden to the tenant, one which is out of proportion to the benefit 
to the other tenants. However, such relative hardship would not indicate unreasonableness of the 
conduct restriction per se, nor, it may be added, would it seem to be the sort of case where the 
application of ordinary contract rules would prevent enforcement of the tenant's agreement. 
The policy of enforcing agreements based upon objective manifestations of m e n t  would be 
undermined entirely if a promisor could avoid enforcement on the grounds that he, without fault 
of the promisee or anyone else, miscalculated the appropriateness of the bnrgain for his own 
purposes and did not really intend its effect. Moreover, as will be shown presently in the text, 
there is no way to accurately estimate the real subjective values in any event. Thus, lack of 
"rationality" should not, short of incompetence, vitiate the tenant's agreement to observe conduct 
restrictions. 
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suggest any of several traditional bases for excusing performance,338 
but none of the bases are related to the character of the restrictions 
themselves (and none, it may be added, depends on the presence of 
"relative hardship" for its applicability). Nevertheless, given this po- 
tential disparity between subjective relative hardships and the appar- 
ent relative hardships shown by objectively manifested intentions, it 
would be clearly preferable, if it  were possible, to measure the relative 
hardship of restrictions according to subjectively held values rather 
than their objectively manifested counterparts.339 Unfortunately, how- 
ever, it is not possible. 
It is impossible accurately to compare subjective benefit against 
subjective burden because to do so would require an interpersonal 
comparison of utility which simply cannot be accurately achieved. 
There is no way to tell whether a prohibition (e.g., on large parties, 
piano playing or dogs) causes a greater burden on a person who wants 
these things than it does a benefit for another who does not. Sometimes 
the courts are required to make such interpersonal comparisons, for 
example, in cases brought in nuisance. Recognizing the futility of 
attempting to compare subjective or "real" values, the law of nuisance 
is content to proceed with only approximate comparisons, making its 
determinations on an objective basis, looking at the benefits and 
burdens as experienced by ordinary persons, and excluding the 
idiosyncratic concerns of the h y p e r s e n ~ i t i v e . ~ ~ ~  But it would not be 
appropriate to follow the example of the law of nuisance in testing the 
reasonableness and enforceability of stricter-than-law conduct stan- 
dards. For if such standards were tested on the objective basis applied 
in nuisaxice cases, then the only enforceable standards would be those 
which are no more restrictive than the law of nuisance itself. The 
protection of special concerns (of the hypersensitive or for special 
situations) would be left--despite the possibility of resolution by 
agreement-in a legal vacuum, protectable only by one or another 
method of self-help. 
Thus, unless the law is to abandon the protection of special con- 
cerns, the only acceptable method for comparing relative subjective 
338. E.g., fraud, mistake, duress, incompetence, procedural unconsaonability).. See notes 
335-37 supra. 
339. It should be noted that measuring the subjective relative hardship necessarily implies a 
case-by-case approach (since different people have different values), and such casuistry means 
that no generalizations about the "reasonableness" of particular types of restrictions (as based on 
relative hardship) would be possible. Still, inasmuch as subjective relative hardship may appcv 
to be a proper basis for nonenforcement, it seems suitable (if not entirely logicid) to discuss it at 
this point 
340. See text accompanying notes 264-75 supra 
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benefits and burdens is to observe an exchange or exchanges between 
the persons in question. As an indicator of relative subjective values, 
an exchange agreement is admittedly not perfect. The possible dispar- 
ity between the parties' real subjective values and those objectively 
shown by the fact of the exchange means that the agreement, the 
objective showing of subjective values, may mis-indicate. Nonetheless, 
reliance on agreement-shown comparative values is better than resort 
to the objective standards of nuisance. For to rely on the latter would 
be ne~essar i ly3~~ to disregard the differing values and special concerns 
which different people have. I t  would be to invalidate any agreements 
that "ordinary" persons would not make. 
b. Lack of Potential for Injury to Any Legitimate Interests 
Another factor bearing quite directly on the "reasonableness" and 
appropriateness for judicial enforcement of landlord-prescribed restric- 
tions is the extent to which such restrictions protect some legitimate 
interest of the landlord or neighboring tenants. For if there is no 
legitimate interest being protected by a stricter-than-law restriction, or 
if there is no potential for injury to any such interests, the freedom 
constraints involved in the restriction have no countervailing justifica- 
tion. 
One type of restriction which would normally seem to be unreason- 
able on this basis is a restriction on off-premises activities. The 
legitimate interest of the landlord and neighboring tenants is in the 
building, its internal environment and what goes on there. Off- 
premises activities generally have no bearing on this. Thus, if a 
landlord attempted to regulate, say, off-premises drinking or sexual 
activities, chances are good that his motivation would not be the 
protection of building-related interests but rather would be goals of a 
somewhat more general social or paternalistic nature. Were i t  not that 
residential leases are almost inevitably "adhesive" in character,342 
there might be no objection to such paternalism or social crusades on 
the part of landlords, however misguided they may be. But given the 
somewhat special leverage which landlords do have in imposing their 
philosophies of life and lifestyle on others, courts should be wary that 
341. "Necessarily" because, as previously stated, interpersonal comparisons of (actual) utility 
are impossible. Relativistic analysis (as characterized in nuisance) could not possibly adapt itself 
to take into account special concerns-of the hypersensitive or for special situations. The specter 
of testimony such as "I like big parties more than the neighbors dislike the noise from them" is 
enough to dissuade one from even considering an attempt at such adaptation. Yet, other than 
looking at people's exchanges, there is no better way to probe the subjective values which people 
"really" have. 
342. See section III(D)(l)(a) supra. 
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this leverage is not abused in promoting objectives which have nothing 
to do with the subject matter of the lease. 
An argument might be made that a few types of off-premises activity 
(e.g., drug-abuse or prostitution) have such a potential of leading to 
on-premises trouble that they are, by extension, building-related and 
hence appropriate for lease-prescribed restriction.343 However, for the 
most part, the off-premises activities of a tenant would seem to be 
beyond the scope of proper concern of a landlord or neighboring 
tenants. Accordingly, lease restrictions concerning such activities 
would be "unreasonable." 
Similarly, activities on-premises but having no spill-over effects into 
others' apartments or common areas would seem to be inappropriate 
subjects for landlord restrictions. Such activities, if they have no effect 
on anyone outside the apartment where carried on, present no threat to 
psychic tranquility or any other interest of neighboring tenants or 
(absent waste) the landlord. The same may be said of activities which 
do have some spill-over effects but which result in no 
However, if special concerns are to be protectable by agreement, care 
must be taken in determining whether in fact there is a spill-over effect 
and whether such effect causes Does prostitution carried on 
(silently) in an apartment have a spill-over effect if the neighbors are 
aware of and bothered by the reason for the comings and goings in the 
corridor? Should such activities be prohibitable by agreement?346 
One can easily conceive of many other special concerns as to which 
it is diEicult to determine whether there are spill-over effects, or 
whether such effects cause injury. Among these might be listed type of 
vocation, age, sexual orientation, current marital status, and school 
background.347 Each of these cases, though somewhat "close," might 
- - - - - - - - -- 
343. See, e.g., Campbell v. Henry Phipps Plaza S., Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 683, 356 N.Y.S.2d 
326 (1st Dep't 1974). 
344. Compare text accompanying notes 192-99 supra. 
345. For example, is a sign in the window within the landlord's "legitimaten concerns? See 
Cooley v. Bettigole, 301 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. App. 1973) (prohibition upheld). How about the fact 
that a tenant cohabits with a member of the opposite sex? See Atkisson v. Kern County Housing 
Authority, - Cal. App. 3d -, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
346. See Remedco Corp. v. Bryn Mawr Hotel Corp., 45 hlisc. 2d 586, 257 N.Y.S.2d 525 
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1965). 
347. The listed items, and several others which will be cited in this section, do not of course 
involve "activities" as such, but rather involve "status." However, the potential concerns which 
people may have about others' status (e.g., a neighbor who has been twice convicted of 
child-molesting) are basically the same as potential concerns about activities as such. The 
activities which a person is likely to engage in are very often a function of status, especially in the 
types of cases listed here. Furthermore, in terms of the impact on the psychic character of the 
intrabuilding environment, the presence of, e.g., a drug addict, may be the w e  whether or not 
he actually shoots up on the premises. But cf. 190 Stanton Inc. v. Santiago. 60 hfisc. 2d 224. 302 
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under certain circumstances, conceivably represent cases of legitimate 
concern even in the landlord-tenant context: school background in a 
building for Princeton alumni, type of vocation in a building for 
doctors and dentists, age in a building for senior citizens, current 
marital status in a building for singles, and sexual orientation in a 
building inhabited by persons who are revolted by such things. One 
may scoff a t  those who would want this sort of social inbreeding for 
themselves, but a self-righteous narrowness of sensitivity is required to 
say that all such desires are incomprehensible. Certainly they are 
building-related in the sense that they reflect concerns about matters 
affecting the intrabuilding environment. 
A number of even closer cases could be mentioned: style of dress, 
identity of guests (though not necessarily their behavior as such) and 
political leanings. In other contexts such concerns may be very un- 
derstandable and appropriate for agreement-provided protection, e.g., 
dress codes in employment, or identity of friends or political leanings 
where sensitive security problems are involved. If they do not seem to 
be legitimate concerns in the landlord-tenant context, it is only because 
i t  is hard to see, in that context, why anyone should possibly care 
about such things, even if they may be "building-related." But if the 
objectionable political leanings are neo-Nazi, and friends are fellow 
sympathizers who show up in their neo-SS regalia, it is easy to see that 
many might understandably be quite uncomfortable and concerned. 
Where do we draw the line on understandability-Nazis, Communists, 
socialists, hippies? 
What develops is a definition of legitimacy or reasonableness of 
special concerns which is based on whether or not such special 
concerns are building-related and, secondly, whether such concerns (be 
they subscribed to by the observer or not), are at least understandable. 
If understandable (in the landlord-tenant context) they should be 
eligible for protection by agreement (in that context) because their 
understandability gives countervailing justification for the freedom 
constraints which protection of the concerns entails. If not understand- 
able, there is nothing a t  all to be gained by the freedom constraint and 
hence no justification for it at Unfortunately, the spectrum of 
- - - - - -- - - 
N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). Accordingly, conduct restrictions and those related to 
status are considered comparable and have not been distinguished. 
348. Note that no mention is made of whether the benefits of protecting specid concerns me 
understandable enough to outweigh the burden of freedom constraints. That is n question of 
relative hardship which was treated in the preceding section. 
It should be observed that arguments raised in the preceding section agninst using supposed 
relative hardship as a ground for invalidity would have no application if compliance results in no 
subjective benefit at all to the "protected" class. Hence, restrictions mny be invalidated on the 
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understandable concerns runs all the way from desiderata having a 
near consensus to the paranoid yearnings of a schizophrenic. A line 
probably has to be drawn somewhere, and one would hope that the 
line between sane and insane would be the recourse of very last resort. 
The trouble is that drawing any line at all would inevitably involve a 
subjective process, and that in turn means judicial intervention in the 
norm-creation process-an invitation to the courts to substitute objec- 
tive standards for those agreed to by the parties. And this would tend 
to defeat the protection of "real" special concerns.349 
In this state of affairs, perhaps the only practicable test of the "un- 
derstandability" of a concern is the fact that someone has gone to the 
trouble of getting a protective agreement and proceeding in the courts 
to enforce it. That is at  least an indication that somebody believes that 
a valuable interest is at  stake, be it an economic asset or psychic 
tranquility. Accordingly, there should be a strong presumption that the 
concern sought to be protected is at least prima facie "legitimate." Any 
lingering doubts on legitimacy would be more appropriately directed 
towards the legitimacy (or abusiveness) of the motives for seeking 
enforcement in the particular case, i .e. ,  to whether such motives are 
building-related or, more particularly, related to the intrabuilding 
environmental character which the restriction is supposed to pro- 
t e ~ t . ~ ~ O  There will still be some tendency to limit "understandability" 
to that which or,dinary persons would understand-for the court to say 
(perhaps implicitly), "no one could possibly be concerned about that," 
as with off-premises activities, lack of spill-over effect or paranoid 
concerns of the mentally ill. However, with a presumption of validity, 
these tendencies to substitute objective values for the real values of 
those directly concerned will at least be kept in check, and such 
tendencies will thus interfere minimally with protecting the special 
concerns of the perfectly sane. 
c. Excessive Strict7zess of Standards 
The freedom constraints attendant to lease-prescribed conduct re- 
strictions tend to be very personal. Their focus is upon the private lives 
of tenants and therefore, compared with other contracts, such restric- 
tions can have an unusually extensive or "oppressive" impact on the 
overall life activities of those whose freedoms they limit. This is 
grounds that they benefit nobody even though, when they do offer some bendit, the supposed 
"relative hardship" required to achieve such benefit is an inappropriate te for invalidating 
them. 
349. See text accompanying notes 334-41 supra. 
350. See discussion of abusire motivation as a grounds for nonenforcement at notes 50 & 55 
supra and accompanying text 
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because such restrictions limit what may be done a t  home, and home 
is, in the densely interactive daily lives of many, perhaps the only 
resort of comparatively uninhibited freedom. For most, probably, it is 
the place of maximum freedom. 
Of course, lease-prescribed conduct restrictions should not be held 
ips0 facto "unreasonable" (and hence inappropriate for enforcement) 
simply because they impose stricter-than-law limitations on tenant 
freedom. All contracts restrict freedom. The protection of special 
concerns requires this. Still, because lease-prescribed conduct restric- 
tions do limit freedom at  home, constituting the perhaps ultimate 
barrier to the acting out of personality itself, particular scrutiny may 
be drawn to the character and strictness of the constraints which such 
restrictions impose. One is tempted to assume that there is a point of 
strictness beyond which stricter-than-law conduct norms should not be 
permitted to go. 
Yet, just because home may be the last resort of comparative 
uninhibitedness, it does not follow that it, any more than the job, the 
streets or business relations, should be entirely without "rules" or 
norms of behavior. For in order to enjoy "freedom" a t  home it is 
necessary to have at least some degree of cooperation from the 
neighbors. I t  is important to keep in mind the familiar paradox that 
rules are just as necessary to protect freedom as they are usable to 
destroy it; to protect some freedoms, other freedoms must inevitably be 
constrained.351 The freedom to enjoy a book, listen to quiet music or 
merely relax may require that the neighbors not be free to enjoy loud 
music. Conversely, the freedom to enjoy loud music may require that 
the neighbors not be free to relax. Thus the fact that the home is the 
last resort where people can be maximally free to act out their desires 
may argue as much for freedom constraints as it argues against them. 
Unhappily, trying to limit the strictness of lease-prescribed freedom 
constraints appears at once to be incompatible with permitting the 
protection of the special concerns which may be preconditions to the 
enjoyment of freedom. For in order to apply "excessive strictness" as a 
criterion of "unreasonableness" (and hence nonenforceability), the level 
or degree of freedom constraint must be measured, a t  least implicitly, 
against some sort of external objective standards. But measuring the 
parties' agreement against any such external standards is at odds with 
the agreement-autonomy which the protection of special concerns 
requires. 352 
351. Cf. Calabresi & Melarned, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 Haw. L. Rev. 1089, 1090-93 (1972). 
352. The level or degree of constraint is in any event highly subjective and hence not 
measurable. Compare the discussion accompanying notes 334-41 supra. Which has the greater 
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In fact, though, the protection of special concerns can be achieved 
even if unqualified autonomy is not conceded with respect to 
agreements imposing restraints on conduct. For example, the protec- 
tion of special concerns does not require the enforcement of restrictions 
on conduct where the restricted conduct would cause no injury (or 
virtually no injury) to others.3S3 Restrictions on such conduct would be 
excessively strict, and hence, "unreasonable," in the sense that their 
enforcement would result in a pointless constraint upon freedom.3s4 
The refusal to concede agreement-autonomy with respect to such 
restrictions prevents excessive strictness without interfering at all with 
the protection of special concerns. 
There is also no incompatibility between preventing excessive strict- 
ness and protecting special concerns where restrictions are struck down 
because they cannot, as legal mechanisms, serve their intended pur- 
pose. Consider for example a rule which provides: "Tenant shall make 
no noises which are audible in neighboring apartments." It is probable 
that almost everybody would like to have the protection of such a rule. 
No more shoes crashing, one after the other, on the ceiling above, no 
more shouts of interspousal discord, no more children's cartoons at  
seven o'clock on Sunday morning. But given the architectural charac- 
teristics of modern construction, few could really comply with such a 
impact on freedom, a prohibition on dogs or a prohibition on piano playing? The itnsvicr depends 
on the desires with respect to either of these on the part of the persons constrained, the intensity 
of such desires, the convenience and availability of alternatives (e.g., off-premises practice 
studios) and the like. Thus, without resort to objective notions about w h ~  "ordinary" pvsons 
desire, the level or degree of constraint cannot be estimated at all. And measuring levels af 
constraint against such objective standards gives no realistic estimate because the difference in 
people mean that any such objectively based estimates will be almost ine\.ilably wrong. Neithu 
piano playing prohibitions nor prohibitions on keeping dog ,  for example, rrould be likely to 
involve any freedom constraint on "ordinary" apartment dwellers if the majority of a p m m t  
dwellers do not do these things anyway. For a pianist or dog-lo\.er, however, such constraints 
may be almost intolerable. 
Comparative estimates of level or degree of constraint may sometimes appear possible. For 
example, a rule which prohibits practice of music instruments after 7:30 p.m. appears more 
constraining than one which prohibits such practice after 9:00 p.m. But applied to particular 
cases, when the subjectively held values of a real person are involved, the two rules may be 
practically identical in their oppression (for example, if the person in question only redly wants to 
play the piano after midnight). 
353. It has previously been observed that lack of resulting injury should be proper grounds 
for refusing to allow forfeiture for breach of a restriction (see section III(B)(Z)(c)(ii) supra) and that 
lack of injurious consequences also argues for the invalidity of the restriction itself (see text 
accompanying notes 344-46 supra). However, as was also observed in both earlier discussions. 
care must be taken in supposing that the restricted conduct causes no injury if the possibility of 
protecting speaal concerns is to be preserved. 
354. In  this sense, the "lack of potential for injury to any legitimate interests." discussed in 
the preceding section, may be considered a subdivision of "excessive strictness." 
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rule without almost impossible inconvenience. When padding to the 
refrigerator during T.V. commercials or "the tread of a woman's bare 
foot" can become a contributing cause of litigati0n,3~~ the inability of 
legal mechanisms to surmount certain physical problems becomes 
obvious. If landlords were permitted to enforce a rule as strict as the 
"no spill-over noise" rule above, the potential for random injustice 
would be as great as or greater than if stricter-than-law conduct 
restrictions were prohibited altogether. 
The problem with such a rule is not the degree to which it constrains 
freedom (though such constraint is considerable indeed). The problem 
is that it attempts to confer a protection which legal mechanisms, the 
regulation of human behavior, simply cannot provide. Occasionally, 
but seldom, this may occur because the state of technology or physical 
laws themselves prevents alleviation of the annoyance. Mostly though, 
it will occur merely because it is uneconomical (albeit theoretically 
feasible) to provide the protection. In  any event, however, even though 
we may wish to permit the hypersensitive to contract away from 
annoyance whenever possible, some things nonetheless simply must be 
endured. And the ordinary life sounds of neighboring tenants, like 
sirens in the streets and sour glances from passersby, are examples of 
these. 
Similarly, there are annoyances which are not "ordinary" in the 
sense that they are generally omnipresent in multi-tenant buildings but 
which, nevertheless, are practically unavoidable. These are the iso- 
lated, temporary occur_rences which inevitably cause bother, some- 
times considerable bother, to those in close proximity, but which 
hardly can be anticipated or prevented, let alone effectively regulated 
by contracts. Most such annoyances, such as a guest or party that 
becomes unexpectedly raucous, a family quarrel at 3:00 a.m. or a 
pervasive odor from burnt bacon, sound trivial a t  their mention, 
however great an upset they may cause others a t  the time. Nonethe- 
less, as has been previously argued,356 objective notions about what is 
a trivial annoyance would be a dangerous basis for judging what is 
subjectively important to others. And in any event, if objectionable 
conduct is isolated and temporary in character, that fact alone should 
supply a sufficient basis for holding the conduct inappropriate for 
restriction.3s7 The same may be said for acts which are accidental or 
355. Pool v. Higginson, 8 Daly 113, 117 (N.Y.C.P. 1878); see Louisinnn Lensing Co. v. 
Sokolow, 48 Misc. 2d 1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966). 
356. See text accompanying notes 339-41 supra. 
357. Cf. rules applicable to evictions for illegal uses of premises. E.g., Murphy v. Trnynor, 
110 Colo. 466, 135 P.2d 230 (1943). See also Lituchy v. Lathers, 35 Misc. 2d 556, 232 N.Y.S.2d 
627 (App. T. 1962); Di Lella v.  O'Brien, 187 Misc. 922, 68 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Albnny City Ct. 1946). 
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occur by mistake.3s8 The occasional annoyances which are inevitable 
(even if not routine) in multi-tenant buildings simply cannot be regu- 
lated or prevented by contracts. And lease restrictions which attempt 
to do so go beyond their possibilities of establishing an overall in- 
trabuilding environmental "character." Such restrictions are, therefore, 
pointlessly (and hence, excessively) strict. 
Thus, in cases where stricter-than-law restrictions attempt to al- 
leviate that which cannot be avoided, such restrictions can be invali- 
dated on grounds of excessive strictness without jeopardizing the 
protection of special concerns. In nuisance cases, courts sometimes 
express this as the "price" or "penalty" of urban life,359 the suggestion 
apparently being that those whose hypersensitivities do not permit 
them to suffer these things should not live in cities.360 The same sort of 
idea, that enduring certain annoyances is the price or penalty of urban 
living, can also be found in cases refusing to enforce lease conduct 
restrictions.361 The language of the nuisance cases can perhaps, in its 
abstractness, be applied with equal aptness in cases of excessively 
strict lease conduct norms. However, the price or penalty of city living 
exacted by the law of nuisance must be considerably higher than the 
rock bottom price or penalty which cannot be avoided even by 
contracting. For in nuisance law, which protects only the ordinarily 
sensitive, references to the price or penalty of urban life serves mainly 
to admonish the hypersensitive that the law of torts will not protect 
their needs.362 To apply that same test to lease conduct restrictions 
would mean that special concerns could not be protected even by 
contract.363 
What then is the price or penalty which cannot be avoided even by 
contract? Minimally, we have seen, it is endurance of the annoyances 
against which the legal mechanisms of contracting cannot protect. But 
what of spill-over annoyances which are not always associated with 
multi-tenant buildings of the type in question and which are ?tot 
isolated, unexpected or the result of accident, mistake or the like? 
358. Cf. relief against forfeitures given in cases of accident, fmud, mistdie or surprise. Sn. text 
accompanying notes 226-27 supra See also Note, Equitable Relief from Forfeiture of a Lease 
Incurred by Breach of Covenant, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1907). 
359. Ryan v. Steele, 6 Misc. 2d 370, 371, 163 N.Y.S.2d 471,472 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Thornburg 
v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 184, 376 P.2d 100, 103 (19621. 
360. "Pleople [who] indulge their inclination to be gregarious . . . must not expect the quiet 
that belongs to solitude." Pool v. Higginson, 8 Ddy 113, 118 (N.Y.C.P. 1878). 
361. See, e.g., Douglas L. Elliman & Co. v. Karlsen, 59 hlisc. 2d 243, 245, 295 N.Y S.td 
594, 597 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). See also Louisiana Lasing Co. v. Sokolow, 48 h k .  Zd 
1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966). 
362. See note 260 and text accompanying notes 264-75 supm. 
363. Cf. text accompanying notes 339-41 supra. 
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Examples of these might include constant dog barking, recurrent foul 
odors from "exotic" cooking, loud music played every evening or 
frequent noisy parties. Are these things (or some of them) also part of 
the price or penalty of urban life? The legal mechanism of contracting 
is capable of protecting against them. The question remains whether it 
should always be available for this purpose, whether making restric- 
tions on these things can ever be "excessive." 
The question is one of public policy and will be examined in the next 
section. 
d. Public Policy Conflicts 
Those who choose to live where population density is high (suburbs, 
cities, or multi-tenant buildings) must expect to have more encoun- 
ters, including personally unpleasant encounters, than those who live 
in a "sylvan glen."364 However, i t  has been herein suggested that, at 
least as to the home environment, the frequency of unpleasant encoun- 
ters to a very considerable extent can and ought to be reducible by 
agreements, that patterns of lease restrictions can offer city dwellers 
considerable insulation from subjectively perceived unpleasantness. 
But even though agreements can provide protection from neighbor 
annoyances somewhat comparable to rural isolation, the question 
remains whether agreements which attempt to do so should in all 
instances be legally permitted. The question is whether the price or 
penalty of urban living does not include the enduring of certain types 
of annoyances which, though excludable by agreements, should as a 
policy matter be borne nonetheless. 
Clearly, there are some public policies which will always outweigh 
any possible interest of individuals to enforce isolation from that which 
they do not like. The policy against discrimination based upon race, 
color or national origin36S is an obvious example. A racial bigot may be 
described as a person whose special concern is to live in a building 
which excludes members of certain racial groups. Yet, for reasons 
unrelated to the policies in favor of contract enforcement, freedom of 
association (or disassociation), autonomy in the disposition of property 
and the like, there is a public policy against countenancing the sort of 
self-segregation which such bigots may desire. 
In a different vein, the public policy against monopolization and 
restraints on trade may outweigh the interest in protecting a special 
364. Louisiana Leasing Co. v.  Sokolow, 48 Misc. 2d 1014, 1015-16, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966), citing Twin Elm Management Corp. v. Banks, 181 Misc. 96, 97, 46 
N.Y.S.2d 952, 953 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1943); see cases cited in notes 360-61 supm. 
365. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 8 3604 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. F, 3604 (Supp. IV, 1973); 
N.Y. Exec. Law F, 296 (McKinney Supp. 1975). 
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concern such as, say, keeping salesmen out of the premises.366 Con- 
ceivably, the policies favoring freedom of expression,367 of association 
or of political leanings368 may outweigh any concerns which underlie 
lease-contained conduct restrictions limiting the exercise of these free- 
d o m ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Other potential public policy conflicts are more problematical. Con- 
sider, for example, restrictions on having children, on changing mari- 
tal status or on age. A restriction against children living in a building 
has been upheld,370 and it is realistic to assume that people who are 
not interested in children may wish to self-segregate into buildings 
where no children are allowed. On the other hand, several states have 
statutes prohibiting restrictions on children."l And as a policy matter, 
allowing landlords to ccpenaliie" tenants or prospective tenants with 
children seems, to say the least, hard. Similar are restrictions on 
changing one's marital status. To allow lease provisions discouraging 
marriage is to permit a fairly drastic interference with a very personal 
matter, and it incidently is also inconsistent with a longstanding 
(though perhaps waning) common law On the other hand, 
should singles not be permitted to self-segregate into buildings catering 
to singles? Or the elderly into buildings reserved esclusively for the 
elderly? 
Even the clearly transcendent policies, can present doubts. Prohi- 
bitions on religious discrimination can make it impossible for reclusive 
sects to isolate themselves and their children from the perhaps much 
despised ways and temptations of nonbelievers.373 Immigrants of like 
366. See Southland Dev. Co. v. Ehrler's Dairy, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. 1971) (regulation 
under lease); Thousand Island Park Ass'n v. Tucker, 173 N.Y. 203, 65 N.E. 975 (1903); Jhgle 
Spring ~ a t e r ' C o .  v. Webb & Knapp, Inc., 236 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
367. But d. Aluli v. Trusdell, 54 Hawaii 417, 508 P.2d 1217, cert. denied, 414 U.S. l a 0  
(1973), indicating that a landlord's interference with a tenant's free expression v:ould not 
constitute an unconstitutional deprivation, even if the landlord resorted to the courts to effectuate 
an eviction for such purpose. 
368. Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976) (non-civil service public employee -not bt 
discriminated against on basis of political leanings). 
369. But cf. Ginsberg v. Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 45 App. Div. 2d 334.339.358 N.Y.S.2d 
477, 483 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd mem., 36 N.Y.2d 706, 325 N.E.2d 876, 366 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1975) 
("Should the plaintiffs and others who bought in reliance on the restrictive covenant be helpless to 
protect themselves?"). 
370. Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946). 
371. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., 5 33-303 (1956); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 6503 (1974); Ill. 
Ann. Stat. ch. 80, 55 37, 38 (Smith-Hurd 1966); id. 8 38 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. 
Real Prop. Law 5 237 (McKinney 1968). 
372. See 6 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, 5s 27.12-.17; 6 Powell, supra note 24, 6 853. 
373. A transcendent policy such as "right of privacy" may make it impossible for families to 
isolate their children from conduct which is (in traditional terms) apparently immoral. See 
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national origin may prefer to congregate where they will be among 
people who share their customs, language and heritage. Laws prohibit- 
ing discrimination based on national origin prevent this, and perhaps 
self-segregation of this type is bad. But in any case, the anti- 
ghettoization laws which promote assimilation (and, in one sense, 
equality) do so at the expense of immigrant ethnic heritages and with 
the implication that such heritages are subequal to the prevailing 
American lifestyle which supplants them. 
It is not the point to reargue the desirability or undesirability of 
policies which may or do exist in relation to any of these. The public 
policies against racial or religious discrimination have been established 
after taking into account, hopefully, all of the considerations men- 
tioned above and many others. Living with them is part of the price or 
penalty of urban life. The point is that courts should be chai-y about 
creating new public policies, ad hoc, as a basis for invalidating lease 
restrictions which they happen not to like. In particular, the creation 
of policies, however formulated, prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of lifestyle are questionable since the protection of special con- 
cerns is, by and large, the protection from the offensiveness which 
others' lifestyles can entail. As already stated, such concerns are 
matters of importance to many, and people do act upon and try to 
achieve protection for them. Accordingly, in the absence of some 
clearly more compelling contravening interest, the law should inter- 
vene supportively to harmonize the interchanges in which such protec- 
tion is sought rather than leaving the entire area to the vagaries of 
self-help.374 
Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority, - Cal. App. 3d -, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1976) (invalidated landlord prohibition on cohabitation by unmarried members of the 
opposite sex). 
374. The implication of the textual discussion is that some forms of discrimination are proper 
subjects of public policy prohibitions (e.g., discrimination on the basis of race or religion) while 
others (e.g., discrimination on the basis of activities or lifestyle) are not. The difficult question 
may be posed as to whether there exists any principle for distinguishing improper kinds of 
discrimination from "legitimate" discrimination and, indeed, as to whether the law should permit 
any discrimination at  all in association or proximity relations. 
The very fact that people perceive definite psychic benefits in being able to select whom they 
will be near (as discussed in text accompanying notes 283-84 supra) suggests the inappropriateness 
of a policy which prohibits all discrimination in association. Basic notions of freedom would seem 
to require a t  least an official attitude of laissez-faire in this regard. The further step of actunlly 
lending the state's assistance to exercises of this freedom may also be necessary if the freedom is to 
have any meaning. I t  is probably true that informal pressures, self-help and the like, rue usually 
adequate to preserve the proximity groupings into which people voluntarily distribute themselves. 
But even given the usual efficacy of extra-legal measures to preserve voluntary proximity 
patterns, the further step of state assistance may be nonetheless desirable to (i) reduce the 
possibility of breaches of the peace which can result from informal pressures or self-help, and (ii) 
protect against aberrational and randomly "unfair" intrusions which will inevitably occur. 
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Lastly, attention is turned to the question left open in the preceding 
section; namely, how should the law deal rvith recurring or continuous 
annoyances which are ?tot inevitable concomitants of urban or multi- 
tenant building life. These are, broadly speaking, the lifestyle or life 
activities annoyances which are bottomed in basic personality or 
interests incompatibilities and which, it  is argued, ought usually to be 
avoidable by agreements aimed at  the protection of special concerns. 
Already mentioned examples include constant dog barking, recurrent 
foul cooking odors, loud music played regularly or frequent noisy 
parties. Other examples could be named, such as nightly piano or horn 
practice or mischievous, uncontrolled children, until the entire range of 
noncontainable activities and life variations were exhausted. 
If lease restrictions aimed at  these kinds of annoyances are to be 
limited, it must be on the basis of some public policy which outweighs 
the enforcement of the agreement-based protections which are 
involved. Unlike the cases of, say, racially discriminatory or 
monopolizing lease restrictions, the annoyances considered here are not 
protected by any specific, articulable public policies; there is, for 
example, no known public policy which specially favors the keeping of 
dogs.375 And, as already indicated, the law should be careful about 
The real question is when should the state refuse to assist in the private selection of neighbors. 
associates and the like, even to the point of imposing certain associations or proximity relation- 
ships. A general answer which accounts for all wses may be impossible, even within the 
comparatively narrow context of lease restrictions. One possibility, however, is that discrimim- 
tion should be unlawful (and hence opposed by the state) when baed  on immutable pusonid 
characteristics such as race, color or national origin. Religion is not immutable in the same sense 
as race, but the policy of permitting free religious exercise may support trmting religion on the 
same basis as race (whereas, for example, sexual orientation, which may be immutable only in the 
sense that religion is, would not necessarily receive the same policy protection). But d. G i n s b y  
v. Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 45 App. Div. Zd 334, 339, 358 N.Y.S.Zd 477, 483 (Zd Dep't 
1974), aff'd mem., 36 N.Y.2d 706, 325 N.E.Zd 876, 366 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1975). On the other 
hand, characteristics such as lifestyle, which are not immutable, and tvhich at least can be 
accommodated to the sensitivities of others, would not be indicatrd for special protection as a 
matter of policy. People whose lifestyle or activities are annoying to others should expect either to 
accommodate themselves to others' sensitivities or to be discriiimtcd against by others who wish 
to keep their distance. 
Finally, in passing, it should be noted that the "irrationality" of the discrimination is not 
mentioned as a basis for making it unlawful. This is on the mumption that it is alwa)-s "rational" 
to discriminate against that which is not liked. However, even if rational, discrimination may be 
appropriately prohibited if the social cost-for example, the cost in dignity to those having certain 
immutable characteristics-is too high. See text accompanying notes 383-88 infn 
As hereinafter discussed, intolerably high social cost or detriment would seem itself to be ;m 
appropriate basis for invalidating restrictions, and invalidating restrictions hued on immutable 
characteristics would thus only be a subdivision of the more general "social cost or detriment" 
basis. Id. 
375. Apart from pure personal freedom considerations, the right to keep a dog for purposes of 
personal security may be argued. See East River Housing Corp. v. hiatonis, 34 App. Div. Zd 
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creating new specific objects of favored policy protection. Hence the 
question is whether there are any general policies which argue for the 
invalidation of lease-prescribed restrictions on activities, conduct or 
the like. Two possible such general policies have already been dis- 
cussed, v i z . ,  the policy against enforcing adhesive contracts376 and the 
relative hardship grounds of not enforcing agreements;377 both have 
been seen to be' unlikely as appropriate bases for nonenforcement. 
Another general policy which is a t  least conceivable would be a 
policy which disfavors private constraints on freedom generally, or on 
the use of land in particular. A policy disfavoring constraints on 
freedom in general would effectively be, in this context, a policy 
against the enforcement of contracts, and as such i t  probably does not 
exist. On the other hand, a policy disfavoring transferor-imposed 
constraints on the free use of land has traditionally received recogni- 
tion at common This is a special case where the general policy 
favoring the enforcement of contracts may be outweighed by other 
factors. As was pointed out at the beginning of this Article, the 
antagonism towards transferor-imposed land use controls arose a t  a 
time when such controls were usually for the benefit of the transferor 
only and when an abundance of under-used land made restrictions on 
development and use socially undesirable.379 The question which now 
arises is whether such disfavor would still be appropriate in cases 
where the direct beneficiaries of the controls are the restricted 
transferee-possessors themselves and a t  a time when use controls in 
general are regarded as almost essential to maximizing the overall 
usefulness of society's real property assets. 
It has already been seen that utter freedom for any one possessor 
means restricted freedom for others; the spill-over effects of one 
possessor's activities place limits on the activities of others.380 Thus, if 
the law is hostile to positive constraints on the freedom of one 
possessor, it does not necessarily promote freedom thereby; it merely 
exalts the freedom of one over the freedom of his neighbor~.~Bl Nor 
937, 312 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 27 N.Y.2d 931, 266 N.E.2d 825, 318 N.Y.S.2d 
146 (1970) (prohibition upheld). 
376. See section III(D)(l)(a) supra. 
377. See section III(D)(2)(a) supra. 
378. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text. 
379. See note 11 supra. 
380. See notes 9, 10, 46 & 351 supra and accompanying text. 
381. The result may be a net gain or a net loss in the overall freedom to benefit from the use 
of land or space. I t  is impossible to say which i t  is without comparing the subjectively held values 
of the persons involved. Cf. note 352 supra. However, because such interpersonal comparison is 
estimable only by looking at an exchange agreement among the parties in question (see text 
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does the fact that residential lease restrictions reduce behavioral free- 
dom at home supply justification for their nonenforcement. Nonen- 
forcement itself also may constrain activities at  home, viz., the ac- 
tivities of the neighbors in their homes.382 Accordingly, in cases where 
use restrictions benefit the transferee-possessors, the reasons which 
may otherwise exist for treating such restrictions "specially" are not 
present. Hence, they should be treated like any other contractual 
undertakings; that is to say, they should usually be enforced. 
There remains, however, one possible general policy basis upon 
which lease contained conduct restrictions may sometimes properly be 
questioned and invalidated. Such restrictions should not be enforced if 
their enforcement would exact an intolerable social cost or detriment. 
Some very obvious instances of intolerable social cost or detriment 
have already been mentioned, viz., the costs which would be involved 
in the enforcement of restrictions based on race or religion, where the 
public policy conflict is clear.383 In jurisdictions which prohibit restric- 
tions on children,384 the social costs of discouraging people from 
bearing children or the social detriment of hindering families with 
children in their search for suitable housing may be considered to be 
intolerable. Other, more difficult, cases can be mentioned. For esam- 
ple, prohibitions on practicing musical instruments may involve an 
intolerable social detriment if the result is to make it difficult or 
impossible for the musically talented to attain proficiency. Courts have 
struck down such home practice prohibitions on just this basis.38J 
I t  should be noted that, in holding restrictions invalid because of 
their social cost or detriment, an analysis akin to that of relative 
hardship is required.386 The social cost or detriment of requiring 
compliance must, in effect, be measured against the personal (and 
perhaps social) benefits which would result from compliance. How- 
accompanying notes 329-41, 352 supra), the existence of restrictions (i.e., such an exchange 
agreement) would itself usually indicate that the enforcement thereof t n U  result in a nct @in. 
382. See text accompanying note 351 supra. See also notes 9, 10 & 46 s u p n  and accompmy- 
ing text. 
383. See text accompanying note 365 supra. 
384. See note 371 supra and accompanying text. 
385. Justice Court hlut. Housing Cooperative, Inc. v. Sandow, 50 bGsct 2d 541, 270 
N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Douglas E. Elliman & Co. v. Knrlsen, 59 blisc. 2d 243, 245, 29s 
N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). Before it is decided that the social cost or 
detriment of a prohibition is intolerable, consideration ought to be given to all of the alternatives. 
For example, a prohibition on music practice a t  home may not involve intolerable social cost if 
practice studios, the use of which bothers no third parties, are r e d k t i d y  avvail&le. In the two 
cited cases, no mention of this rather obvious solution was made. But cf. O'Connor v. Inhm 
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct.), in 168 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 1972, a t  17, col. 5. 
386. See section lII(D)(2)(a) supra. 
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ever, the major objection to invalidating restrictions on relative hard- 
ship grounds (that subjective or "real" relative hardship is unknowable 
except as evidenced by the parties' exchange agreemenP7) is inappro- 
priate here. For the social costs or detriments of compliance are 
"objectively" known, a t  least in the sense that it is the court's and 
legislature's function to make such determinations in formulating 
public policy. The court or legislature can quite properly conclude that 
such social costs or detriments outweigh any subjective personal 
benefits which particular restrictions may provide.388 
In summary, contravention of public policy is an appropriate basis 
for invalidating restrictions whenever the restrictions are inimical to 
some recognized defined policy and, more generally, whenever the 
court concludes that the social costs or detriments (meaning usually the 
external costs) of enforcing the restriction are intolerably high. In such 
cases, the discomfitures which such restrictions are intended to protect 
against may be said to be a part of the price or penalty of choosing to 
live near others, even though they may theoretically be avoidable by 
agreements. However, in the absence of such defined public policies or 
high social costs or detriments, the parties' agreement-autonomy 
should be preserved, and the restrictions protective of special concerns 
should be enforced.389 
387. See notes 329-41 supra and accompanying text. 
388. Of course, the social costs or detriments will include the personal costs or detriments 
experienced by those subject to the particular restriction. For example, a prohibition on piano 
practice a t  home tends to deprive society of accomplished musicians (an external cost) but also 
deprives the potential pianist of .the pleasure, acclaim, profits and other benefits of virtuosity. 
However, such personal costs or detriments should usually be irrelevant to the public policy 
validity of the restriction; as purely personal costs and detriments, they should be properly 
compared only against the personal benefits which the restriction provides to the persons 
protected by it (and such a comparison can be made, as previously shown, only by reference to 
exchange agreements among the parties (see section III(D)(2)(a) supra)). Thus, widesprcnd 
prohibitions on loud recorded music may result in many unhappy listeners, and the sum of thelr 
personal detriments may be a considerable "social" detriment. However, the absence of such 
prohibitions may result in a lot of unhappy neighbors, also a considerable social detriment. For 
the courts to invalidate the restrictions in such cases would be subject to the objections posed in 
section III(D)(2)(a) since the "social" detriments and "social" benefits are really only the sums of 
the personal detriments and benefits which contracts cause to the contracting parties. 
The one exceptional kind of case, where personal costs or detriments are properly taken into 
account, is that where the detriment is of a type or magnitude that the contract should not be 
countenanced even if no one but the contracting parties are adversely affected. Lease restrictions 
imposing such detriments are a little hard to imagine outside perhaps of restrictions based on rncc 
or religion or other well-known articulated public policies, usually involving (to borrow from fifth 
and fourteenth amendment nomenclature) "fundamental rights." 
389. Cf. the several apparently frivolous conditions cited in Scott, Control of Property by t l~c  
Dead, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 527, 535-37 (1917). I t  was observed that "[aJthough conditions like these 
may be arbitrary, or even foolish, they are not contrary to any public policy." Id. at 537 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
An attempt has been made to describe and evaluate justifications for 
allowing landlords the legal power to exert control over tenant behav- 
ior. 
Not only does the landlord's direct interest in his proper@ offer 
justification for such control powers. More importantly, the control 
may be justified by the interest which the preponderance of tenants 
have in the conditions or "character" of the buildings in which they 
live. Because such conditions or character may be significantly affected 
by the spill-over effects of tenant activities, landlord control of such 
activities is, essentially, a form of private environmental regulation. 
By permitting such intrabuilding environmental regulation to be effec- 
tuated privately, the law can promote (or at least not stifle) the variety 
of intrabuilding environments which corresponds to the varied tastes 
and needs of different people. It permits the protection of special 
concerns so that, in addition to protecting the preponderance of a 
building's tenants from aberrational acts, landlord control of tenant 
conduct can also protect the needs of idiosyncratic or hypersensitive 
individuals. 
The landlord's law-conferred power to control tenant behavior (and 
the intrabuilding environmental characteristics) is comparatively 
slight. Accordingly, provisions in leases are generally necessary in 
order for landlords to have such power of control. Furthermore. lease 
provisions may also be desirable (and are frequently or even usually 
included) to give a remedy (forfeiture) which the law does not provide 
and to simplify the proof of "objectionability." The latter is achieved 
by setting out in the lease formulations of conduct norms which are 
more susceptible to proof than the relativistic standards of tort law. 
Both of these drafting objectives commend themselves to judicial 
support. The forfeiture remedy may well be, in the conduct restriction 
context, the only really effective remedy since only it offers any 
assurance of relief from long-term arrangements which have gone sour. 
In any case, powers of forfeiture should not (as applied to conduct 
restrictions) be regarded as merely a "security" or a penalty. Forfeiture 
is a bargained-for contract alternative, to put the parties back where 
they were when the lease was still prospective and its mutual desirabil- 
ity could still, at  best, only be guessed at. I t  allows the landlord to 
rectify mistakes which the majority of his tenants may find intolerable 
to live with. Likewise, the goal of providing clearer formulations of 
conduct standards deserves judicial support not only because clearer 
standards simplify proof in litigation but, even more importantly, 
because reducing the doubt in litigation may eliminate the need for 
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resort to the courts entirely. Nonjudicial settlements would be thereby 
facilitated. 
Finally, landlords may wish to prescribe stricter-than-law conduct 
standards in order to protect special concerns which are not so 
commonly shared as to justify the attention of the legislative or judicial 
lawmakers. Such special concerns-of the idiosyncratic or the 
hypersensitive-are not protected by the law of nuisance or other tort 
law; but since they are nonetheless real and presumably sought after, 
efforts to protect them by agreement should (like the subject matter of 
most contracts) receive the support of the courts. They should not be 
left, by an attitude of hostility, to extra-legal solutions, such as 
self-help. However, because the "contract of adhesion" nature of leases 
means the landlord is in a somewhat special position to impose his life 
philosophy on tenants, courts should exercise some supervision to 
assure that the power to protect special concerns is not abused. 
Although relative hardship is a specious basis for invalidating attempts 
to protect special concerns, other appropriate bases for invalidation 
(e.g., lack of legitimate concern, futility of the restriction or "public 
policy" conflict) may appear. Apart from these types of cases, how- 
ever, landlords' attempts to provide specially protected environments 
for their tenants should be valid and enforced. For it is only through 
such enforcement that the pluralistic rental market can provide the 
maximum contentment to the maximum number of residential tenants. 
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